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EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY INFANTRY BATTALION: 1939-1968

by

Virgil Ney

October 1968

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

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by


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ABSTRACT

The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several thousand years; its American ancestors may be found in the units organized during the American Revolution. The modern infantry battalion in the United States Army began in the period just prior to World War II. The battalion was forged and tested on the battlefields of Europe and in the Pacific Area. Nuclear weapons, the Korean War, and the Cold War have exerted considerable influence on the size, composition, and weaponry of the present-day infantry battalion. The adaptation of the World War II armored division organization to the ROAD division has given the infantry battalion of the United States Army the highest fire and movement capability it has ever possessed in our military history. The advent of the helicopter and its application to troop carrier and fire support missions enables the infantry battalion to become highly air mobile.



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SUMMARY

The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several centuries. Prior historical eras produced the ancient equivalents of the military formation which became known as the battalion. In the United States Army, the battalion first emerged in the American Revolutionary Army under the command of General George Washington.

The modern United States infantry battalion may be dated from the period of 1939-1945.

The Korean War period began with the infantry battalion much the same organization it had been in World War II. Heavier weaponry, better small-unit (squad) organization and training were noted in the infantry battalion of 1950-1953. Aside from the missions of conventional warfare, the infantry battalion was faced with operational requirements for possible nuclear warfare. The "flexible response" was a doctrinal approach toward establishment of an infantry unit which could function in response to the requirements of conventional or nuclear war or any other land combat mission. The battle group of the 1960's eliminated the regiment permanently and the battalion temporarily from the Army for a brief period of time. The battle group was abandoned primarily because of its assumed poor capability of response to low-intensity, nonconventional warfare. The infantry battalion was returned to the Army as the basic building block for the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) program of creating streamlined, combat units which would be responsive to all types of 20th century warfare.

In the mid-1960's the trend toward air mobility of the infantry battalion, other than airborne troops, was evidenced in the experimental tests conducted at Fort Benning with a view toward an airmobile division. These tests culminated in the activation of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and its deployment to Vietnam where it has already earned a citation for distinguished combat service.

The infantry battalion has evolved, over the years, into an essential element of our combat forces. Vietnam is the proving ground for establishing its efficacy in a limited, low-intensity type of warfare. What it does there will portend what it will be, and what it can do, in the near and distant future.

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EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY INFANTRY BATTALION: 1939-1968

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - 1775-1940

On the 14th of June 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the formation of ten companies of riflemen which were to be raised in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. The six companies from Pennsylvania were organized as William Thompson's Rifle Battalion. Historically, Colonel Thompson's Battalion was the first rifle battalion in the Continental Army and, as such, the lineal ancestor of all infantry rifle battalions of the United States Army. At this early date in American military history, it should be noted that the term "battalion" was often interchangeable with the term "regiment" (Ref 1).

By December 1775 there were forty-nine infantry battalions (or regiments, for the two terms were virtually synonymous) and several unattached companies in the establishment. (Ref 1,p 2)

British and American forces were organized in similar fashion. In the English regiment there were ten companies. Eight of these companies were termed the "battalion companies" and the remaining two the flank or "elite" companies. Of these two flank units, one was designated as the "grenadier company" and only the best men were assigned to it. Often these grenadier companies were detached from their parent regiments and consolidated into provisional grenadier battalions for difficult assignments and dangerous posts on the battle line. Another interesting development in the British Army battalion was the designation also of the tenth company as a "light company." Like the grenadier units, they could be consolidated into battalions for provisional service as scouting, screening, and harassing units with the mission of moving in advance of the regular line of battle. The riflemen, under such skilled commanders as Daniel Morgan, carried out the same missions for the Americans (Ref 1).

The following extract is significant because it shows the first official recognition of the value of "light infantry" in the early American military organization. This recognition has persisted in every war in which the United States has engaged.

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At first there was no counterpart to flank companies in the Continental Infantry. Beginning in August 1777, however, General Washington directed that 108 men and 9 officers be drawn from each brigade and formed into a temporary Corps of Light Infantry. When winter came this corps was disbanded; but it had proved so useful that Washington urged Congress to authorize one light company for each battalion to be formed into a separate corps, during every campaign thereafter. It was with the Light Corps, which resulted, that Anthony Wayne stormed Stony Point 15 July 1779, in the most celebrated night attack made by Americans during the Revolution. (Ref 1, p 6)¹

Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, as the volunteer Inspector General and Drillmaster of the Continental Army at Valley Forge, exerted great influence upon the organization and tactical training of the Continental Army. His Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States was such an important contribution to the military art that some of its features may still be seen in the United States Army of today. General von Steuben's reorganization of battalions and companies into standardized units and his instructions for their commanders brought order out of the military chaos at Valley Forge and success to American arms (Ref 2).

It is of further interest to note that, after 1777, regiments in the Continental Army were authorized a strength of 728 officers and men, with each company containing 78 enlisted men. These strengths were greater than the British counterpart units which totalled 477 and 38, respectively. While American unit strengths were greater than the British, General Washington was forced to reorganize and consolidate units after every campaign due to battle losses and the uncertainty of the militia recruiting system then in vogue. At the surrender at Yorktown, 18 October 1781, the Continental Army contained a total of sixty battalions of infantry. With the end of the war and the ratification of the peace terms in 1783, the Army and its battalions was steadily reduced until by 2 June 1784 there were only 80 artillerymen left on duty guarding military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. At this point in the Army's history there were no battalions in existence! (Ref 1).

In the interim between the American Revolution and the War of 1812, the infantry of the United States Army underwent innumerable crises. The regiment, with its battalions much the same as in the Revolution, proved unwieldy and unsuccessful in its early Indian campaigns (c. 1790) against the Miami Indians in Ohio. The disastrous experience with the Miamis resulted in a drastic reorganization of the minuscule Army.

¹ A brigade generally consisted of two infantry regiments with supporting artillery.

The entire military establishment was converted in 1792 into a legion, that is into a field army in which the three combat branches, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were combined in the same organization. The element of the Legion in which they were combined was known as a Sublegion, of which there were four. Each sublegion contained infantry, riflemen, cavalry, and artillery; indeed it was the forerunner of the modern regimental combat team. (Ref 1, p 9)

The sublegion was not only the forerunner of the regimental combat team of World War II, but it must be considered an ancestor of the battle group instituted in the post-World War II search for a suitable unit for nuclear and/or conventional combat in the atomic age. In 1796 the legion was legislated out of existence by Congress as it had not proved successful in the field against the Indians. Like the battle group of over a century later, the legion was an experimental search for a flexible combat formation to meet all requirements.

The period before the War of 1812 was a time of drought for the infantry. At one point in 1802 there were only two infantry regiments in service. British aggressive acts caused the Congress in 1808 to increase the Regular Army by five infantry regiments and to reactivate the regiment of riflemen. By 1812, Congress had authorized the largest regiments and battalions seen up to that time in the United States (Ref 1).

Second, it established an organization that was at variance with the seven existing regiments. As a result, in the first six months of 1812, there were three different-sized infantry regiments, besides one of riflemen. The 1st and 2d Regiments made up the infantry of the "military peace establishment," and they had ten companies of seventy-six enlisted men. The 3d through 7th Regiments, authorized in 1808, were called the infantry of the "additional force," and comprised ten companies with two more officers and two more enlisted men than the 1st and 2d had. The 8th through 17th in no way resembled the others, for they had 18 companies of 110 enlisted men, arranged in two battalions.

In June 1812...there...were to be twenty-five regiments of infantry, exclusive of the rifle regiment, each containing ten companies of 102 men. Thus all the infantry regiments were made uniform on paper, and a standard of organization established that persisted throughout the conflict. (Ref 1, pp 10-11)

After the War of 1812 the forty-six infantry regiments and four rifle regiments were reorganized, consolidated, and reduced to eight infantry regiments and one rifle regiment. Each infantry regiment had ten companies, each with a reduced strength of seventy-eight men. In 1821

Congress reduced the size of the companies to 51 enlisted men. At the same time, Congress deactivated the rifle regiment and the 8th Infantry (Ref 1).

The Seminole War (1836-1842) had some effect upon the organization of the infantry of the Regular Army. By 1838, an additional thirty-eight privates and one sergeant were added to each infantry company and another Eighth Infantry Regiment was formed. Threat of war with Mexico brought forth official permission to increase each infantry company to a strength of 100 enlisted men. The regiment comprised ten companies — with the designations "regiment" and "battalion" interchangeable. The companies were lettered after 1816, instead of being numbered or named after their captains, although the naming practice persisted until after the Civil War (Ref 1).

In the War with Mexico, light battalions of Regulars were often formed for specific missions by temporarily detaching companies — not necessarily the flank ones — from different regiments. Composite battalions of this sort usually did not do as well in battle as established ones, in which the men and officers understood each other, and regimental pride was an active stimulant. There was, however, more distinction between flank and line in the volunteer regiments. Two companies out of ten were specifically organized as light and were given a choice between rifles and muskets. The flank rifle companies which resulted were often detached from their regiments and used together for special sharpshooting assignments. (Ref 1, p 15)

Improvements in weapons, notably the invention of the expanding base lead bullet by Captain Minié of the French Army and development of the experimental breech-loaders, increased the accuracy and lethality of infantry shoulder weapons. This factor caused all infantrymen to become light infantrymen or "skirmishers" -- all were required to function as the flank companies of historic fame.

In answer to President Lincoln's call for troops, the War Department on 4 May 1861 prescribed the organization and strength of the regiments to be formed. The volunteer regiments, furnished by the States, were patterned after the Regular Army units of the period. Briefly, each infantry regiment was composed of ten companies. Each company comprised a captain, a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, a first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, one wagoner, and from sixty-four to eighty-two privates. The minimum strength of the regiment was 869 officers and men; maximum strength was 1046. The regimental staff consisted of the colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a surgeon, two assistant surgeons, a chaplain, three sergeants (sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, commissary sergeant), a hospital steward, two principal musicians, and a band of twenty-four members. The latter organization was not usually retained by the regiment. Following the old tactical patterns, the regiment could be

handled in combat either as two battalions, commanded by the lieutenant colonel and major, respectively, or as a single battalion. The cavalry regiment consisted of six squadrons (battalions) of two companies (troops) each.

The European influence upon American military organization was particularly strong during the Civil War in the areas of organization and tactical doctrine. Weigley explains this by noting that

In European armies the organization of the regiment into several battalions was growing in favor in the middle nineteenth century, since it made for greater tactical flexibility and permitted the detachment of battalions for recruiting duty. The nine new Regular infantry regiments which were called for on May 4, 1861, reflected this tendency. They were to be composed of two or more battalions each, of eight companies to the battalion. Each of them was to have the three majors appropriate to three battalions. Also reflecting European practice, each of them was assigned to a geographical region from which it was to recruit. But these regiments, the 11th through the 19th, failed to reach full strength, because recruits perferred the looser discipline and higher bounties of the volunteers. At Gettysburg none of the Regular regiments represented had more than eight companies present. When the war ended, the new Regular regiments were reorganized to the conventional one-battalion pattern. (Ref 3, pp 226-

It is of interest to note that the Army of The Confederate States followed generally the patterns of organization established by the Federal Army except that all regiments in the Confederate service contained ten companies. Each company was authorized a minimum of 64 and a maximum of 125 private soldiers. Infantry regiments numbered about 642; in addition, there were 9 legions, 163 battalions, and 62 companies unattached to regiments (see Fig. 1).

In 1866, the post-Civil War United States Regular Army was authorized forty-five regiments of infantry. The regiment, now no longer the three-battalion type, was established as the traditional prewar, tencompany unit, with regiment and battalion one and the same (Ref 1).

From 1866 to 1890, the infantry of the Regular Army underwent a number of changes in organization. By 1876, because of an economic depression and government retrenchment, the strength of a company dropped to a low of thirty-seven men. After the Custer massacre in June 1876, the infantry strength was reduced by 5,000 men and the cavalry increased by 2,500. With a lessened need for troops on the western frontier, a further reduction in 1890 eliminated two companies, I and K, from each of the twenty-five authorized regiments. The remaining two hundred companies each contained one sergeant and four corporals less than before and a total of forty-six privates (Ref 1).




Figure 1. Chart of Civil War Army Organization Source: Civil War Centennial Commission

The improvement of weapons, especially in breechloading small arms and artillery, caused the military thinkers of the 1890's to consider the need for dispersion on the battlefield, and its direct effect upon the control of the troops by the commander. It was believed by these authorities that no man could control ten companies (the regimental organization) in combat. A three-battalion regiment (four companies each) was urged by the Secretary of War in 1890 (Ref 1).

In 1898, the United States entered war with Spain. The three-battalion infantry regiments previously suggested by the professionals of the Regular Army were adopted. Companies were increased from 50 to a total of 106 enlisted men. The battalion contained 424 men, and the regiment, with addition of noncommissioned staff, consisted of 1309 enlisted men. The following extract describes the role of the battalion in the US Army after the Spanish-American War:

The organization of infantry regiments into three battalions of four companies each -- finally brought about by the War with Spain -- persisted as a permanent alteration. With this, it is interesting to note, the Army had returned to the regimental organization used from 1790 to 1792. This 100-year reversion, however, did not arise from a study of the earlier period -- rather it sprang from the experience of the Civil War, coupled with that of the later wars in Europe. As we have seen, this experience had demonstrated that the old regiments were far too big to be effectively controlled in battle. As long as the system in which battalion and regiment were one and the same was followed, the regiment was a fighting subdivision in the line of battle. On the other hand, in the shift to more modern practice which the infantry was making, the battalion was a fighting subdivision while a regiment exercised administrative control over three of them. The fault in the shift was that the American battalion was too small to perform its work. This may be illustrated by comparing the new organization with those in Europe. The French and Prussian infantries both used regiments of three battalions, but the battalions were far larger.. The Prussians had 1,000 enlisted men in theirs, the French had close to 700, while we had no more than 425. (Ref 1, pp 30-31)

The World War I US infantry regiment was organized to include three battalions and a regimental machinegun company. The battalion comprised four companies of 6 officers and 250 men each. The regimental strength was 112 officers and 3,720 enlisted men (Ref 3).

By July 1917, the number of machinegun companies in the regiment had been increased optimistically to one per battalion but this could not be continued, by terms of the National Defense Act of 1916, without eliminating rifle companies from the battalions. The solution was to

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create separate machinegun battalions and to leave one machinegun company in the regiment. The machinegun battalions were: brigade (three companies); and division (four companies) which was eventually reduced to two companies and motorized. Under this organization, the machinegun battalion elements could be attached to and detached from attacking or defending units as required.

Major General David W. Gray, Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command has commented, in detail, upon the organization of the infantry at all levels. Of especial interest is his evaluation of the changes wrought in the infantry which is quoted below:

The 1918 organization of the division had undergone considerable change from that of 1914. The three brigades of three regiments each had been reduced to two brigades of two regiments each (the so-called "square division"). Each regiment still had three battalions of four companies each, but the rifle companies now had four platoons instead of two. Each platoon had two sections of three squads each, giving the division 1,132 squads, or about 50 more than the infantry was the addition of a light mortar and 37-mm gun platoon in the regimental headquarters company and a machine-gun battalion in the division.

To support the infantry advance, 37-mm guns, threeinch mortars and machine guns from the regiment and brigade were usually attached to the battalion. Clearly then the basic element of fire support became the battalion. Thus the battalion commander no longer as a normal practice accompanied his battalion in the attack but positioned himself where he could control the use of his supporting fires and of his reserves. This meant that the company had become the basic element of maneuver and the company commander the highest-ranking officer habitually advancing to the assault. As a rule, a rifle company attacking on a normal 250-yard front deployed two platoons in assault and two as reserves. In each platoon one section led and one section followed as a support. These supports provided the additional momentum essential to break into the enemy's position, while the reserve platoons could either outflank or pass through the initial assault platoons to continue the attack. In fifty years we had moved from a division commander's war to one by battalion commanders. (Ref 4, pp 24-25)

The infantry battalion of the United States Army in 1940 was the lineal descendant of those battalions which had served in the wars and expeditions of the past. Essentially, the battalion of 1940 was tried and proven in the maneuvers of 1940 which tested the triangular division concept against the old World War I square infantry division. World War II was a war of

movement and all units, including the division, were pared of excess personnel and equipment to give them greater mobility and flexibility. Table of Organization 7-15 (see App B) of 1 October 1940 prescribed an infantry rifle battalion as follows: a headquarters (T/O 7-16); a headquarters detachment (T/O 7-16); three rifle companies (T/O 7-17); and a heavy weapons company (T/O 7-18). The battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel assisted by a major as executive officer. The aggregate strength of the battalion was 932, of which 28 were commissioned officers.

In examining the above unit structure it will be noted that the 1940 infantry battalion was quite dissimilar to the prewar one. The Chief of Infantry, Major General George Lynch contended in his annual report that

in the years from 1937 to 1941 American Infantry had undergone a real revolution. Organizationwise, the foot establishment was arranged along lines that had been more carefully tested than ever before in peacetime. As for weapons, they were turned over completely, except for the .30-caliber heavy machine gun. In other words, the 60-mm mortar (first adopted as standard in 1937, but remaining scarce) had replaced the old Stokes and its successors, while the heavier mortar, 81-mm, had been adopted and the BAR so much improved as to be virtually made over. Finally, the Springfield 1903 shoulder rifle had yielded to the semi-automatic M1. In addition, new small arms such as carbines and submachine guns, had entered infantry armament, together with the larger machine gun, the .50-caliber. (Ref 1, pp 47-48)

An historical summary of the evolution of the infantry battalion and the span of control from 1777 to 1964 is given in Appendix C.

THE WORLD WAR II RIFLE BATTALION

The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese brought all prewar preparation to a climax. There was then a definite purpose to maneuvers and training as the Army faced combat in every type of environment in a global war. The organization of the infantry units prior to Pearl Harbor was to be tested in combat. The phase-out of the horse and horse-drawn equipment was in its final stages. All vehicles in the infantry were motor-propelled and the infantry battalion was furnished transportation for nearly every purpose from command to weapon and supply vehicles. The $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck (jeep) became at once the "pet" of the infantryman. Almost immediately, this versatile vehicle gave the infantry a mobility which it had never before experienced. The jeep served as a command vehicle, a gun vehicle, and a hauler of supplies. Other vehicles were assigned to the battalion and by 1 April 1942, T/O 7-15 (see App B) allotted a total of fortyseven vehicles, of which 22 were jeeps; also included were 3/4-ton weapons carriers. The enlisted strength of the battalion was set at 884 compared with a total of 904 in the T/O 7-15 of 1 October 1940 -- a reduction of 20 men. These cuts were found principally in the rifle companies and heavy weapons companies. The rationale behind these reductions may be found in the following extract:

General Lesley McNair...had been chief of staff of the provisional division that had tested triangularization in 1937, and he believed in the basic principles of the revision that had resulted. Foremost among these was pooling. Its natural corollary was to keep all units lean, because, when extraordinary needs arose, those units could draw from the pools maintained at the next higher level. Another one of the important principles embraced by McNair was that which gave the best of men and equipment to the offensive portions of units, and cut the other segments to a minimum. The application of these austere principles was sharpened by the urgent need to conserve shipping space; so McNair caused infantry organization to be finely combed for excess personnel and equipment. (Ref 1, p 52)

By 1942, the conversion of the prewar United States Army to a wartime national force was being accomplished slowly but surely. Training, testing, and grading the newly formed units occupied the bulk of the energies and talents of General Headquarters of the Army. However, there were those in command who did not feel that the troops were properly organized and trained for the waging of modern war.

Large unit organization, in March 1942, embodied the outcome of the reforming ideas of the 1930's and the establishment of the Armored Force in July 1940. The March

directive enumerated siz types of divisions: infantry, armored, motorized, cavalry, airborne and mountain.

Infantry divisions were barely emerging from a tumult of reorganization. The main features of the new plan -triangular structure through elimination of the brigade, adaptation to conditions of open warfare, use of motor transportation only - had been discussed in the Army since the early thirties (had in fact been urged by General Pershing in 1920), and tentatively endorsed by the War Department in 1935 and tested in the field in 1937 and 1939. Not until 1940, after the collapse of France, did these ideas crystallize in an approved table of organization. The Regular Army divisions were then physically reorganized. Not until after Pearl Harbor did it prove feasible to bring the National Guard divisions into conformity with the new system. The purely wartime divisions, which began to be activated in March 1942, followed the new pattern from the start. (Ref 5, p 7)

The War Department took a novel step toward correction of these deficiencies by the establishment of the Army Ground Forces in 2 March 1942. The mission of the Army Ground Forces, as stated in Circular 59, was "to provide ground force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations." The tactical organization which offered the greatest possibility of success in battle became the principal desideratum of all planning and organizational changes (Ref 5).

Tactical organization, which designed for combat, was indispensable to the preparatory effort as well. Tables of organization and equipment were the basic guide to mobilization. T/O units were the blocks out of which the Army was built. The total of all T/O units constituted the major portion of the troop basis... The internal character of each unit, as fixed by its tables, dictated the total number of similar units required. (Ref 5, pp 1-2)

The Army Ground Forces, under the command of General Lesley J. McNair (1883-1944), exerted a profound and lasting influence upon the organization of every unit in the United States Army, from the rifle squad to the division. Essentially one of the Army's finest artillerists, General McNair was a genius at organization and training. Naturally conservative as a professional soldier, he demanded that all units be functional and without excess personnel or materiel. He questioned everything that went into the TOE and especially he cut command and headquarters personnel to the minimum. He believed that all people in a combat unit should be able to function in combat. His ideas were implemented during World War II; today

they survive in the tactical organization of the current Army, and constitute excellent guidelines for the Army of the future. The following paragraph sums up the General's ideas on tactical organization:

General McNair's leading idea in tactical organization was a simple and definite one: to concentrate a maximum of men and materials in offensive striking units capable of destroying the enemy's capacity for resistance. The derivatives of this idea were many. One was to have a minimum of non-combat soldiers, to hold down non-tactical overhead and make tactical staffs small and efficient. Headquarters companies, staffs and administrative personnel could be kept small by elimination of unnecessary links in the chain of command, by reduction of paper work and the use of verbal orders. Combat units should be streamlined for quick decisive action; they should have only such personnel and equipment as were needed always. What a unit needed only occasionally should be held in a reserve pool under higher headquarters. Such pools not only kept personnel and equipment from idleness, but also permitted rapid massing for concentrated use. Transport and impedimenta of all kinds should be assigned sparingly and pooled where possible. Weapons and units primarily defensive in character should absorb as little as possible of the national resources. Special type units and excessively specialized personnel, useful on certain occasions only, should be discouraged. Links in the chains of supply and administration should be cut; divisions and corps should be lightened, with their overhead machinery relegated to armies. (Ref 5, p 6)

From the above extract may be derived the general organizational policy which existed during World War II and has persisted until the present. General McNair was saying, in effect, that "he wanted military units that were lean and mean." Lean to the point of functional numbers and mean as to firepower, striking force, and effect upon the enemy. This ideal strives to be achieved in the tables of organization and equipment published for the United States Army. This is especially true of the combat-type units, such as the infantry, artillery, and armor. (For special type battalions see App B).

The triangular division cut off nearly 13,000 men from the square division's strength. The strength of the new division was about 15,000 men. The overall reduction was achieved by elimination of personnel in the infantry divisions as follows:

The triangular division lopped some 13,000 men from the old square-division strength, emerging with about 15,000. The reduction was achieved by reducing

headquarters and administrative staffs and thinning out support and service troops. Equipment and matériel were cut to the essentials. The result was a lean, tough, more maneuverable division. (Ref 6, p 35)

In the infantry battalion, the 1 April 1942 TOE substituted a headquarters company for the old headquarters detachment as it existed in the 1940 TOE. The strength of the new headquarters company totalled 130 enlisted men and 5 officers compared with the old headquarters detachment of 48 enlisted men. This new organization in the rifle battalion was not well received by General McNair but it and the new regimental cannon company were included over his vigorous objections. Automatic rifles were brought out of the automatic rifle squad (which was dropped) and returned to the rifle squads where they had been before February 1940, that is, one per squad. (App B and Ref 7)

In November 1942, the overseas troop-movement shipping space problem became so critical that another drastic reduction in infantry units was ordered by General McNair. A Reduction Board was established to accomplish this difficult and sometimes painful task. The General was determined to cut the infantry rifle regiment by 400 men and to do this without removing many riflemen from the battalions. These drastic changes were reflected in TOE 7-15 published 1 March 1943. The principal casualty in this reduction within the infantry was the cannon company which was dropped from the table and its howitzers placed in the regimental headquarters and headquarters company. This arrangement did not last long. The Reduction Board finally cut 216 men from headquarters and the heavy weapons companies of the battalions. Appropriate TOE were published on 15 July 1943. (Ref 1)

How these radical cuts in strength were accomplished is shown in the following extract. It is of considerable value to note the rationale used in the removal and addition of men and weapons to the component units of the rifle battalion. The recognition of the "close-in fighters" as the base for the division and its combat units is a most valid on, it was valid then and its validity has not diminished.

...the infantry rifle squad was unchanged. It reremained a team of twelve men, armed with ten M1 rifles,
one automatic rifle and one M1903. Three such squads
formed a rifle platoon. Three rifle platoons were grouped
with a weapons platoon to form a rifle company. The
weapons platoon was modified slightly. It retained two
cal. .30 light machine guns and three 60-mm. mortars
as its primary weapons. It lost two automatic rifles,
but gained three antitank rocket launchers and one cal.
.50 machine gun, the latter for antiaircraft defense.
Personnel of the rifle company was virtually untouched,
being cut from 198 to 192 through removal of a transportation corporal, a truck driver, a cook's helper, a messenger, an orderly and a basic private. The 27 rifle
companies of the division retained a strength of 5,184 --

the close-in fighters around whom the rest of the division was built. Saving 6 men in each company saved 162 in the division, or 16,200 if 100 infantry divisions should be mobilized.

The heavy weapons company, with which three rifle companies were grouped in the infantry battalion, was cut into more deeply than the rifle company, being reduced from 183 to 162 officers and men. Thirteen of the 21 men removed were truck-drivers. Armament was strengthened. To the primary weapons - six 81-mm. mortars and eight cal. .30 heavy machine guns - seven antitank rocket launchers and three cal. .50 machine guns were added. (Ref 5, p 22)

It will be noted in the extract above, that, in the last paragraph, mention is made of the heavy weapons company and how the economies in personnel were achieved. This instance seems to exemplify an axiom which might read, in effect, "whenever unit strength is reduced, weapon strength must be increased." The gaps in the line must, perforce, be closed by additional firepower. Obviously, the type of weapons to be added, or amplified, will depend upon the unit and its mission. It is safe to conclude that in infantry units of all types and sizes, only those weapons that will assist or accelerate the maintenance of fire and movement will be found in this category. The following commentary bears out this great need for continuous support of battalion weapons.

The fire power of a mortar platoon at the immediate call of the battalion commander is needed. Lessons learned from the European Campaign point out that the support of battalion weapons must be continuous and, therefore, they must be capable of being displaced by hand or transported across country. There was a suggestion that the 4.2" mortar replace the 31mm mortar but a clear majority (47 out of 57) preferred the 81mm mortar. (Ref 8, p 8)

The anticipated losses in firepower within the rifle battalion was compensated by the addition of seven caliber .50 machineguns, M1, HB, flexible, to each rifle battalion, that is, one to each rifle company and three to the heavy weapons company. At this time the new 2.36-inch rocket launcher (the Bazooka) appeared in a total issue of 24 to the battalion. These advanced (for the times) antitank weapons were located in the headquarters company, the rifle companies, and the heavy weapons company within the battalion. Thus, the rifle battalion's firepower was increased despite reduction of manpower and in an area where it was anticipated that it would be badly needed—antitank defense.

It should be noted that the addition of the rocket launchers and the .50 caliber machineguns to the battalion was in keeping with General McNair's basic concept that antitank and antiaircraft defense should be the responsibility of individually fired weapons, not those that were crew-served.

Here again, we find an excellent example of the economy-of-force principle that guided the general in his organizational concepts. He did not like the mine platoon of the antitank company because he considered that it was purely a defensive unit. Although it was dropped in the TOE of 26 May 1943, it was reinstated in the same year in July, with a strength of 31 men. The 37mm guns of the antitank company and the remaining nine guns were divided equally among the headquarters companies of the three battalions. The total enlisted strength of the rifle battalion under TOE 7-15, 1 March 1943 was 818, with 32 officers. (App B)

Not all changes shown on the TOE were actually made, as noted in the following extract:

The headquarters company of the battalion, falling from 135 to 108, was cut proportionately far more than the line companies, on the principle that headquarters overhead should be trimmed. The loss was largely in the antitank platoon, on the principle that defensive personnel should be held to a minimum. Defensive weapons earmarked for the security of headquarters were particularly frowned upon by General McNair. The four 37-mm. antitank guns assigned to the antitank platoon were reduced to three. The 37-mm. gun was retained despite adverse report from North Africa, on the grounds that it was easier to manhandle than the 57-mm, gun proposed in its place, that it was effective when used within its proper range, and that in any case 57's were not yet available to replace it. Three cal. . 30 machine guns, one cal. .50 machine gun, and eight antitank rocket launchers were added to the battalion headquarters company, which therefore, although reduced 20 percent in personnel, obtained a net augmentation of armament.

Total reduction of personnel in the infantry battalion was from 916 to 850, a saving of 66, of which only 18 were in the rifle companies. (Ref 5, pp 22-23)

The General Board, European Theater of Operations, was charged with specific study of the battlefield functioning of all units, including the infantry rifle battalion and its component elements. The purpose of the board was to recommend changes in organization with a view toward better combat performance and guidance for more efficient organization in the future. These reports were not theoretical; they were based upon direct interviews with numerous commanders, at all levels of command, and members of the type units concerned. With reference to the battalion headquarters company, the board reported:

The problems encountered by this unit are closely parallel to those of the regimental headquarters company. Communication is the greatest problem and insufficient personnel is presently allotted to insure a continuing and adequate wire and radio net. Experience indicates that an

increase in the personnel of the communication platoon by two wire teams is necessary. No enlisted men are available to perform the functions of command post guards, escorts for prisoners of war and other miscellaneous duties which arise in combat. Provision should be made for personnel to perform these duties without depleting the strength of the ammunition and pioneer platoon or the rifle companies. For this purpose a section, 12 enlisted men, has been added as a military police section. Supply of the battalion is a responsibility of the battalion commander; however, the battalion supply officer (S-4) is not assigned to the battalion and is answerable only indirectly to the battalion commander. It is thought best to assign this officer to the battalion. The inability of the battalion anti-tank platoon to furnish adequate protection against hostile armor, for reasons listed earlier under the heading of the anti-tank company makes it desirable to eliminate this platoon. (Ref 8, p 7)

With reference to the foregoing battaion strength and organizational patterns, the following extract is highly significant:

All the complications...faced by Army Ground Forces during the year from October 1942 to October 1943, and the organization developed for infantry in that year persisted for the duration of the war in Europe. However, when redeployment to the Pacific area became necessary, Ground Forces once more examined the tables of organization and equipment. This time three factors were decisive in the appraisal. The first one was the wealth of combat experience accumulated in Europe; the second, that the scarcity of shipping space had ceased; and the third, the death of General McNair. These factors resulted in a general enlargement of infantry units. (Ref 1, p 54)

World War II witnessed the first use of armored infantry by the US Army. Essentially, this requirement was caused by the advent of the armored divisions. The best military thought at the time pointed to the need for infantry integral to the armored division for the protection of the tanks and for seizing and holding terrain. Hence, the design of armored infantry battalions and regiments to carry out these vital missions was initiated somewhat over the objections of the Chief, Army Ground Forces. To appreciate this organization problem, it is necessary to review the background. In 1940 the tanks were separated from the infantry and the armored force was established. This solution did not solve the problem of the infantry/tank relationship on the battlefield. The armored divisions, when first organized, did not provide organic infantry for the protection of tanks and ground exploitation

² Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair was killed in action at St. Lo, France, 25 July 1944, while observing frontline units in combat. He was promoted to General posthumously in 1954.

of armored gains. The initial inception of the armored infantry in the United States Army may be noted in the following extract:

The next type of specialized infantry...was that intended to provide the foot elements of the new armored divisions. It was called "armored infantry." The first of this type in the United States Army came into being when the old 6th Infantry was converted to armored on 15 July 1940. After that, certain numbers which had been inactive on the infantry list since just after the first World War were activated in 1941 and 1942 to become armored infantry. These were the 36th, 41st, 46th, 48th-52nd, 54th-56th, 58th, 59th, and 62d Regiments. Within a few months the new armored infantry regiments were broken up to form separate armored infantry battalions. First and last there were sixty-six of the latter (Ref 1, p 49)

The armored infantry battalions were essentially copies of the standard infantry rifle battalions. However, they were smaller with less men in the rifle companies. One factor which reduced the number of fighting men available in the armored infantry battalion was the specific battalion requirement for drivers and maintenance personnel. Conversely, the firepower was greater than the standard battalion because of the machineguns mounted on the vehicles (M2 and M3 half-tracks). The training given the armored infantry battalion was essentially dismounted infantry tactics, although some training was given in fighting from the vehicles. This training was seldom employed in combat, as the armored infantry, once deployed from the vehicles, fought dismounted the same as standard infantry (Ref 9).

General McNair was again to exert great influence in the organization of the armored infantry. His attitude toward the armored force and its basic concept is shown in the extract below:

General McNair...had always doubted the invulnerability of the tank. It became clear that tanks would frequently have to be escorted by foot troops sent ahead to locate and destroy antitank defenses. It was recognized that the armored division, internally, required more infantry in proportion to tanks and, externally, would usually operate in closer proximity to infantry divisions than had been supposed. The increasing rapprochement between tanks and infantry raised not only the question of the internal structure of the armored division but also that of the number of armored divisions which ought to be mobilized, (Ref 10, pp 322-323)

The armored infantry battalion, as provided under TOE 7-25, 1 March 1942, contained a battalion headquarters and headquarters company (T/O 7-26) and three rifle companies (T/O 7-27) with a total of 676 enlisted men and 24 officers. This battalion was the smallest infantry battalion in the US Army during World War II. Obviously, there were standard infantry battalion elements, such as the heavy weapons company, which it did not require for the performance of its combat mission. A look at the armament of the armored

infantry battalion shows that it was, at this early period, furnished with organic weapons affording heavy firepower support, that is, antitank guns, assault guns, 60mm mortars, and 81mm mortars. (App B)

It was at this point in the organization of the armored division that the concept that interchangeable battalions of all types were mandatory for that unit appeared. Even before the armored divisions entered combat and

...in view of wide differences of opinion, both the Army Ground Forces and the Armored Force desired as elastic and adaptable a structure as possible... The regimental echelon in the armored division was abolished. The battalion became the basic unit. The division received organizationally three battalions of tanks, three of armored infantry, and three of armored field artillery. Infantry strength in proportion to tanks was thereby doubled. At the same time separate tank battalions, separate armored infantry battalions, and separate armored field artillery battalions were set up in nondivisional pools. These battalions were made identical with the corresponding battalions organic in the armored division. Hence they could readily be attached to the armored division. (Ref 10, p 327)

The armored infantry regiment was retained within the armored division until 15 September 1943, at which time the regiment was disbanded and separate armored infantry battalions were established. The ratio, based upon combat experience in Africa and Sicily, of armored infantry battalions to tank battalions, was now changed from one-to-two to one-to-one. The rationale for this change was found in the improvement of antitank weapons, such as rocket launchers and the German Panzerfaust, and the extensive use of antitank mines. At El Alamein, in October 1942, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery of the British Eighth Army used his armored infantry to probe the German lines and to open a gap through which the armored units could advance.

The following extract is of value because it differentiates between the types of armored divisions and explains the employment of the armored infantry battalions:

Both the 1942 type of division and the 1943 type were employed in combat. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions were employed under the 1942 table of organization, the 1st later being reorganized in Italy to conform to the 1943 table of organization. The 2nd and 3rd ended the war as old type "heavy" divisions. All other divisions were employed as organized under the 1943 table of organization or as "light" divisions. The "heavy" type was capable of longer sustained action than the "light" type. Both types of divisions were successful. Certain weaknesses were found in both. Both were weak in infantry, particularly the "heavy" division with its two armored regiments of six tank battalions and armored infantry regiment of three armored infantry battalions. The

"light" division with three tank battalions and three armored infantry battalions fared better, but needed at least one additional rifle company in each armored infantry battalion in order that tank and infantry battalions could be married up—squad for squad, platoon for platoon, and company for company. (Ref 11, p 34)

TOE 7-15, 15 September 1943, shows the armored infantry battalions of the armored division to contain 35 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 962 enlisted men. The increase in overall strength within the armored infantry battalion was found basically in the inclusion of the additional rifle company.

The organization of the standard infantry rifle battalion as it was in 1943 and 1944 remained fairly stable with minor additions of men and equipment. TOE 7-15, 26 February 1944, was the table establishing the infantry rifle battalion until 1 June 1945, when new tables were published. The 1944 TOE 7-15 carried a total of 825 enlisted men and 35 officers for the battalion. This was "a lean and mean" organization, so lean that many thought that its efficiency in combat had been decreased. The rifle companies were believed to be too small for the type of heavy ground combat encountered in Europe. The strength of the company was increased from an aggregate of 193 to 242 men so that casualties could be absorbed and enough personnel left to function efficiently in a fast-moving combat situation. New members of the battalion were principally in the rifle companies where two new sections were added to the weapons platoons, that is, the assault section (2.36-inch rocket launchers) and the special weapons section (57mm recoilless rifles).

Experience in the European Theater indicates that the major subordinate units of the infantry division were insufficient in strength and general composition to insure the division's ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations independently with maximum efficiency. The absence of tanks in the division organization was especially felt. (Ref 8, p 2)

In the infantry rifle battalion the new 75mm recoilless rifle was added in a new gun platoon in the heavy weapons company. These new weapons gave the infantry rifle battalion a new type of mobile artillery which greatly increased firepower. (See App B for complete TOE 7-15,26 February 1944 with changes to 30 June 1944.)

The TOE 7-15, 1 June 1945, reflects the influence of US Army infantry combat experience in both Europe and the Pacific. The austerity program of General McNair was replaced by a program of "beefing up" the battalion and its elements to ensure the manpower and firepower to bring the war to a victorious close. With this goal in sight, the planners in the War Department and Army Ground Forces faced toward the Pacific and a new problem: redeployment (App B).

Examination of the TOE noted above reveals that the infantry regiment was increased in personnel from the old 1944 strength of 3, 323 enlisted men to a new strength of 3, 528 enlisted men. The bulk of these men were assigned to the rifle companies within the battalions. Enlisted strength of the rifle

company rose from 187 to 235. The towed guns (57mm) were eliminated from the regimental antitank company and were replaced by tanks mounting 90mm rifles. The regimental cannon company, equipped with heavy tanks mounting 105mm guns, was, in effect, a tank unit for the direct support of the battalions of the regiments.

Backup for the changes effected above, may be found in the tollowing extract from Report No. 15, European General Board:

The present 57mm towed anti-tank gun is unsatisfactory. Lack of cross-country mobility, coupled with the fact that the penetrating power of the 57mm projectile is insufficient to stop the modern tank, makes it imperative that another weapon be substituted. The majority of experienced combat leaders agree that the present anti-tank weapon should be replaced by a self-propelled tank destroyer or a medium tank... Present recoilless weapons lack the necessary penetrating power demanded in an effective regimental anti-tank weapon and other protection is therefore mandatory. (Ref 8, p 6)

The principle of flexibility in the employment of the infantry regiment and its battalions was noted in the creation of the regimental combat team (RCT) for the accomplishment of specific combat missions. This concept consisted of a planned grouping of certain divisional elements around a standard infantry regiment, that is, a battalion of artillery (105mm), a combat engineer company, a medical collecting company, and a signal corps detachment. These ad hoc organizations were employed with success in both the European and Pacific Theaters during World War II. (Fig. 2) It is of interest, in view of the concepts advanced by General McNair, to note that, even at this early date, military thinking was tending toward "a flexible response" to the requirements of the modern battlefield. Prior to the formation of the regimental combat team, the group and grouping concept with reference to the battalions within a division had been advanced by the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

The reorganization of the nondivisional units in the Army ground forces during World War II was to have a salient effect upon the existing wartime Army organization and the formation of the present Army. In 1942, the nondivisional regiments (antiaircraft, field artillery, mechanized cavalry, and combat engineers) were converted to separate battalions. Group head-quarters companies (batteries), with a ratio of 1 to 4 battalions (squadrons), were activated. This was a daring and novel experiment in US Army unit organization which made of the group

...a form of organization already employed with certain newer weapons, notably tanks and tank destroyers. It differed from the regiment in that component battalions were self-sufficient for supply and administration (in the manner...of the reorganized armored division), and that the battalions were not assigned organically to the group, but attached to it and detached from it as circumstances




Figure 2. Task Force Organization - Pacific, World War II

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dictated. The group was not a T/O unit. It might contain, at a given moment, no battalions or half a dozen battalions, though three or four were considered normal. Group head-quarters were supposed to eschew administration, to be tactical only, to control battalions in combat, and to supervise their training. Battalions in principle dealt directly with army on administrative matters, and brought their own supplies from army supply points. (Ref 5, p 51)

The above conversion served General McNair's purposes. It effected a considerable economy in the elimination of the headquarters of the regiments of the cited nondivisional units. It also served as a pattern for the elimination of the regiments in the armored division and the creation of separate armored infantry battalions where there had formerly been armored infantry regiments of three battalions. The same purpose was achieved in the armored division with the establishment of the Combat Commands, A, B, C, which were, in effect, group headquarters. A further benefit of the reorganization was the cutting of the strength of the headquarters companies at all levels (Ref 5, p 52).

The infantry battalions of World War II were the most modern and best-equipped of any infantry units ever fielded by the United States Army, up to that time. Well supplied with the best weapons American ingenuity and industrial knowledge could produce, they were sized and shaped for combat by careful military planning and eventual combat experience. As early as 1938, the infantry battalion of the US Army possessed an aggregate strength of 691. By June 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the battalion had grown to a strength of 932; within one year its strength was slightly less: 916. The proposed strength for the rifle battalion in March 1943 was 850. By July 1944, it had been increased to 871 and by January 1945 it had been reduced to 860. In June 1945, the aggregate strength of the battalion rose to a wartime high of 1,014. During the period of World War II, the average strength of the US Army infantry battalion was 876 men.

During World War II the struggle in many areas of the globe became a battle for air bases. This was especially true in the Pacific and to a lesser extent in Africa. The requirement for the military unit known as an air base security battalion became evident in 1942 while the North African campaign was in full operation. In the United States Army these battalions (in reality infantry) were hastily assembled from a temporary TOE and trained to take over the task of holding the air fields after the regular infantry battalions had conquered the areas in which they were situated (App B).

The air base security battalion was tailored for a very specific task of defense and only a limited number were organized. However, they are worthy of careful consideration in view of current air base protection and security problems in Vietnam. The air base security battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel and possessed the usual battalion staff. Organically the battalion included a headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company. All elements of the battalion were motorized, mounted in half-tracks and armored cars. Heavy machineguns

and cannon were included in the battalion's weaponry. Jeep-mounted machineguns, both light and heavy, were also included in the armament. The general organization of the security battalion stressed high mobility and heavy firepower. A highly efficient system of communication was provided within the battalion and with other combat nets within the battalion's area of air base security responsibility.

The global character of World War II dictated certain tailoring of organizations to special climatic and environmental conditions. The European Theater of Operations functioned in a conventional temperate zone four-seasonal weather pattern. This condition called for troops and organizations capable of operation in hot, dry, wet, cold, and snow-type weather. No particular organizational problems were presented by the European environment. Battalions were not required to be especially organized for combat--except in Italy where infantry mountain divisions were utilized. Mountain units were lightly equipped with motor transport and the troops were trained in mountaineering skills. Ranger battalions were employed in the European Theater, but this was because of the peculiar nature of the mission and had little or nothing to do with the environmental conditions. Special forces, ski troops, and those trained for Arctic service appeared in various highly specialized operations where conventional troops could not be expected to perform efficiently and effectively.

The Southwest Pacific area presented a variety of environmental differences from that encountered by the troops in the European Theater of Operations. Planners in the War Department and individuals in the various training commands and units, were of the opinion that the jungles and tropical areas of the Pacific would require specialized military organizations. Hence, there were light infantry battalions and regiments, especially organized and trained for jungle warfare. The theory behind the light features of these units was that in heavy jungle areas the standard infantry battalion would become "bogged down" with conventional unit organizational patterns and equipment and vehicle transport. But in actuality, these units which were designed and trained for jungle combat in the Pacific never had the opportunity to prove themselves in jungle combat. As the result of training tests these units, the 71st and 89th Infantry Divisions, were reconverted to standard infantry in 1944. Thus, standard infantry battalions were used in jungle combat in the Pacific and proved themselves to be adequate for the task (Ref 1, p 50).

The Rangers were a traditional American military organization dating back to the French and Indian War period of our colonial history. Tough, lean, and functional in organization and personnel, the six Ranger battalions were organized as hard-hitting, light infantry battalions capable of independently conducted commando-type raids deep into enemy territory. These elite units were noted for their high esprit, dash, and physical toughness. These battalions fought with distinction in both Europe and the Southwest Pacific area. In the SWPA and the Philippines, the Sixth Ranger Battalion served with the Sixth US Army under General Walter Krueger. Additionally, General Krueger organized a non-TOE unit of battalion strength which he designated as the "Alamo Scouts." Following closely the ancient Ranger tradition and the scout idea of nineteenth century

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western Indian and Philippine campaigns, the Alamo Scouts became one of the most effective intelligence-gathering and raiding units in the Pacific area ³ (Ref 12).

In World War II the requirements of possible special missions, such as operating behind enemy lines during winter under adverse weather conditions, led to the formation of an unusual type of specialized unit, the 1st Special Service Force. Ideally composed of lumberjacks, forest rangers, and game wardens, this unit was an especially elite force. In addition, it had the unusual distinction of being filled with both United States and Canadian soldiers as an experiment in international cooperation. From this viewpoint, it was highly successful and while it operated well, it was eventually deactivated in December 1944 and its members transferred to a standard infantry regiment (Ref 13).

In addition to the foregoing special-type infantry units, including those of company, battalion, and regimental sizes, was another "commandotype" unit, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) which became famous as "Merrill's Marauders." This unit was organized for a specific mission in Burma and in essence, was a carbon copy of the contemporary British "Long Range Penetration Unit" 4 which operated in Africa and the Middle East. The unit was filled with jungle-fighting specialists, both officers and men, who were volunteers. The mission was a "behind the enemy lines" type of operation which meant that the "Marauders" had to possess high mobility, flexibility, and independence of action. Obviously such a unit must either live off the country or rely upon air-drop delivery of rations, ammunition, and other essential supplies. Transport was a combination of animal pack trains and essential air-deliverable motor vehicles. Mortars and howitzers were mule-packed and man-carried. After an arduous and bitter campaign against the Japanese in Burma, the 5307th was reorganized as the 475th Infantry Regiment in August 1944 (Ref 14).

World War II battlefield experience from Europe and the Pacific continued to influence the teachings at the Service Schools and its effect was noted in the reorganization of infantry units. In the new tables of organization dated 1 June 1945, the somewhat lean infantry battalions were increased in personnel. With redeployment to the Pacific a fact to be faced when the war in Europe was terminated, infantry regiments were increased from 3,323 enlisted men to 3,538 and additional weapons and vehicles were included. Logically, the greatest increase was in the infantry rifle battalion, with the rifle company increased from 193 to a total of 242 enlisted men.

³ For detailed information on the wartime service of Ranger and Scout battalions and the armored infantry and separate infantry battalions, see <u>The Army Lineage Book</u>, Vol II; <u>Infantry</u>. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953.

⁴See Virginia Cowles, <u>The Phantom Major</u>, New York: Harper and Bros., 1958, for an account of one of these units and its activities.

A considerable number of these additional men were located in the new assault and special weapons sections added to the weapons platoons of the rifle company. The increase from three to six of the 2.36-inch rocket launchers (Bazooka) in the company and the addition of the 57mm recoilless rifle required additional operators in the assault and special weapons sections, respectively.

The novel and highly unorthodox 75mm recoilless rifle appeared in the infantry rifle battalion at this time, operated by a gun platoon which was added to the heavy weapons company. The addition of this recoilless rifle, gave the infantry battalion the heaviest and most accessible weight of fire in our military history up to that time (Ref 1).

A World War II modification of the divisional organization of the infantry was noted in the organization and employment of what were termed "Regimental Combat Teams." This type organization was temporary and utilized in connection with special missions. Essentially organized around the infantry regimental structure, the typical combat team comprised the following: a regiment of infantry, a battalion of 105mm artillery, a company of combat engineers, a medical collecting company, and a signal detachment. Without lineage or tradition, these RCT were military tactical ad hoc organizations of great flexibility. Usually, when the mission was accomplished, they reverted to their regular divisional unit. These temporary units were of especial value in the Pacific area where they were the answer to the requirement for forces capable of landing and taking an island-based enemy objective (Ref 1).

Conversely, the infantry rifle battalion was capable of being formed into what was designated as a "Battalion Landing Team" which, in effect, was a smaller version of the RCT formed for separate amphibious operations. When the battalions were operating within the RCT structure, it was still possible for certain battalions to be organized and designated as "Battalion Landing Teams" for the accomplishment of special missions. AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, April 1965, has this to say about a Battalion Landing Team:

In an amphibious operation, an infantry battalion normally reinforced by necessary combat and service elements; the basic unit for planning an assault landing. (Ref 15, p 62)

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⁵ The reorganization of the infantry under the ROAD concept has eliminated the regiment from the US Army--the ROAD infantry brigade approximates the WWII and Korean War RCT organization.

With the elimination of the regimental organization under the ROAD concept, the old "Regimental Landing Team" becomes "The Brigade Landing Team" and is defined thus:

An assault landing team. It is a balanced task organization composed of a brigade headquarters, two or more battalion level combat units and the reinforcing combat and service elements required for combat and interim logistical support during the period it conducts independent tactical operations.

(Ref 15, p 73)

In the above-quoted extract it will be noted that considerable flexibility has been built into the concept in that two or more battalions may comprise a brigade landing team, depending upon the mission and the objective assigned. The ROAD concept of the use of the battalions as "building blocks" is employed in this temporary organization—as well as in the permanent organization structure.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II BATTALION AND THE KOREAN WAR

The end of the war in Japan and the surrender of the Imperial Japanese government to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur marked the end of an era. Gone was the period of exclusively conventional explosives for the waging of war. These had been overshadowed and outranked by a new and terrible force. The detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki served to end the war with Japan but more than that they heralded a new age of nuclear war. The absolute lack of experience of any Army in combat under nuclear conditions served to inhibit, frustrate, and puzzle the military profession.

At the same time, a new form of political warfare "the cold war" was mounted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites against the Western Allies with whom it had collaborated during World War II. The principal tactic of the Soviet Union was to be difficult and testy in her diplomatic relations with the West. Her ideology and propaganda were employed and her military might displayed as often as possible to upset the status quo in the post-War world. For a few years after World War II, the United States and her Allies were in a somewhat secure position because the United States possessed an atomic monopoly. However, whenever the USSR would achieve a breakthrough in the atomic field, the United States and her Allies must be prepared for nuclear warfare.

The United States Army had just finished the demobilization of the World War II Army and was in the throes of reorganization to meet the prospective challenge of the nuclear age when the United States Army plunged back into combat in the Korean War (1950-1953).

The divisions first committed in Korea were those hastily ordered from occupation duty in Japan. While some attempt had been made to make them war-ready, they were not, as yet, up to the task of facing a tough, aggressive enemy like the North Koreans. The reduced battalion regiments were not large enough and the infantry battalions (reduced by one rifle company) were even weaker when facing a determined foe.

The North Koreans proved to be skillful, tough, and numerous. American troops hastily shuttled to Korea from the occupation army in Japan were unready for them physically, psychologically, and even in equipment. The two-battalion regiments were too thin for sustained resistance on fluid battlefields on which the enemy had captured momentum before they arrived. (Ref 3, p 507)

TOE 7-15, 16 April 1948, established the infantry battalion as having the capabilities of furnishing a base of fire, maneuvering in all types of terrain and climatic conditions, furnishing limited antitank protection, and seizing and holding terrain. These capabilities were not essentially different from those possessed by the World War II infantry battalion under the 1945 TOE. The assigned mission was "to close with the enemy, capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver or repel his assault by fire or close combat." There was little new in the assigned mission; it was the

traditional mission of infantry battalions from time immemorial. The battalion still consisted of headquarters and headquarters company (TOE 7-16N); the heavy weapons company (TOE 7-18N); and three rifle companies (TOE 7-19N). The aggregate strength of the battalion was 917 (34 officers and 883 enlisted men). There were three 57mm recoilless rifles in each rifle company, and four 75mm recoilless rifles in the heavy weapons company (see App B).

It is of considerable interest to note the comment upon the postwar Army by Russell F. Weigley:

This Army of 1950 was very much a postwar Army, shaped less by military doctrine looking to a future war, to which this Army so often seemed irrelevant, than by the past, by the last war, of whose massive armies it was the remnant. Under the shadow of atomic power, development of nonatomic weapons had lagged, and procurement had lagged still more, so the weapons of the Army remained those of World War II, developed as long ago as the period from World War I through the mid-1930's, and now often warworn: the M-1 rifle, the Browning Automatic Rifle, .30- and .50-caliber machine guns, 60- and 81-mm and 4.2-inch mortars, 75-mm bazookas, and 105-mm howitzers. Though Pershing tanks had made limited appearances on World War II battlefields, available tanks were still mainly Shermans, despite their shortcomings. With World War I weaponry, the Army was geared for World War II tactics. (Ref 3, p 502)

On 27 June 1949, a Reduction Table No. 7-15-N-20 Infantry Battalions, Active Army, was published by the Department of the Army. This table reduced the 1948 battalion from 917 men (34 officers and 883 enlisted men) to an aggregate strength of 32 officers and 685 enlisted men. This reduction was ordered approximately one year before the outbreak of the Korean War. Its effect was to be tragically felt upon the early battlefields on the Korean Peninsula.

The infantry battalion of the Korean War was essentially that prescribed by TOE 7-15, 15 November 1950. It provided for a headquarters and headquarters company (TOE 7-16); a heavy weapons company (TOE 7-18); and three rifle companies (TOE 7-17). The full strength of the battalion was 919; reduced strength was 722 (see AppB). The combat in Korea called for strengthening of the battalion in both personnel and weapons.

The possession of an "atomic monopoly" after World War II gave the United States a distinct advantage in planning for the organization of the postwar units of the United States Army. This great power, both actual and political, served to preserve the <u>status quo</u> of the existing military units. The infantry divisions which entered the Korean peninsula were much the same as those which had fought across Europe and the Pacific six years before. The only real change organizationally in the infantry division was the addition of a tank battalion and the reduction in strength of the infantry battalions.

In 1955, the Soviet Union exploded its first tactical atomic device and thus marked the end of an era. This historical event signalled the requirement of the United States Army for military units capable of operating on the atomic battlefield. What the future battlefield would demand of units seemed to center about the matter of dispersion and avoidance of the massing of troops. With these qualities in rind, the planners were forced to look toward Army units possessing mobility, rapid and highly efficient communications and, above all, devastating firepower.

The armored division, by virtue of its World War II organization, was almost the ideal atomic warfare combat unit. Inherently, it was dispersed in its three combat commands and small battalions, and it had high mobility, great firepower, and shock action. Thus the armored divisional organization offered a partial solution to the planning for nuclear warfare. The infantry and airborne divisions were not so adaptable in organizational format—they required complete overhauling for use in future warfare, nuclear or conventional. The following extract describing the pentomic division (see Fig. 3) as the new organization was called, explains the radical changes introduced:

Inf div. Inf and Inf de Inf de

Source: Army Information Digest, September 1965.

Figure 3. Pentomic Infantry Division

Except for the armored division, whose strength remained about the same (14,617), the pentomic division was smaller than the triangula division. The infantry division was reduced from its 6 strength of 17,460 to 13,748 and the airborne division from 17,085 to 11,486. The airborne division was lighter with less vehicles and heavy weapons, and was completely air transportable. The infantry division was partially air transportable. The armored division had complete mobility, all elements being mounted on tracked or wheeled vehicles or in army aircraft. (Ref 16, p 61)

General Clyde D. Eddleman, who was Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, said of the pentomic concept of organization in 1958:

In looking to the future, and in projecting the Pentomic concept beyond its present successful start, we must continue to seek the best balance between selective fire-power (atomic and conventional) and new mobility means. The trends in development of future firepower are reasonably evident. In the field of battlefield mobility, we must look largely to new forms of air vehicles for our greatest advances. (Ref 17, p 10)

Major General David W. Gray points out in a most succinct manner the employment of the pentomic concept. As he notes, these changes were farreaching in that they eliminated the regiment and the battalion:

By the end of the Korean War, planners were hard at work on certain very fundamental changes in the organization of the infantry divisions—changes which ostensibly were designed to better enable the Army to fight a tactical nuclear war. This organization, the pentomic, was adopted as standard in 1956. The three regiments were replaced with five battle groups, each having five companies. Each rifle company had four rifle platoons and one weapons platoon. The regimental 4.2-inch mortar company was retained in the battle group but now it was manned by artillerymen. The three 81-mm mortars were placed in the weapons platoon of the rifle company. (Ref 4, p 26)

The regimental organization which had served the United States Army since the American Revolution was eliminated and the new "battle group" took its place in the order of battle (see Fig. 4). The battle group (1,400) was an unusual unit, larger than a battalion and smaller than a regiment. By July 1958, the divisions of the Army were reorganized according to the pentomic formula. New infantry weapons, the M14 and the M60 were replacing the older M1 rifle, the Browning machinegun, and the automatic rifle. There was a strong trend toward added air mobility for the infantry, and boards such as the Howse Board deliberated, experimented, and recommended.




Figure 4. Infantry Battle Group "Pentomic" Division

The level of command at which "pentomic" planning was conducted is shown in the following extract from a recent (1968) book:

The official theory that future wars would be atomic encouraged at least one change for which the Army could show genuine enthusiasm. That was the reorganization of the combat division to give it smaller, less cumbersome maneuver units, intended to operate independent of the traditional front lines of earlier wars. Westmoreland was closely involved with (General Maxwell D.) Taylor and his operations staff in devising the new commands and giving them a name—the "pentomic" division, made up of five battle groups instead of three regiments. (Ref 18, pp 239-240) (parenthesis added)

The loss of the regimental organization, the substitution of the battle group headquarters, and the phasing out of the battalion puzzled many traditionalists among the military professionals. The regiment and the battalion were units that had served from the very beginning of our Army's history; the creation of the battle group which was neither a regiment nor a battalion presented an enigma. The trend was toward "flexible response" to all types of warfare and the organizational criteria required to achieve this ideal military condition were well-stated in the following comment by Colonel (now Major General) William E. DePuy:

There would seem to be merit in the idea of organizing heavy, perhaps medium and light, combat forces in separate TOE building blocks which could then be assembled in various combinations within non-TOE divisions heavily supported with organic and supporting mobile nuclear weapons systems in order to fit more precisely any set of variants in the enemy or the mission, mode of movement, terrain and climate, and nuclear or conventional operations. (Ref 19, p 40)

Under the pentomic concept the battle group as organized was a most radical departure from traditional US Army unit organization, especially in that it eliminated the regiment as a tactical unit of the infantry division. The regimental organization had been the cornerstone of all US Army organizational structure since the American Revolution (Ref 30). However, the military planners in the Pentagon and at the Service Schools could justify the demise of these ancient and traditional tactical structures by virtue of the possibility of their having to engage in nuclear warfare. The best thinking in the United States Army held to the thesis that nuclear war unit battlefield vulnerability to nuclear weapons could be reduced...

<u>First</u>, by <u>dispersion</u> into formations smaller than those considered to be lucrative atomic targets. Dispersion must be coupled with other passive measures

designed to reduce the susceptibility of our forces to detection, such as concealment and camouflage.

Second, by mobility so that the enemy would be presented only with fleeting targets.

Third, by physical protection against heat, blast and radiation, including the use of armored fighting vehicles and carriers. (Ref 17, p 4)

At this point in the reorganization, the smallest unit within the infantry division was completely reorganized. The infantry rifle squad was divided into two fire teams of five men each. This organization, small as it is, is important because the squad is the forward element of the battalion having close contact with the enemy. Hence, the effectiveness of the battalion in combat is measured in terms of the effectiveness of the rifle squad as it performs its combat mission by fire and maneuver.

General Gray has this to say about the reorganization of the rifle squad:

The most important change in the infantry structure was the division of the squad into two five-man fire teams. This meant that now the basic element of close combat was the five-man fire team of which the company could dispose at most 24--the same number, although they were now smaller, as in World War I. This was a momentous step, for it finally recognized, after many, many years of error, that one man cannot effectively control eight or more fighters in the critical phase of close combat, and that with the defender dispersing in greater depth the attacker needed more rather than fewer basic close combat elements. (Ref 4, pp 26-27)

The battle group has passed into military history but it is worthy of note for certain contributions to flexibility it made during its brief existence. In 1958 Captain Marvin L. Worley, Jr. commented upon the battle group as follows:

The battle group is a self-contained unit consisting of a headquarters and headquarters company, four organic rifle companies and an artillery mortar battery. The battle group will normally be employed as an organic element of the infantry division to which it is assigned. When properly reinforced, the battle group may be assigned independent missions under corps or field army control. The formation of battle group task forces will be accomplished by the attachment of tanks, additional fire support elements, engineers, and transport means allocated by the division commander. The composition of task forces may change frequently to meet the need for flexibility in the organization of the division for combat.

The rifle company consists of a company headquarters, 4 identical rifle platoons, and 1 weapons platoon. Each rifle platoon has 3 rifle squads of 11 men each, organized into 2 fire teams of five men each; and a weapons squad with 2 machineguns and two 3.5 rocket launchers.

The weapons platoon with its three 81mm mortars and two 106mm recoilless rifles provides fire support for the 4 rifle platoons. (Ref 20, p 61)

One of the distinctive features of the battle group was its support by an organic artillery mortar battery. This support was the heaviest ever allocated organically to a United States Army infantry unit smaller than a regiment. The mortar battery was organized and equipped to tie into the division artillery fire support nets in order to call in additional fire support. The battery was also provided with a forward observer section to be with each rifle company. There was also an air control team for communication with the forward air control officer (see App B).

The rifle company of the battle group was compactly organized and supported with organic heavy weapons. There was considerable maneuver built into the rifle squad with the establishment of two fire teams of five men each. The weapons squad was armed with two caliber .30 machineguns and two 3.5-inch rocket launchers. These latter weapons gave the rifle platoon its own antitank capability. The headquarters and headquarters company of the battle group was a most versatile unit. It provided communications, reconnaissance, and antitank support for the group. The communications platoon was equipped to handle communications for the battle group headquarters and to the companies but not within any other elements. The reconnaissance platoon was a basic unit for battlefield surveillance and target acquisition but it also possessed the characteristics of a patrolling and screening force for the battle group commander. The assault gun platoon, with four 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps, provided the group with an extra heavy antitank fire capability. The eventual plan contemplated equipping the assault gun platoon with the M56 gun or the DART. The counterfire squad was equipped with sound-locating devices for target acquisition. It functioned under the group intelligence officer (Ref 20).

A supply and maintenance platoon and personnel section which provide logistical and administrative support. Additional support will be provided by the division service support units. In normal situations, the division transportation battalion will deliver all supplies, except ammunition to the battle group (unit distribution). When required, vehicles from the transportation battalion may be attached to the battle group so that the battle group can draw and transport its supplies from the division supply points. Unless vehicles from the division transportation battalion are attached, the battle group does not have the capability to effect its own resupply under the supply point distribution system, except for ammunition and emergency food supplies. (Ref 20, p 62)

By 1962, the pentomic concept had lessened somewhat in importance because of the international situation. The Army planners were convinced that there should be only one basic type division for both nuclear and conventional combat. The armored divisions, with their three combat commands under the division headquarters, pointed the way toward the new one-type divisional concept. With the headquarters functioning as the "power handle," the three combat commands were highly interchangeable and flexible. The same concept was applied to the infantry division under the program of Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) (see App C). The following extract explains:

For example, an infantry division might have 8 infantry battalions and 2 tank (armor) battalions; an armored division might contain 6 tank battalions and 5 mechanized (infantry) battalions; a mechanized (infantry) division might have 7 mechanized (infantry) battalions and 3 tank battalions; and an airborne division might include 9 airborne (infantry) battalions and 1 tank battalion. The new airmobile division is heavy with cavalry battalions (infantry). Three of these, one brigade, are parachute-qualified. However, there is no fixed normal or standard mix of maneuver battalions for ROAD divisions. The airborne division has a strength of approximately 13,500; the others have a strength in excess of 15,000. (Ref 16, p 63)

Of greatest significance to the Army was the return of the battalion to the infantry division and the elimination of the battle group. The battle group was replaced by the traditional battalion—adjusted to a new age. The regiment was not revived although its protagonists fought a sharp rear—guard action in the pages of the Service Journals in an attempt to restore the ancient and honored unit. However, modern war, het or cold, nuclear or conventional, seems to have left the regimental colors and traditions to the tender care of the historians and museum curators (see Fig. 5).

The phaseout of the battle group in 1962 and its replacement by the maneuver battalion of the ROAD division did not eliminate some of the better features of the pentomic battle group. The new battalion organization retained the rifle squad and its two fire teams, which gave the infantry the most maneuverable and balanced rifle squads in its long history. The 4.2-inch mortar company, the fifth company in the old battle group, was reduced to platoon strength. Further, the artillerymen who formerly operated the mortars for the battle group were replaced by infantry mortarmen. The 81 mm mortars remained with the rifle company in the weapons platoon. Thus the maneuver rifle battalion of the ROAD division was assured of the support fires of organic heavy weapons (Ref 4).

In the Army Information Digest of March 1962, the following comment was made relative to the ROAD concept:

A fundamental concept underlying the new structure is that of tailoring divisions to meet varying requirements. This is done with "building blocks" that are interchangeable within and between divisions.




Figure 5. The Airmobile Division Organization

These building blocks are the COMBAT MANEUVER BATTALIONS that are assigned to a common DIVISION BASE.

The DIVISION BASE contains the elements required for all divisions. It includes the command and control elements; the division artillery, other required combat and combat support units such as the reconnaissance squadron, an aviation battalion, a signal battalion, and an engineer battalion; a support command which provides administrative and logistical support of the division; and three brigade headquarters. The types of units that make up the division base are the same for all divisions; however, their equipment, organization, and methods of operating may vary depending upon the type of division and its mission. (Ref 21, p 4)

The ROAD concept was not new to the United States Army. While it was not so identified, the ROAD concept grew out of the organization of the World War II armored division. The following comment is significant of the ROAD fundamental concept.

All ROAD divisions have a common base. Although there are slight variations in the composition of the base, for all practical purposes it consists of the division head-quarters, three subordinate brigade headquarters (thus retaining the triangular armored division's format of three combat commands), the division artillery, an engineer battalion, an aviation battalion, a signal battalion, a cavalry squadron, a military police company, and a support command. The primary mission of the cavalry squadron is reconnaissance; it perpetuates the term "cavalry" bacause it employs ground vehicles and aircraft in much the same manner as troopers of old employed horses. (Ref 6, p 39)

The support command, a new departure for the United States Army, was charged with provision of medical, administrative, maintenance, and supply service. Artillery support for the ROAD division was contained in three 105mm howitzer battalions. In addition, there was a missile battalion with HONEST JOHN and LITTLE JOHN rockets, and a battalion (composite) of 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. As can be seen from the above, the ROAD division possessed artillery and missile weapons with both conventional and nuclear capabilities.

The ROAD division brought a maximum of flexibility and versatility to the infantry. Essentially, its flexibility rests in the three brigade head-quarters and the maneuver battalions; the pentomic battle group was eliminated and a smaller battalion substituted in its place. There were a number of reasons for dropping the battle group, one of which was its unwieldy command structure—there was no intervening authority between the group commander (colonel) and the company commander (captain or lieutenant). The "experience gap" of the commanders in the battle group chain of command was too great for modern warfare with its requirements of dispersion and independent operations. The pentomic concept was one

which served essentially as an interim measure until a better infantry division structure, such as ROAD, could be conceived, tested, and adopted.

The 4.2-inch mortar survived with distinction the various organizational changes effected by Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID) and ROAD. The obvious need for a weapon with artillery capabilities and effects in support of the infantry battalions in all types of foreseeable combat caused the 4.2-inch mortar to be retained. Combat experience of the infantry in Korea with the 4.2-inch mortar had been good. The heavy mortar provided not only a heavier punch but it could, by virtue of its high angle of fire, reach areas that artillery could not.

General George S. Patton, Jr. was essentially an armor commander, yet he was somewhat of a generalist rather than a specialist. His notes and recommendations for the conduct of war throw considerable light upon his military thinking and they are as valid today as when written. The following quotations are significant rationale for retention of the 4.2-inch mortar in the ROAD organization:

A battalion of 4.2-inch chemical mortars, when available should be attached to an infantry division. An infantry regiment in combat should have a 4.2 chemical company attached. (Ref 22, p 407)

In the battalion the heavy weapons company paces the battalion. (Ref 22, p 410)

The 4.2-inch mortar was retained for several cogent reasons. The ROAD divisional organization was established to give the infantry a built-in flexibility for response to a requirement for operations in either conventional or nuclear war. In essence, this response was to be effected by the traditional doctrine of fire and maneuver. But in nuclear war, dispersion of units for combat was indicated. From consequent increased independence of command and maneuver under nuclear warfare arises the requirement for independent and heavy supporting fires for the infantry battalion. The 4.2-inch mortar possessed characteristics similar to field artillery which was authorized in the ROAD reorganization of the infantry division. However, it is well to note the advantages of the heavy mortar over the conventional artillery cannon in the following terms:

Cannon are capable of delivering all types of fires. They are characterized by flexibility in employment, accuracy, the ability to shift fires quickly, a high rate of sustained fire, and the ability to mass large volumes of fire from dispersed positions under all conditions of weather and terrain. Cannons have restricted mobility in difficult terrain, relatively short ranges, and comparatively heavy tonnage requirements for ammunition.

Heavy mortars have capabilities similar to cannon. They differ from cannon primarily in their higher trajectory, shorter minimum and maximum ranges, and greater volume of fire per tube. They are readily moved by air and can be emplaced in positions inaccessible to ground vehicles. They are useful in providing large volumes of fire in support of close combat forces. (Ref 23, p 37)

A battle group comprised a headquarters company, four rifle companies, and a mortar battery. The mortar battery included a battery headquarters and two mortar platoons. Although the battle group was, in reality, a large battalion, it required the same organic heavy fire support as the eliminated regimental organization. It will be recalled that in World War I, the heavy machinegun was organized into machinegun battalion units which were separate from the infantry rifle battalions and regiments. By this token, the infantry rifle battalion had no heavy machineguns organically assigned. Required machineguns were attached to companies and battalions for specific missions and combat operations. This arrangement was not satisfactory and the planner of ROCID and ROAD organizations had this lesson of history before them. Ergo, the 4.2-inch mortar remained organic to the ROAD battalion, as it was neither desired nor desirable to form a separate divisional heavy mortar unit.

In the infantry rifle battalion, especially in Vietnam, where jungle rice paddy and mountains make the movement of the 4.2-inch mortar and its ammunition a heavy task for the foot soldier, there is a tendency to return to the smaller caliber mortar (the 81mm) as a heavy weapon for the battalion, and employ the 4.2-inch mortar in a more or less semi-fixed fire base along with the artillery. As has been noted in Evolution of the US Army Infantry Mortar Squad: The Argonne to Pleiku, the Marines have returned the 60mm infantry mortar to combat service. This return of the smaller caliber mortar has not displaced the M79 grenade launcher in the battalion rifle companies. The M79 is still regarded as a fine grenade launcher. The trend toward smaller caliber and lighter mortars may be a particular requirement of the limited war in Vietnam. That the trend would obtain in a conventional conflict cannot be judged with any degree of accuracy, since the doctrine of fire and movement and the need for certain weight fires and certain celerity of movement would still govern. In Vietnam, this doctrine is being tested by combinations of guerrilla war, terror, and conventional war including siege warfare, in the current battle actions.

The principal component of the rifle battalion, the rifle company, was reorganized under ROAD to contain three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. The rifle platoon contained three ten-man rifle squads and a five-man weapons squad.

The use of the armored personnel carrier (APC) by infantry units has been on the increase since the Korean War. The armored or mechanized infantry rely almost entirely upon the APC for mobility and maneuver to the final assault phase of the combat. Within the past year or so there has been considerable feeling that the soldier mounted in the APC should be firing from the moving vehicle. Experimental firing ports have been installed in a number of APC with the idea of employing the full combat potential of the

⁶These comments are based upon information received from a former Chief of Infantry Section, OCAFF, now G-3, ARPAC.

troops being carried therein in the maneuver phase. There are those who consider this move as one in the wrong direction and they are quick to allege that the APC, thus altered, is a poor tank. The following comment in 1965 is of significance in view of the trend toward fighting from the APC:

Armored infantry are specialized in that they advance mounted in armored personnel carriers and upon dismounting, fight as infantry. They can operate in combat without tanks or they may combine both mounted and dismounted actions in their tactical patterns. Mounted combat from the present armored personnel carriers is difficult if not impossible for the squad personnel within the vehicle. Fires of the carrier-mounted weapons only can be delivered while the vehicle is moving. The addition of numerous gun and rifle ports in the hull would tend to weaken the personnel protection potential of the carrier. The protection afforded by the armored personnel carrier enables the armored infantry squad to get as far forward as possible for the delivery of a decisive blow upon the enemy when he is subjected to or recovering from the heavy fire power of the accompanying tanks. The fires of the carrier-mounted weapons assure the squad close support when it is needed. (Ref 24, p 55)

Here we are presented with a dilemma: the sacrifice of the overall protection of the APC up to the point of close contact with the enemy or engagement while moving by small arms and grenade fires from ports in the hull of the APC. Conversely, there are advantages, psychological and military, to be gained by firing from the interior of the APC while it is in motion. Among these are occupation of the passengers with a combat task prior to disembarkation and closing with the enemy, that is, delivery of aimed fires upon the hostile position and personnel prior to dismounting, thus inhibiting the hostile force from delivering accurate and effective fire against the APC as they advance.

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION

The span of control may be defined as the number of principal subordinates a commander must direct to insure that the unit he commands is
functional in garrison or in the field. Historically, the span of control has
been established by the format of military tactical organization which is
prescribed by regulations or orders based upon current doctrine. Broadly,
the span of control is limited by both human and material factors, that is,
the physical and mental abilities of the commander and the state of the art
of weaponry and communications, including transport. Specifically, the
span of control is limited by the terrain, climate, and general environment
of the combat area. Throughout history, the military profession has
endeavored to limit the number of individuals in the commander's span of
control by constant reorganization of units and redefinition of tactical doctrine
and individual functions.

In the Greek phalanx and the Roman Legion, the span of control was measured in terms of the number of subordinates the leader could control in combat with his voice or visual signals. At that period of history, the number was deemed to be in the area of eight to ten men. Prior to this era, the Chinese general, Sun Tzu, had stated:

The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men. It is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one. It is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. (Ref 25, p 55)

Aside from the requirements for mechanical and lethal weaponry there are additional factors involved in the organization and control of the infantry battalion. The size, shape, and interior organization of the battalion has been influenced throughout history by human factors. Inasmuch as war is conducted by humans and not machines, the human qualities of age, experience, education, training, intelligence, bravery, ability, and determination exert significant influence upon the span of control of the commander. How many subordinates can a commander control under the stress of combat? This condition has varied throughout military history and is directly related, not only to the human factors, as cited above, but to the weapons, tactics, and state of the military art. Each period of history has produced outstanding field commanders at all levels of military organization. Assuming that the human factors do cause what the psychologist terms "individual differences," there must be criteria that affect the organization, size, command, and control of the infantry battalion. It is impossible to average these individual differences, but a standard military training and academic education will tend to equalize these differences.

AR 320-5, <u>Dictionary of United States Army Terms</u>, defines command in the following terms: "Command: The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces."

Command is then an expression of the authority of the state in the person of an individual who holds rank for this purpose. The battalion and other military organizations from the field army to the rifle squad of the infantry are subjected to command by an individual assigned solely for that purpose by virtue of his rank and position in the military service. Command of any military unit is exercised by the commander through means of subordinate commanders. The number of principal subordinate commanders serving under a higher commander constitute the "span of control." Over the years and through many campaigns, wars, and battles, the number of subordinates that a commander can control has been found to depend upon the state of communication existing between them. In ancient times, vis-à-vis control was traditional, but with warfare becoming more complex and dispersed due to improved weapon lethality and mobility this was no longer possible. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century (1890) this fact was recognized by the reorganization of the US infantry regiment into three battalions of four companies, each under the command of a major. Thus the span of control of the battalion was established at four subordinate unit commanders plus a minimal battalion staff of two or three officers and noncommissioned officers. This span of control has survived generally until the present period of 1968.

Examples of command and control situations from history have shown that there is a limit to the number of subordinates a commander can control. Recent advances in communication techniques have afforded the commander instant and effective communication with his unit commanders. Ergo, assumption will be made by some that because of improved communications the span of control may be increased. There is justification for challenging the foregoing statement. Questions relating to the above assertion may be phrased somewhat as follows: (1) Is span of control a direct function of the efficiency of the means of communications available to the commander? (2) When did communications evidence such improvement that the span of control could be increased? (3) What form of improved communications has exerted the most influence upon the span of control? The following extract will shed some light upon the above queries:

From the earliest times through the Napoleonic period, the primary means of transmitting orders on the battlefield was either by runner or by mounted aide; semaphoric and later rudimentary electrical means were employed only between the army in the field and the seat of government. But early in our own Civil War the Union Army took the lead in the adoption both of the mobile field telegraph, connecting armies, corps, and division, and of Major Meyer's visual signalling system which extended to smaller units. While neither of these systems can be compared in efficiency to the electronic methods... they were both vast improvements over the use of runners or horsemen; and by the latter part of the Civil War, they were in common use in both contesting forces. (Ref 26, pp 11-12)

The matter of individual differences establishes the superior from the average or mediocre performer. However, the military structure is based upon approved, established tables of organization and promotion systems. These are career patterns by which certain individuals are posted to specific assignments by rank. These ranks have been attained by prescribed periods of service in grade, seniority, or selection. Assumption is made by all concerned that by the time the individual has reached a certain grade in his specific arm or service, that he is qualified professionally, by experience, training, etc., to command a unit comparable to his rank. Thus, the span of control for each rank, in the military hierarchy, is established by law. Such fact assumes that the incumbent at each level of the command structure is involved in a span of control situation, either as a superior or as a subordinate of a superior commander. It follows that the spans of control of all commanders are established and they must perforce accept them and operate.

In the American Civil War (1861-1865) the tactical organization of the regular Army infantry battalion took the form of an eight- or ten-company unit. The battalion commander's span of control was almost as great as that of the Volunteer (State Troops) of the regimental commander which included ten company commanders in addition to his staff. The number of individuals controlled directly by either the battalion commander, or the regimental commander, under the span of control principle always included the staff of four to eight officers and noncommissioned officers at headquarters, in addition to the eight or ten company commanders. If battalions were formed in the Volunteers, it was possible for the lieutenant colonel and the major to command them, hence, the span of control of the colonel was reduced to his staff and two principal subordinates. It must be remembered that the staff officer of the battalion or regiment possessed the authority by delegation to issue orders in his commander's name (see Fig. 1).

The officers who reported directly to the colonel of the Volunteer regiment were the lieutenant colonel, the adjutant, the major, the quarter-master, the chaplain, and the two assistant surgeons. Administration was accomplished by the adjutant who worked directly under the second-in-command. Training and operations functions were performed by the major when he was not doing duty as a temporary battalion commander. In practice, the regimental commander had only to command his staff in order to implement his span of control over the companies, or battalions, when formed.

Numerically, the number of subordinates a commander can direct successfully in battle has been shown historically to be approximately eight or nine. The span of control of the battalion commander, from the beginning of the US Army, is noted in the Historical Background to this study. Traditionally, it has varied from three to ten subordinate unit commanders less a staff of from three to six battalion headquarters personnel. One of the peculiarities of the chain of command system which is the basic rationale for the span of control is that the commander may, under certain conditions, bypass his staff and issue orders directly to his principal subordinates. Occasions when this is done are in emergencies and usually when

the battalion commander is on the ground away from headquarters or his command post. In the type of combat encountered in Vietnam, this is usually the situation with the command helicopter constituting a highly-mobile command post for the battalion commander. In this instance, the battalion commander must keep his staff fully aware of his location and his actions and to whom he has issued specific orders either verbally or in writing, in full or fragmentary form. Unless he does this, the command and control function of the battalion under the chain of command and span of control system will collapse,

In further clarification of the span of control principle and its operation, the span of control can be discussed as three functions. These are the tactical, the administrative, and the staff functions. The tactical span of control is directly concerned with the command and control of combat troops in operations, whereas the administrative span of control is concerned with noncombat or support units. The staff span of control, exercised by the commander's deputy, second-in-command, or executive officer, is concerned with staff command. On high levels the chief of staff performs the command and control function under the orders, commands, and directives of the unit commander.

In the modern infantry battalion, the commander does possess a tactical span of control of four company commanders. He also possesses a staff and administrative span of control of his executive officer and the S1, S2, S3, and S4. As noted, he usually deals with his staff through his executive officer, hence, the span of control totals five men. Obviously, if the battalion commander does not follow the chain of command principle, his span of control will be increased as he deals directly with his staff and not through the executive officer. If this latter officer is bypassed, as a matter of personal policy or professional ignorance, the commander may find that his span of control has become unwieldy. In this instance, professional education and training will make the difference, that is, "there are no poor battalions, only poor battalion commanders."

The battalion is the largest ground unit which is personally influenced, under "usual" conditions of combat by its commander. A brigade commander, except in an emergency, does not interfere with the operations of one of his battalion commanders. However, a battalion commander often directly controls one of his own companies—for example, when the unit is faltering because of the combat loss of its commander. In the event that all company officers are casualties, the battalion commander would send one of his staff to take command, thus influencing the action indirectly. Within the battalion, the companies are the "building blocks" of the battalion structure, and the battalion commander's primary responsibility is that they are properly emplaced and combat functional.

Under the ROAD concept of organization the battalion commander's starf consists of an executive officer (major); an S3 (major); an adjutant (captain); S1 (captain), and S2 (captain), an S4 (captain), a communications officer (captain); and a sergeant major. This is a typical infantry battalion commander's staff. While the staff does increase the number in the span

of control, it should be noted that in practice the battalion commander deals with his staff through the executive officer who functions as a chief of staff, The battalion staff operates through the elements of the headquarters and headquarters company assigned as integral to the battalion. The headquarters and headquarters company has grown from a battalion headquarters detachment of World War II days to an organization comprising 19 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 269 enlisted men and, as such, is one of the four companies within the span of control of the battalion commander. Theoretically, in 1968 the battalion commander possesses a span of control of one executive officer plus four company commanders. If he does not use his executive officer as he should, his span of control may be enlarged as he controls each staff officer personally. Whether this situation occurs depends mainly upon the professionalism and experience of the battalion commander and the training of his subordinates. As such, the battalion staff officer does not command, he issues orders and directives in the name of the commander on the basis of delegated authority. He is, in a sense, an extension of the commander's authority so that he may cope with the span of control required for control of the battalion. This span of control principle enables the battalion commander to operate with a span of control of six (one staff officer and five company commanders).

Concerning modern tactical communication and its impact upon the span of control, the thinking among professional soldiers is that the dimensions of the battlefield are growing. Today, the battlefield can be national, international, or local, in site and area. This belief is based essentially upon the fact that the past World Wars were global in extent. These latter conflicts involved millions of men and millions of miles of territory. The great distances required a maximum effective performance from the contemporary communication media. These media included radio, both voice and CW (code), telephone, land telegraph, panels, flags, and lights. These were the types of communication available to the air, ground, and naval services of the combatants. World War II, Korea, and Vietnam were especially marked by the advent of the portable, tactical radio-telephone and its assignment down to the infantry rifle platoon and squad. With communication thus assured from the higher to the lower level units a control of combat was achieved to a degree never before attained in the long history of warfare.

In modern warfare, sophisticated communications systems have not enlarged the span of control but have afforded better control by the next higher commander. Captain Roger H. C. Donlon, USA hero of Vietnam, commented thusly: "The key to the whole thing is communications. Without it we had nothing."

The span of control principle is, of course, basic to the organization and operation of the kattaion. How many subordinates a commander can control in battle is determined by several conditions. Among these conditions are the period of history involved or the time frame in which the commander finds himself and his unit. Weaponry, and especially communications, available to the commander have significant effect upon the control limitations imposed upon the commander. Historically, the span of control has been

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demonstrated as having exerted vital and far-reaching influences upon the successful or unsuccessful exercise of military command. There is a limit to the number of subordinates that a commander can control in garrison or in the field. It should be noted that these circumstances are environmentally and tactically different. Nonbattle or garrison situations are marked by an absence of the pressure engendered by the possibility of combat wounds, deaths, and military failure --that is, surrender.

The span of control in a noncombat situation will be affected by the mission of the unit-training. The maneuver phase, which is employed by the military profession to test proficiency, should reflect a realistic span of control comparable to that employed in combat. Whether or not three or four companies are the maximum that a commander can control in combat is a question that has never been definitely answered. That the battalion organization is centered about the span of control is an acknowledged fact of military life. Theoretically, under the span of control concept, the commander functions by controlling three or four company commanders. For his rank and responsibility this span of control is about all he can operate under combat conditions. With the battalion headquarters personnel of executive S1, S2, S3, S4 (the battalion staff), and various enlisted men as assistants, it will be seen that the span of control of the battalion commander extends much farther than to the three or four company commanders of the battalion organic units.

Colonel Arthur P. Wade, late of the staff and faculty of the United States Military Academy at West Point, had this to say in his previously cited paper on the subject of the span of control:

In recent years a theory has gained circulation that a commander's span of control is directly related to his means of communicating with his subordinate commanders. The theory has now been expressed officially in the directives which led to the reorganization of the infantry division. A basic tenet of the reorganization, for example, was the idea that the new division should optimize a span of control, defined as 'the maximum number of subordinate elements at each echelon which can be controlled effectively.' This theory was expressed, in general terms, by the principle of 'recognition of increased span of control possible through modern signal communications'. (Ref 26, p 11)

The modern means of communication available to the commander enabled the Army to reorganize the infantry division and its component units under the now outmoded and outdated battle group (ROCID) concept. At the time of this concept, 1956, it was noted that:

... the division commander now controls directly 8 subordinate maneuver elements: 5 infantry battle groups (the battalion was eliminated—as well as was the regiment), a reconnaissance squadron, a tank battalion, and under the new concept of employment of atomic fires—the nuclear delivery means of division artillery. This span of control

is contrasted with that of the old triangular division, wherein the division commander controlled directly only three infantry regiments, a tank battalion, and to a lesser degree, a reconnaissance company. (Ref 26 p 11)

The World War I United States Infantry was organized and reorganized along the lines of the French and Allied tables of organization. Eventually the various infantry units were organized as follows:

Organization	Enlisted Men	Officers			
Company	250	6			
Battalion	1,026	27			
Regiment	3,755	100			
Brigade	8,210	225			
Division	27,152	975			

In the World War I United States National Army organization. there were 4 companies of 250 men in each infantry battalion. The infantry regiment consisted of three battalions of approximately 1000 men each. The infantry brigade was comprised of 2 infantry regiments of 3000 men each and the infantry division consisted of 2 brigades with a division rifle strength of about 12,000 riflemen. The span of control of the infantry rifle company commander covered 5 lieutenants and his company first sergeant, mess sergeant, and supply sergeant. On battalion level, the battalion commander, a major, commanded four company commanders and his adjutant, or, second-in-command. The regimental commander's span of control encompassed three battalion commanders and a small regimental staff, the adjutant, the regimental executive officer and S-1 Personnel, S-2 Intelligence, S-3 Operations, S-4 Supply. There was generally a Chaplain assigned plus the necessary medical officers, including veterinarians. (Ref 27, pp 83-84)

The infantry organization of World War II was perhaps the best planned and most tightly organized ground force ever sent into battle by the United States. The battalion was larger, but lean in personnel and mean in its weaponry and capabilities.

Spacing between troops and units as a factor of span of control has always been a minor concern of the commander in the field. Historically, the ancients utilized the order of battle alinement system to help solve this perplexing problem. Weaponry and its employment in battle exerted considerable influence upon the precise, mathematical spacing of the men and the lining up of the units. Weapons wielded by muscular power alone required that the wielders be compactly arranged to give the maximum effect of the cutting edge of the hand-held weapons in the man-to-man struggle.

With the discovery of gun powder, the traumatic power of the weapon was increased since it projected its force at greater distances. The battle thus became more indirect and the soldier only closed with his enemy at the final phase of the battle. But the theory of massed fires of

companies and battalions caused the compact phalanx or square-type formations of the ancients to be retained until weaponry became too accurate and lethal to withstand in formation.

Basically, the spacing of troops in modern war dated from the field manuals of the Civil War which stated "that the comrades in battle were to maintain visual and vocal contact." Essentially, in the United States Army, this has meant a five-pace interval between skirmishers on the line. In the parade formation ranks the distance between ranks is traditionally 40 inches, with the distance between soldiers about 14 inches. The size of the infantry squad eight to ten men) has been correlated with the number of men the squad leader can control in combat by hand and voice signals. With modern communication devices the distances between soldiers have increased. The factors of environment, terrain, climate, and visibility determine the spacing of the troops and units. Under modern mobile conditions of combat no precise mathematical table, as worked out by the ancients, is applicable. The soldier must adjust himself to the terrain, taking advantage of all cover and concealment. Improved communications permit distances between "his comrades in battle" to be greatly increased.

There has been some doubt raised as to the effect of the state of the communication art upon the span of control exercised by the commander on the battlefield. In terms of contemporary communications before the great discoveries and inventions, the personal and human capabilities of the commander and the commanded are directly involved:

Radio telephone, wire telephone and other less technical means of communication gave the commander of a World War II unit communication above and beyond that ever before available. Units, at all levels, were controlled and directed toward their missions by fragmentary orders. Given over the radio by the voice of the commander, these orders were as pertinent and direct as they were personal and human. This was not the equivalent of the direct, personal, vis a vis leadership of the Civil War combat commander, who waved his sabre and charged. Over the radio, the tone of the voice and the personal contact with the commander, even remote, was, in a modern war-- a good substitute. (Ref 27, p 117)

Span of control must always be correlated with the contemporary state of the art of tactical communication. From the Civil War through World War I, battlefield communication was constantly drawing away from the vis-a-vis command procedures of previous wars. Improved weaponry and updated organization and tactics exerted significant influences upon the span of control.

⁷ The spacing or dispersion of units on future battlefields, especially in event of nuclear war, cannot be predicted accurately. However, comparisons have been made in an interesting and informative article in the Military Review of March 1960, entitled "Interaction of Firepower, Mobility and Dispersion." While this article does not claim to prescribe troop spacing it does furnish invaluable historical comparison with a view toward the future.

Human factors are essential elements in the span of control in the areas of memory, mental concentration, and the specific intelligence quotient of the commander himself. It has been said that the span of control is basically a function of the mind of the commander. Individual mental, physical, and moral factors will positively or negatively influence this function. Wade has said it well in the following extract from his cited paper:

Even with the ultimate in communications -- long-range thought transference -- optimum span of control would still vary with individual commanders. Those blessed with rare flexibility of mind, keen concentration, and a photographic memory might have no difficulty in controlling 8 or 9 subordinate elements; others, probably equally fine tacticians, would find it restrictive to work directly with more than 5 or 6 subordinates. (Ref 26, p 14)

Historically, tactics and organizational concepts will change, and weapons and communications will reach fantastic capabilities. However, these will be subject to the limitations of the military professional intellect which must direct and control their implementation. Justification of increased span of control solely upon the invention and utilization of improved means of communication is neither sound nor wise. As noted, the limited capabilities of the human mind tend to negate the advantages of these technical advances in communications.

In effect, an increase in the span of control wholly based upon improved communications may handicap the average commander. If he is gifted with certain attributes of the great captains such as a photographic memory, a highly-developed intuition, creativity, and supported by a highly competent staff, he will experience little or no difficulty (Ref 26). However, if he does not possess these, the increased span of control may not only be a handicap but a military disaster as well.

In World War II, the addition of the so-called Walkie-Talkie and SCR 300 gave the infantry and other arms instantaneous and generally reliable communication. For the first time in our military history, there was radio communication between the elements of the infantry company. The <u>Army Lineage</u> Book comments:

Five hand radios were included in a company's equipment. These, and telephones, knit companies tighter together than had been the case since the Civil War; but it by no means made them act as one man. Dispersion to avoid the deadly effects of enemy fire threw squads, or fractions of squads, on their own in combat, particularly in dense foliage, in the mountains, and in night operations. (Ref 1, p 57)

Thus, in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam, it was and is possible for a commander of an infantry battalion to talk directly with the leaders of the attacking units and direct their efforts. Often this direction is vital because the commander is either airborne or in a terrain or tactical situation remote to the subordinate unit commanders. Supporting

fires of mortars and artillery are also controlled and directed by radio and telephone (airborne or ground) communication in ways which were never thought attainable in past wars. 8

Beginning with the Korean War, the helicopter began to assert itself as a most important new means of command, control, and transport at all levels. Highly maneuverable and capable of vertical ascent and descent, this air vehicle enabled a commander to reach the troops quickly. Enroute, he was afforded maximum observation of the battle area. Aside from its great command and control potential, the helicopter was an ideal transport vehicle for evacuation of the sick and wounded. Maximum employment of the helicopter in this activity was initiated in Korea. During the Korean War and after, there was some advancement of the idea that helicopters possessed a tactical combat potential.

In the post-Korean development period, the helicopter came into its own as a command, centrol, fire support, and transport vehicle. With its high speed and vertical ascent and descent characteristics, the helicopter introduced radical changes in the time and space factors of tactical ground operations. The effect of the helicopter upon the span of control at battalion level has been noted primarily from the standpoint of communications. By its inherent speed and mobility, the helicopter has given the battalion commander in Vietnam a high degree of personal contact with and control over his frontline elements. Never in our military history has the infantry battalion commander been able to fly, or hover, above his combat units on site and possess visual and vocal contact with the units and individuals in his span of control. This outstanding contribution of the helicopter is, of course, in addition to its revolutionary effect upon tactical operations in the delivery of troop units to or from the combat area.

⁸ See Army 1967 Green Book, pp 172 and 174, for a condensed review of communication facilities and equipment available to the infantry from squad to division level.

THE ROAD AND AIRMOBILE BATTALIONS IN VIETNAM

In Vietnam, standard infantry battalions of the ROAD concept are engaged in combat. The "building block" employment of the rifle battalions within the brigade and division has functioned well according to reports received from the battle zone. In connection with operations in Vietnam it must be recalled that the US Army is fighting a three-faced type of warfare, that is, conventional war, guerrilla (unconventional war), and nonviolent warfare (civic action). To establish a battalion organization that can operate equally well in all three types of combat has been difficult for US Army planners. The following commentary by a combat-experienced brigade commander in Vietnam is of interest as it defines the role of the battalion in the typical "search and destroy" operations carried out there:

The battalion is the basic operational unit in jungle search-and-destroy operations. Its fighting is done principally by squads and platoons under company commanders' control. The unit that locates the enemy should not be reluctant to break contact and withdraw far enough to permit free, uninhibited employment of supporting fires. After supporting fires have done their damage, the unit can again push forward small units to survey the situation and to bring in new supporting fires, if appropriate, or continue its search.

The brigade commander, once the enemy is located, should see that massive volumes of supporting fires are put on the enemy and simultaneously commit additional battalions to block the enemy's withdrawal and to employ supporting fires to destroy him.

Battalion, brigades, and divisions operate by means of platoon and squad tactics. Therefore, battalion, brigade, and division commanders must know how their platoons and squads operate and insure that they operate

soundly and professionally. (Ref 28, p 17)

In Vietnam combat experience has demonstrated many important facts about the battalions of the present-day infantry arm. In both the ROAD standard infantry division and the airmobile 1st Cavalry Division, the battalion is the primary functional unit for supply and combat operations. These battalions possess mobility and celerity never envisioned even in World War II and Korea. Because of these two factors, planning at all levels, including the battalion, must be more closely coordinated than in the days before the helicopter became a vehicle of command and control, supply, and fire support. The infantry battalions depend upon the UH-1D helicopter for logistic support and the artillery and armor battalions look to the CH-47 to deliver the goods to the battle units.

The position of the brigade in the overall chain of command is well established by the tables of organization of the various types of infantry

divisions. How the brigade commander and staff serve the battalions is excellently stated in the following extract:

There are several ways in which the brigade can assist battalions with logistic support of their operations. The brigade provides planning guidance to the battalion and insures a close marriage of operations and logistics during planning and execution. It insures that the division locates logistic elements in the best position to support the brigade's operations. The brigade acquires, allocates, and coordinates the use of helicopters for logistic support of the battalions, and also expedites solutions to the logistic problems with which the battalions need assistance. (Ref 29, p 38)

The brigade and division headquarters are related to the maneuver battalions of the infantry division as the "power handle" is related to the attachable-detachable tools it operates. The transmission of this "power" to the battalions is controlled by the brigade commander.

The brigade commander can assist the battalion commander in several ways. He can insure the availability of adequate supporting fires and airborne artillery observers and forward air controllers constantly overhead. He can place at the battalion commander's full-time disposal at least one and preferably two helicopters. The battalion commander can use one helicopter for command and control purposes and for assisting his units with land navigation. The other he can use for administrative and logistical missions. One OH-13 and one UH-1D will satisfy the battalion commander's minimum needs. The brigade air officer must aim to provide maximum support to battalions. (Ref 28, p 18)

One of the problems envisioned by Army personnel when ROAD displaced the regimental structure and substituted the battalion was the matter of unit spirit. The regiment was, for centuries, the repository of the <u>esprit</u> of the fighting unit. In a sense, the regiment was in the same relation to the officers and men as was the family to its children; the commander was often in <u>loco parentis</u> to his troops. Further, the historical record of the regiment—its wars, campaigns, battles, and expeditions—set a pattern of heroic, faithful service which the current personnel by their membership were obliged to try to emulate. The battalion of today has inherited its history and traditions from the old regimental organizations of which the battalions were formerly integral parts. The lineage has not been broken as evidenced by the following:

...one solution to the problems of maintaining unit historical continuity throughout the United States Army, the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), was approved by the Secretary of the Army on 24 January 1957. The concept was designed to provide a flexible regimental structure that would permit perpetuation of unit history and tradition in the new tactical

organization of the divisions, without restricting organizational trends of the future.


To accomplish the purpose, famous regiments were selected to serve as parent organizations of all Infantry, Armor, Cavalry, and Artillery tactical units in the Army. (Ref 30, p 17)

With reference to the brigade lineage and tradition authors of the abovecited article point out that brigade histories and traditions will come from

Brigades that were inactivated or disbanded when Regular Army divisions were triangularized in 1939-40. Except for the 1st and 2d Infantry Brigades, which served briefly in World War II as airborne Infantry brigades, and from 1958 to 1962 as Infantry brigades, the Regular Army Infantry brigades have not been used since then. This source will provide two of the three brigades for the 1st through 8th Infantry Divisions. The third brigade in each division will perpetuate the history of the former division headquarters company, which was inactivated when division headquarters was expanded to form the current division headquarters and headquarters company. (Ref 30, p 24)

Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., USA, a brigade commander in Vietnam has furnished a most valuable contemporary commentary upon the function of the brigade commander vis-ā-vis the battalions and the division (see Figs. 6 and 7). He points out that unit spirit is an absolute of success in combat operations. This is an old military axiom and has been stated in many ways by as many commanders as there are armies. How to build esprit in the brigade which is in reality a functional "power handle" for the employment of its tools (battalions) constitutes a real challenge to the brigade commander. The battalions are not permanently assigned to the brigade, hence, one might surmise that the spirit of the brigade will be found in the spirit of the battalions it commands, for the time being. This is not essentially so as indicated in the following extract:


... unit esprit is built most effectively around the battalion and the division itself since these have distinctive histories and traditions and a fixed organization. However, the brigade commander has a different problem in building brigade esprit. Being one of three tactical headquarters which, at one time or another, commands every battalion in the division, the brigade should build its own esprit in a manner that disparages no other unit and contributes to the ability of all battalions and brigades to work together smoothly and in wholehearted cooperation. Being recently created and lacking a distinctive history or tradition, the brigade must build its esprit on the present and the future, not the past. (Ref 29, p46)



Note: This organization is based on TOE 7-15E.

To simplify, company headquarters, and battalion headquarters section of headquarters and headquarters company, and Davy Crockett and chaplain sections augmentations are not shown.

Figure 6. Current Battalion Organization




*This alternative shows combat support element retained in headquarters and headquarters company. A less desirable solution would be to form a separate combat support company The antitank platoon would be at cadre strength.

Figure 7. Revised Battalion Organization

Deployed to Vietnam in 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) has already earned the Presidential Unit Citation for distinguished service in combat. For the first time in our military history infantry battalions have gained mobility far beyond even the early thinking expressed by General James M. Gavin in his book Airborne Warfare. The eight infantry battalions, of which three have airborne-qualified personnel, are assigned to the brigade headquarters in much the same manner as tools are attached to a power-handle unit (see Fig. 8 for battalion organization). The high degree of mobility of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was succinctly stated by the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on 16 June 1965:

As a result, about one-third of its combat elements can be moved into combat by its own aircraft; the other two-thirds will move simultaneously either in air transport aircraft or by shuttling of the division's own aircraft. (Ref 31, p 34)



*One Bde Hqs, and 3 Inf Bns, will have an Airborne Capability **Maneuver Bns will be assigned to Brigades as required.

(Source: Army Information Digest; August 1965, p 36)

Figure 8. The Airmobile Cavalry Division

On brigade and battalion levels, the tactical advantages accruing to the airmobile division are many and varied. Mobility has been a <u>desideratum</u> for all commanders from the beginning of history; the airmobile concept appears to solve the maneuver problem in a positive and dynamic way. The following extract sums it up well:

Airmobility brings to the Army the advantage of permitting the commander to apply decisive firepower and manpower in the most critical area of the battlefield at the most critical time of the battle. (Ref 31, p 35)⁹

See Army Green Book, October 1967, pp 146-154 for a concise review of Army aircraft and aircraft weapons systems.

With reference to communications (within the airmobile division), the following comment has been made:

The airmobile unit commander need not fret that he is outrunning his line of communications. Supply helicopters can catch up with him wherever he goes. Unlike paratroopers an air infantry assault force can fly out after a raid deep into enemy territory. In pursuit it can be persistent and deadly. Its ability to surprise the enemy is a real advantage. (Ref 32, p 14)

The infantry battalions now in combat in Vietnam are almost completely different from those that fought in World War II and the Korean War. In view of the drastic changes brought to the infantry by ROAD and the airmobile concept, it is interesting to note what effect these changes have had on the commanders of these most modern military formations in such a combat situation as Vietnam. Because of the nature of the war there—a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare and jungle and urban combat—the battalion commander faces a more proximate relation with combat and combat leadership. The following comment is revealing with reference to the area of human factors:

Comparing the demands and stresses of combat in the jungles of Vietnam with those experienced during the first year of Korean combat, it seems that company commanders in Vietnam are subjected to about the same stresses as platoon leaders in Korea, and battalion commanders to about the same stresses as company commanders in Korea. While there are exceptions, the average company commander in Vietnam seems to burn himself out in five to seven months, and the average battalion commander in six to eight months. This, of course, varies with individuals and with their experiences, brigade commanders should be able to command for a longer time. (Ref 29, p 41)

While it is too early to deal with Vietnam with a proper historical perspective, it is not presumptuous to note that Vietnam is in reality a proving ground for the latest concepts concerning the organization and operation of the US Army infantry battalion. After-action reports indicate that the infantry battalion as constituted, armed, and commanded today is meeting the challenge of combat as well, or better, than its honored ancestors met the challenges of the past. One has only to read the listing of distinguished unit citations to be informed of this fact. These awards, achieved in the stresses of battle, attest to the ability of the newest concepts of military units to wage battle under conditions of modern warfare.

¹⁰ For a factual, on the ground, account of the operations of US infantry battalions and other units in Vietnam see Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, Battles in The Monsoon, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1967.

CONCLUSIONS

The present-day infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several hundred years. Its formation and size have varied with the type of weaponry and tactics in use at a particular period of history. Essentially, the battalion evolved out of the necessity for a system of command and control on the battlefield. Initially, this system was one based upon conditions of visual or vocal control. Because of this, the "span of control" was recognized as a determining factor in establishment of the size, shape, and organization of a battalion. The present-day battalion with its self-sufficiency, mobility, and heavy firepower is capable of operating independently in certain type missions. To date, it has not been tested in nuclear war but it has shown its ability to function in conventional and unconventional operations and counterinsurgency campaigns. The battalion organizational structure has been shaped by the requirements of weapons and tactics. Within the battalion, the most important building block is the rifle company.

The battalion is a military unit having both combat and administrative functions. It can maneuver, fight, advance, hold, or defend ground. It can march or ride; be airborne or airmobile. It can travel by water and land on hostile shores; it can land on hostile terrain from the air.

The battalion is an important building block of the current infantry division. It possesses great flexibility and firepower and can adapt to the varied conditions of land combat. It is an organizational military entity the parts of which are interchangeable much in the same way that a type tool is attached to a power handle (the brigade headquarters). The mission assigned to the unit will determine the type of tool (battalion) to be employed.

The company is the basic element of the battalion, which includes one or more such units. The elements of the battalion are controlled by a commander who is assisted in his exercise of command and communication by a staff. This staff consists of officers other than those assigned to the component companies. Usually, the staff officer has no command within the battalion — he serves primarily as an assistant and advisor to the battalion commander. The staff operates on the basis of delegated authority; the responsibility for what the battalion does, or fails to do, rests upon the battalion commander.

In essence, the rifle company is to the battalion headquarters as the battalion is to the brigade headquarters. Within the rifle company, the platoons are in a like relationship to the company headquarters; within the platoons and between the rifle and weapons squads the same relationship to the platoon headquarters obtains.

When centralized control of communications fails, alternate and decentralized systems of communications must continue to furnish sub-ordinate commanders with intelligence and operational directives and orders.

Less sophisticated and decentralized systems of communications will be required to function on the battlefields of the present and the future.

The span of control and the communications afforded the battalion commander have a critical bearing upon his ability to exercise unit control. In the rifle battalion, the commander possesses a span of control of four, that is, one headquarters and headquarters company commander and three rifle company commanders. The span of control principle has a direct bearing upon the physical size of the infantry rifle battalion. History has shown that there is a limit to the number of subordinates that a commander can control in battle. With advanced communication techniques, the span of control may be increased. Vulnerability of these communication techniques to failure, or to enemy action, will require that the span of control be basically that capable of operation with less sophisticated means of communication.

Centralized control of communications and staff procedures in warfare is one of the results of modern electronic progress. Such control has been sought after and achieved in varying degrees throughout military history. However, in the exercise of unit control, centralized control of communications and staff procedures has its limitations. Mechanical breakdown, or destruction by enemy action, of complex devices and machines which create such controls, is to be expected and planned for under modern operational conditions.

Sophisticated communication equipment may increase the degree of command and control over units of the battalion but it can never completely eliminate the human factor in command. The span of control principle will be assisted by new and now unknown and undeveloped communication equipment, but its operation will continue to be a human function; individual differences between commanders will always determine the quality of the control exercised over men and units. These communication devices will also have the adverse effect of removing the personal element in field leadership at higher echelons of command, including the battalion. There will be some compensation for this situation by the improved organization of the company and the platoon and the squad—those units which actually "close" with the enemy on the ground, and are the "forward" elements of the battalion.

The principle of pooling of equipment is as applicable to the infantry rifle battalion as it is to any other military organization. For years pooling of equipment and weapons has been a controversial subject in the military profession. In combat, the infantry soldier needs his weapons with him and immediately available for operation in the performance of his mission. To pool, or not to pool, weapons and other equipment is a decision governed by the military situation, the terrain, and the combat mission. Weapons, being the soldiers' principal tools of survival, will be less often pooled than vehicles. In current (1968) combat operations in which the infantry battalions of the United States Army are engaged, the pooling of organic vehicles is, for practical purposes, a standing operating procedure. It is concluded that in future operations pooling may become more general because of the success of this most recent combat practice.

For the warfare of the future, the infantry battalion will be required to meet new challenges in combat. A battalion organization can be structured with men and weapons to meet all tests of combat. Improvements and innovations in weaponry will cause distinct changes in combat doctrine affecting the battalion. The battalion may be decreased in strength as organic weapons become more lethal. Crew-served weapons may be found to be more useful and effective in establishment of certain types of infantry formations, as yet unknown to the military profession. The infantry platoon and company, integral parts of the infantry battalion, may likewise be decreased in size for the same reason.

The battalion commander of the future will have much in common with his brother officers of the past. However, with this difference, he will be operating in a context of combat which has become complicated and one wherein personal example and courage will be even more necessary than in the past. He will be required to operate, with his units, often in an independent mission—at remote distances from headquarters. Hence, he must make decisions which will not be those equated normally with his rank and service. He must be able to wage combat, or plan and conduct pacification operations, simultaneously, or separately. He must be able to wage combat with either violence or with nonviolent "civic action." He must be aware of the political connotations of warfare. In essence, he will be the "educated" soldier as envisioned by Milton "skilled in the arts of war and of peace."

CORG-M-343 59

APPENDIX A

TASK ASSIGNMENT



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND FORT SELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22050

IN REPLY REPER TO

12 September 1967

(CORRECTED COPY)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CORG

SUBJECT: Task Assignment 18-67, "Evolution of the U. S. Army Infantry

Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam"

- 1. The Commanding General requests that you perform a study within the scope of Project 1 of your contract for Calendar Year 1967.
- 2. $\underline{\text{Title:}}$ Evolution of the U. S. Army Infantry Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam.
- 3. Objective: To show the evolution and development of the U.S. Army infantry battalion from the American Revolution to the present. Included in detail will be the historical perspective of the battalion-type organization -- as noted throughout our military history. The effects of veaponry and tactics upon the organization and function of the infantry battalion will be shown by historical examples. Further, the evolution of the battalion as a tactical unit -- rather than an administrative formation -- will be covered. The direct effect of the emergence of the battalion as an independent unit of maneuver and firepower, upon the command and rank structure of the Army will be noted.

4. Administration:

- a. The study will be presented to the Commanding General in the form of a CORG memorandum.
 - b. Project officer. Mr. Jean Keith, HQ USACDC, 44632.
- c. Direct coordination with the USACDC Infantry Agency is authorized.
 - 5. Correlation: This project is assigned Action Control Number 11609.
 - 6. This task must be completed by September 1968.

CDCRE-0

Task Assignment 18-67, "Evolution of the U. S. Army Infantry Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam" $\,$ SUBJECT:

- - a. Estimated technical man months by calendar year.
 - b. CORG Project Leader.

JOHN T. PIERCE III
Colonel, GS
Chief, Operations Research
Support Division
Evaluation Directorate

APPENDIX B

SELECTED TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

To understand in detail the evolution of the infantry battalion, especially in the period from World War I to 1968, it is useful to examine the various tables of organization and equipment which establish the battalion for a certain period of our military history. Many of the tables herein are rare and out of print and not generally available. For this reason they were included as valuable adjuncts to the documentation of this study. Because of the physical impossibility of the inclusion of all tables pertaining to the evolution of the infantry battalion, the author has included those tables which he considered most relevant and pertinent to the evolutionary, historical process involved in the creation of the modern Infantry Battalion. As additional aids to planters of future battalions, these tables should be of considerable value in establishing the "reason why," or the rationale, for the evolutionary changes noted in the long and distinguished history of the United States Army Infantry Battalion.

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 October 1940 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion, Rifle

	2	3	1	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Specialists' Ratings (Class)	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
1. Licutenant Colonel		1				1			
2. Major		1				1			
3. Captain				3	1	4			
4. First Lieutenant		2		6	5	13			
5. Second Lieutenant				9		9			
6. Total Commissioned		4		18	6	28			
7. First Sergeant			1	3	1	5.			
8. Staff Sergeant			2			2			
9. Sergeant			1	72	16	89			
10. Corporal			6	57	28	91			
11. Private, Hrst Class)			S 16	210	64	200)	16		
12. Private)			22	309	96	427			
13. Specialist	3d			(6)	(3)	(9)			
14. Specialist	4th			(9)	(4)	(13)			
15. Specialist	5th		(6)	(3)	(12)	(21)			
16. Specialist	6th		(6)	(27)	(27)	(60)			
17. Unrated			(22)	(417	(96)	(535)	16		
18. Basic			(4)	(57)	(18)	(79)			
19. Total Enlisted			48	651	205	904			
20. Aggregate		4	48	669	211	932			

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 October 1940 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion, Rifle

 		,	·	,					
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Specialists' Ratings (Ciass)	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7–18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
21. Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal.					8	8			
22. Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal50, M2 Flexible					4	4			
23. Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal. .30, M 1919 A 4				6		. 6			
24. Mortar, 60mm				9		9			
25. Mortar, 81mm					4	4			
26. Motorcycle with sidecar		2	<u> </u>	2		4			
) Command and 27. Truck ½-ton) Reconnaissance		2		5		7			
28. Truck ½-ton, Weapon Carrier		2	6	16		24			
29. Pistol, Automatic, Cal45	4	19	138	152		313			
30. Rifle, Automatic, Browning, Cal 30, M 1918 A 2			24	8		32			
31. Rifle, US (al30, M 1		29	513	59		601			
This table supercedes T/07-15 Mar 1, 1940, including C1, April 26, 1940.						×			
		<u> </u>							
Changes 1 War Dep	artment	Novem	ber 6, 19	40					
Line 12			13						
Line 13			25						

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1942 TO 7-15 Armored Infantry Battalion

	2	3	1	5	6
1	Battalion Headquarters and Head- quarters Co. T/O 7-26		Total Battalion	Ð	Remarks
1. Lieutenant Colonel	1'		1		
2. Major	1.		1		
3. Captain	1	l.	4		
4. First Lieutenant	3	2	9		
5. Second Lieutenant	3	2	9		
6. Total Commission	.8	5	24		
7. First Sergeant	1	1	4	4	
8. Technical Sergeant	2		2	2	
9. Staff Sergeant	7	.5	22	22	
10. Sergeant	12	18	66	56	
11. Corporal	8	11	41	4	
12. Technician, Grade 4	4	2	10	6	
13. Technician, Grade 5	27	23	96	3	
14. Private, First Class	41	49	188		
15. Private	55	64	247		
16. Basic	(14)	(16)	(62)		
17. Total Enlisted	157	173	676	97	
18. Aggregate	166	178	700	97	
19. Carhaif-Track, M2, w/armament	8	4	20		
20. Car. half-track, M3, with armament	3	12	39		

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1942 TO 7-15 Armored Infantry Battalion

Page 2

	2	3	4	5	6
1	Battallon Headquarters and Head- quarters Co. T/O 7-26	3 Rifle Comparies (each) T/O 2-27	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cache	Remarks
21. Car, half-track, M3, w/armament	1	1	4		
22. Car, half-track, M4, w/armament	3		3		
23. Carbine, cal30	56	58	230		
24. Gun, antitank, self-propelled	1	1	4		
25. Gun, antitank, Towed		4	12		
26. Gun, assault, self-propelled	3		3		
27. Gun, machine, cal30, light	1	1	4		
28. Gun, machine, cal30, light, with ground mount		6	18		
29. Gun, submach. (incl. on ordnance vel	1.) 19	18	73		
30. Gun, submach. (on 1-ton truck)	9	1	12		
31. Mortar, 81mm	3		3		
32. Mortar, 60mm		3	9		
33. Pistol, cal45	31	13	70		
34. Rifle, Cal30	81	88	315		
35. Trailer, 1-ton ammunition and	3		3		
36. Motorcycle, solo	4		4		
37. Truck, ‡-ton	9	1	12		
38. Truck, 2½-ton including:	3	2	9		
39. Equipment	(1)	(1)	(4)		
40. Kitchen	(2)	(1)	(5)		

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1942 TO 7-15 Armored Infantry Battalion

Page 3

	2	3	4	5	6
1	Battalion Headquarters and Head- quarters Co. T/O 7-26	3 Rifle Companies (each) T/O ∿ 3/	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cache	Rem arks
41, Radio set	17	4	29		
This table supersedes T/O 7-25, Nover	ber 15, 1940.				

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 April 1942

Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Unit	Technician Grade	Headquarters (T'O7–16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (each) T/O 7-17)	Heavy Weapons Company (T/O 7-18)	Toral Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks
1. Lieutenant Colonel		1				1		
2. Major		1				1	_	
3. Captain		1	1	1	1	6		
4. First Lieutenant		1	1	2	4	12		
5. Second Lieutenant			3	3		12		
6. Total (Commissioned)		4	5	6	5	32		
7. First Sergeant			11	1	1	5	5	
8. Staff Sergeant			6	5	4	25	24	
9. Sergeant			88	16	10	66	17	
10. Corporal			11	16	24	83	5	
11. Technician Grade 4	<u> </u>		4	2	3_	13	12	
12. Technician Grade 5	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	7	3	3	19	16	
13. Private First Class		<u> </u>	41	66	59	298		
14. Private, including	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	52	83	74	375		<u> </u>
15. Basic		<u> </u>	(12)	(18)	(16)	(82)		<u></u>
16. Total Enlisted			130	192	178	884	79	
17. Aggregate	4		135	198	183	916	79	
18. Carbine, Ca30		2	78	35	105	290		
19. Gun, 37mm, antitank		_	4	<u> </u>		4		
20. Gun, machine, Cal. 30			<u> </u>		8	8		
21. Gun, machine, light, cal 30				2		6		
22. Mortar, 60mm				3		9		
23. Mortar, 81mm		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		6	6		
24. Pistol, automatic, cal45		2		10	28	60		
25. Rifle, automatic, cal30	\perp		7	11	7	47		<u> </u>
26. Rifle, cal30, M1	\perp		41	133	29	469		<u> </u>

Washington, D.C., War Department, 1 April 1942

Infantry Battalion

Page 2

1	2	3	4	5	s 6	7	8	9
Unit	Technician Grade	Headquarters (T/O 7–16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7–16)	3 Rifle Companies (each) (T/O 7-17)	Heavy Weapo Company (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks
27. Rifle, Cal30, M1903			9	9	14	50		
28. Truck, 1-ton			15	1	4	22		
29. Truck 3/4-ton, Command & Reco	n.				1	1		
30. Truck, 3/4-ton, Wpns Carrier			6	1	15	24		

This table supersedes T/O 7-15, October 1, 1940, including C1, November 6, 1940.

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1943 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3	3	-1	5	G	7	8	9	10
1	Specialists' Ratings (Class)	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre		arks
1. Lieutenant Colonel		1				1			
2. Major		1				1			
4. Captain		1	1	1	1	6			
5. First Lieutenant		1	2	2	4	13			
6. Second Lieutenant			2	3		11			
7: Total Commissioned		4	5	6	5	32			
8. First Sergeant			1	1	1	-5	5		
9. Staff Sergeant			7	6	5	30	29		
10. Sergeant			5	15	9	59	11		
11. Corporal			8	15	21	74	5		
12. Technician, Grade 4			4	2	3	13	12		
13. Technician, Grade 5			7	3	4	20	14		
14. Private, First Class			31	64	50	273			
15. Private, including			40	80	64	344			
16. basic			(9)	(17)	(14)	(74)			
17. Total Enlisted			103	186	157	818	76		
18. Aggregate		4	108	192	162	850	76		
.19. Carbine, Ca30, M1		2	47	28	78	211			
20. Gun, 37mm			3			3			
21. Gun, Machine, Cal30					8				

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1943 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion

Page 2

	2	3	-4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Specialists' Ratings (Class)	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Rem	arks
22. Gun, Machine, Light, Cal30			3	2		9			
flexible 23. Gun, Machine, (al50, M2 HB/			1	1	3	7			
24. Launcher, Rocket, AT, M1			8	3	7	24			
25. Mortar, 60mm				3		9			
26. Mortar, 81mm					6	6			
27. Pistol, Automatic, Cal45		2	6	10	28	66			
28. Rifle, Automatic, Cal30				9		27			
29. Rifle, Cal30, M1			47	135	48	500			
30. Rifle, Cal30, M1903			8	10	8	46	ļ 		
31. Trailer, 1-ton			1			1			
32. Truck, 4-ton			6		5	11			
33. Truck ∤-ton, amphibian			1			1			
34. Truck, 3/4-ton, Weapons Carrier			4		1	5			
35. Truck, 1½-ton			2	1	7	12			

This table supersedes T/O 7-15, April 1, 1942, including C1, October 4, 1942.

Washington, D. C., War Department, 26 February 1944 TO 7-15

Infantry Battalion

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Rem	arks
1. Lieutenant Colonel	1				1			
2. Major	1				1			
3. Captain	1	1	1	1	6			
4. First Lieutenant	1	2	3	3	15			
5. Second Lieutenant		2	2	4	12			
6. Total Commissioned	4	5	6	8	35			
7. First Sergeant		1	1	t	5	5		
8. Technical Sergeant		3	4	3	18	18		
9. Staff Sergeant		9	16	15	72	19		
10. Sergeant		6	15	11	62	3		
11. Corporal		5	1	13	21	5		
12. Technician, Grade 4		6	2	3	15	12		
13. Technician, Grade 5		11	4	2	25	14		
14. Private, First Class		55	104	79	446			
15. Private, Including		21	40	31	172			
16. Basic		(11)	(17)	(14)	(76)			
17. Total Enlisted		117	187	158	836	76		
18. Aggregate	4	122	193	166	871	76		
19. Carbine, Cal30	2	51	28	82	219			
20. Gun, Machine, Cal30, heavy, flexible				8	8			

Washington, D. C. War Department, 26 February 1944 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion

Page 2

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Rem	arks
21. Gun, Machine, Cal 30, light flexible			2		6			
22. Gun, Machine, HB, Cal50, flexible		2	1	1	6			
23. Gun, 59mm, Towed		3			3			
24. Launcher, Rocket, AT, 2.36-inch		8	5	6	29			
25. Mortar, 60mm			3		9			
26. Mortar, 81mm				6	6			
27. Pistol, automatic, cal45	2	15	10	34	81			
28. Rifle, automatic, cal30			9		27			
29. Rifle, cal30, M1		56	143	50	535			
30. Rifle, Cal30, M1903, A4			3		9			
31. Trailer, 4-ton		2	2	14	22			
32. Trailer, 1-ton		1			1			
33. Truck, 4-ton		9	2	19	34			
34. Truck, 3/4-ton, Weapons Carrier		1		1	2			
35. Truck, 1½-ton, cargo		4			4			
This table supersedes T/O&E 7-15, 16 July 194	13.							

Washington, D. C., War Department, 30 June 1944

TO 7-15

Changes No. 1

Infantry Battalion

Page 3

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Rem	arks
Line 14		52	104	76	440			
Line 15		19	40	28	167			
Line 16		(6)	(17)	(8)	(65)			
Line 17		112	187	152	823			
Line 18		117	193	160	860			
Line 21		6	2		12			
Line 22		2	6		20			
Line 28			15		45			
Line 29		51	143	44	524			

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION No. 7-415

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1942.

AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: †---- Air Base Security Battalion

					,				
١	1	2	*	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Unit	Headquarters and headquarters detachment (T/O 7-416)	Fixed defense company (T/O 7-417)	Striking force company (T/O 7-418)	Total battalion	Attached medical (for details see p. 2)	Aggrezate	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
2 3 4 5 6	Lieutenant colonel Major Captain First lieutenant Second lieutenant	3	1 2 2	1 8 3	1 5 5 5	1 	1 6 5 5		t Invert number of battalion. a Substitute: rifle, cal. 30. Warrant officers, bas- ics, and relief crews
7	Total commissioned	5	8	7	17	1	18		are not included in this
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Master sergeant First sergeant Technical sergeant Staff sergeant Sergeant Corporal Technician, grade 4 Technician, grade 5 Private, first class Private	1 1 2 5 7 5	1 7 19 3 3 56 57	1 6 20 21 3 16 83 83	1 2 2 11 29 42 11 26 144 145	1 1 2 3 3	1 2 2 12 28 43 11 28 147 148	1 2 2 11 14 3 2 2	battalion since they will not be required in its normal function.
18	Total enlisted		150	233	412	10	422	37	
19	Aggregate	31	155	240	429	11	440	37	
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	O Car, half-track, M2. O Carbine, cal. 30 °. O Carrier, half-track, M3. O Gun, 75-min, self-propelled. O Gun, machine, heavy, cal. 30. O Pistol, cal. 46. O Riffe, cal. 30. O Riffe, cal. 30. O Riffe, cal. 30. O Truck, ½-ton, weapon carrier. O Truck, 2½-ton, cargo. 8 Radio.	34	51 12 30 6 68	4 120 12 4 36 84 13	205 12 4 12 66 6 152		12 12 4 12 66 8 152 16 6 3		

456461°--42

T/O 7-415

MEDICAL DETACHMENT, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: Medical Detachment, †..... Air Base Security Battalion

Total commissioned					
Captain		1	2	3	4
Total commissioned	1	Unit	nican	Total	Remarks
16 Total enlisted.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Total commissioned Staff sergeant, including	5	1 (1) 1 (1) 2 3 3 (4) (1) (1) (1)	The serial number symbol shown in parentheses is an inseparable part of the specialist designation. A number below 550 refers to an occupational specialist whose qualification analysis is found in AR 645-26. A number above 550 refers to a military occupational specialist listed in Circulars Nos. 14 and 67, War
	16	Total collisted.		10	

[A. G. 320.2 (4-9-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjulant General.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION No. 7-415

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 13, 1943.

AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: † _____ Air Base Security Battalion

	·				· · · · · · ·			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
1	Unit	Headquarters and headquarters and service company (T/O 7-416)	2 airdrome combat companies (each) (T/O 7-417)	Total battalion	Enlisted cadra	Tank platoon\$	Transportation section	Remarks
2	Lieutenant colonel	1		1				†Iusert number
3	MajorCaptain.,	i		i				of battalion.
4 5	First lieutenant	3	1 3	5 7		····i		tTo be activated only when specified on activation order.
Š	First lleutenant		2	4			••••	on activation order.
7	Total commissioned	6	6	18		1		
8	Warrant officer	2		2				
0	,				-			
10	Master sergeant First sergeant	1	i	1 3	1 3			1
11	Technical sorgeant	4		.4	4			
12 13	Staff sergeant	1 1	5	13	13	1 8	1 1]
14	Corporal	l	22	44	2 5			
15 16	Technician, grade 4	1 111	i	9 12	5	3	1	
17	Private, first class Private, including	l ii	63	137		4	1	
18	Basic	14 (3)	78 (16)	170 (55)		5 (2)	(1)	
	Total enlisted.	54		<u> </u>				
20			179	412	39	22	15	
21	Aggregate	62	185	432	39	23	15	
22	O Car, scout, M3A1			:::			5	
23 24	O Carbine, cal30.	62	43	148			6	
26	O Gun, machine, cal50, M2, HB.]	ľ	
26	o Gun, submachine, cal45, M3		8	12			ii	
27	O Launcher, rocket, AT, M1	3		3				
29	U l'istol butomatic, chi. 45		12	12		23		
30	O Rifle, automatic, cal30		Ű	18				
32	O Tank, light.	l	121	242				
33	O Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, carge	3	ļ	3		ļ		
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35	O Truck, %-ton	3	1	5 2				ļ.
36	O Truck, 3/-ton, weapons carrier O Truck, 2/4-ton, cargo	3	ļ	3				
_		<u> </u>		<u>'</u>		<u> </u>	<u>'</u>	

[A. G. 320.2 (3-26-43).]

*This table supersedes T/O 7-415, April 1, 1942.

By order of the Secretary of War:

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

CORG-M-343

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

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AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES No. 1

WAR DEFARTMENT WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 30 JULY 1945

T/O 7-415, 13 April 1943, is changed as follows:

Line	Column			
PIDE	1	3	4	6
18 19	Private, including	7 <u>1</u> (9)	156 (21)	5 (1)
20	Total enlisted	172	398	21
21	Aggregate	178	418	55
31	O Rifle, cal30	114	228	

(AG 320. 3 (24 May 45))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

EDMARD F. WITSKLL

Major General

Acting The Adjutant General

G. C. MARSHALL Chief of Staff

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION No. 7-416

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 1, 1942.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION.

Designation: Headquarters, †____ Air Base Security Battalion

Headquarters Detachment, †____ Air Base Security Battalion

	·							
	1	2	8	4	5	6	7	8
1	Unit	Technician	Battallon headquarters	Headquarters detachment	Communica- tion section	Total	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
2 8 4	Lieutenant colonel		1 •1 •2	•1		1 1 8		finsert number of bat- talion. Executive.
8	Total commissioned		4	1		8		
678	Master sergeant, including Sergeant major (502). Technical sergeant, including Operations (814) Supply (82!). Staff sergeant, including. Communication (542). Sergeant, including. Communication, assistant (642). Corporal, including. Clerk (445). Supply, motor (348). Technician, grade 4			(1) 2		(1) 2	(1) 2	 Detachment commander. Substitute: riffe, cal.
9 10 11	Operations (814)			8	 1	33	3-66	.30. Warrant officers, basics, and relief crews are not in-
8 4	Sergeant, including Communication, assistant (512) Corporal, including				(i)	(i) (2)	(i) (i)	since they will not be required in its normal opera- tion.
8	Clerk (4/5) Supply, motor (348) Technician, grade 4			8		(1) (2) (5)	(1) 	The serial number sym bol shown in parentheses i an inseparable part of the
0	Technician, grade 4 Technician, grade 5 Private, first class. Private. Chauffeur (345). Clerk, operations (408). Clerk, supply (374). Operator, radio and telephone (776). Operator, radio and telephone (776). Operator, radio and telephone (776). Orderly (608).			6	16	8 8		specialist designation. A number below 500 refers to an occupational specialist whose qualification analysis.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Clerk, operations (405)	8 8		(1)	(8)) (1) (5)		sis is found in AR 615-26 A number above 500 refers to a military occupationa
16 17 18	Operator, radio and telephone (776) Operator, radio and telephone (776) Orderly (698)	5		(2)	(6)	(5)		Warrant officers, basics and relief crews are not in cluded in this battalior since they will not be required in its normal operation. The serial number symbol shown in parentheses is an inseparable part of the specialist designation. A number below 500 refers to an occupational specialist whose qualification analysis is found in AR 615-26 A number above 500 refers to a military occupational specialist listed in Circulars Nos. 14 and 67, Wallers Nos. 14 and
0	Total enlisted	 -		11	18			
10 11	Aggregate O Carbine, cal. 30 d		4	12	18	34	6	
32 33	O Truck, M-ton.	I		1 2	4	2 4		

[A. G. 320.2 (4-9-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION No. 7-416

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 13, 1943.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: Headquarters, † Air Base Security Battalion Headquarters Company, † Air Base Security Battalion

1	-	•	-		6	,	•	٥	2	n	11	13
				Headqu	Feadquarters company	mpany						
	Tech- nician grade	Bat- talion head- quar- ters	Com- pany bead- quar- ters	Admin- istra- tive section	Supply and mess section.	Com- tions and opera- tions section	Total com- pany	Aggre- gate	En- listed cadre	Tank pla- toon	Trans- porta- tion sections	Remarts
Leutenant colonel Major Captain First lieutenant		4	H									finert number of bat- talion . Operates battalion mess.
Total commissioned		:					2	0		•1		when specified on activa-
Warrant officer				3	:		2	67				non orders.
Master sergeant, including.				:3			- 3	-1 9	-9			* Executive and 8-3.
			7	•1	1.	• 2						· Armed with carbine,
						<u> </u>	2 2	2 2	EE.			oal. 30.
Personnel (816)	-	1	-	€	100		Ēŝ	_	E E			maintenance officer.
			61		300		<u></u>]m{	•	•1	i-j:
					9		3	3	3		Ξ	Drives truck, 24-ton.
					(E)		É	6	(2)	Θ		
			3		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		j-	<u>-</u>)	6	7	operators.
	ī	_			(1)		(3)	ω			Ξ.	Armed with pistol.
Tank commander (795)	,						,			9		machine.

The perial number symbol shown in parentheses bal shown in parentheses is an integerable part of the specialist designation. See A.R. 615-26.	
10-10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
2	
නක පු <u>ප ල</u> මු <u>ප </u>	
	900
-9=13888888888	mmm
3	7
8 (C 1.0) (C 1	
· 8 868	
• 65 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2	
83 84 84 84 85 83 85 84 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85	
ph (228).	O Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo. O Truck, X-ton. O Truck, 2/x-ton. cargo.

T/O 7-416

By order of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjulant General.

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T/O 7-416 C1

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES No. 1

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 30 JULY 1945

T/O 7-416, 13 April 1943, is changed as follows:

- 1. Delete 1 basic (521), 14no 60, column 11 (not included in k_0 -als).
- 2.. This results in the following:

Line	Column	
	1	11
28 60	Private Basic (521)	P5 (1)
61	Total enlisted	21
62	Aggregate	55
68	O Pistol, automatic, cal45	55

(AG 320 .3 (24 May 45))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

EDWARD F. WITSELL Major General Acting The Adjutant General G. C. MARSHALL Chief of Staff TABLE OF ORGANIZATION No. 7-417

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 1, 1942.

FIXED DEFENSE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: Company A, †____ Air Base Security Battation

	1	3	3	4	5	6	7	8	٥	10	12	12
				2 m gu toon	achin n pla s (ea	ne- l- ch)		de pl loon	•			
	Unit	Technician grade	Company beadquarters	Platoon headquarters	6 machine-gun squads (each)	Total plateon	Piatoon beadquarters	6 rifle squads (each)	Total platoon	Total company	Enlisted cadro	Remarks
	Captain	•••	1			1	1		1	1 2 2		† Insert number e battalion. • Drives vehicle i
١,	Total commissioned	 	• 2	•1		1	•1		1	8		addition to other du ties. • Substitute: rifie
	First sergeant (585) Staff sergeant, including Mess (824). Platoon (651) Sergeant, including Squad leader (653) Supply (821). Corporal, including Clerk (405). Squad leader (653) Squad leader, assistant (653).		•1	··i		ī	ï		···i	1	14	cal80. Armed with ca
	Platoon (651)		(• 1) 1	(÷i)	 -		(· i)	i	(1) 8	(3)	(1)	bine. 4 For use of detact
	Borgeant, including Bound leader (653)	:::	72.33		::::			(° 1)	(6)	(1)(3)7(6)(1)9	(3) (1)	ments reinforcin nearby air bases when used as part
23155730012	Corporal, including		(• 1)	::::	¨i´	6		ï	6		i (1)	the modile reserve.
	Squad leader (653)	 	(• i)		(•i)			;;;;		(2)		Armed with pistor Armed with rifle.
7	Technician, grade 41	1]	ļ				(*1)	(6)	(3)	ï	This company w
	Private, first class including		17	2	1 -	20	2	10	62			establish the fixed d fenses of an air ba and will be suppl mented by personn
ίi	Private	ļ.,.	7:::	ļ	(+1)	(6)	Ì	(*1)		(18)]	mented by personn of the air base.
	Chauffeur (345)		} <u>.</u>	ļ							775	
	Cook (000)	5	2							(2)	(<u>i)</u>	not included in th
7	Gunner (605)		(2)		(01)	(6)				(12)		l will not he required.
6	Mechanic, automobile (014).	4	(==1)		(21)	(0)				(12) (1)		its normal operation. The serial numb symbol shown in r
ני ני	Messenger (675) Orderly (695)		\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	('2)		(3)	(13)		(2)	(8)		i rentheses is an inse
3	Rifleman (745)	<u> </u> :		ļ	<u> </u> :		<u> </u>	(?)	(42) (6)	(42) (6)	:::	arable part of the sp cialist designation. number below 500 i
•	Rifleman, automatic, as- sistant (746)			 .	 		<u> </u>	(>1)	(6)	(6)		i fers to an occupation
5	Total enlisted		1		4	27	8	12	75	160	12	specialist whose qua- fication analysis found in AR 615-26.
6	Aggregate			4	4	28	4	12	76	155	12	number above 500 i
7	O Carbine, cal30 b O Gun, machine, heavy, cal.	ļ	23		2	14				51		fers to a military occ pational speciali listed in Circulars No
0	O Pistol, cal. 45			<u> </u>	1 2	12		1	6	12 30	:::	14 and 67, War Depa ment, 1942.
	O Rifle, automatic, cal30			2		2	-4	10	64	6		
0123	Q Truck, M-ton. Q Truck, M-ton, weapon car-		i	ļ		ļ	}	ļ		ï		
9	rier weapon car-		46	ļ	 .	.	ļ	ļ	 	6	ļ	

T/O 7-417

By order of the Secretary of War:

OFFICIAL:
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

FIXED DEFENSE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Changes No. 1 WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, November 25, 1942.

T/O 7-417, April 1, 1942, is changed as follows:

Line	Column		
LADO	1	8	10
2214 31	Bugier (503) [Delete entire line.]	(* 1)	(1)

[A. G. 820.2 (11-21-42).]

By order of the Secretary of War:

&. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Table of Organization No. 7-417

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 13, 1943.

AIRDROME COMBAT COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

AIRDROME COMBAT COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

[a. g. 2012 (3-26-43).] By order of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

> Orriciat: J. A. ULIO, Major General, The Adiulant General.

T/O 7-417 C 1

AIRDROME COMBAT COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES \

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 30 JULY 1945

T/O 7-417, 13 April 1943, is changed as follows:

- 1. Delete 7 basics (521), line 28, column 3 and 11.
- 2. This results in the following:

	Column		
Line	1	3	11
16 17 18 28	Technician, grade 5 Private, first class Private	13 (9)	1 63 71 (9)
29	Total enlisted	16	172
30	Aggregate	18	178
36	O Rifle, cal30, Ml	13	114

(AG 320.3(24 May: 45))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major Coneral
Acting The Adjutant General

G. C. MARSHALL Chief of Staff

T/O 7-418

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION No. 7-418

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 1, 1942.

STRIKING FORCE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

		17			Remerts	#	with squad. • Substitute: rifle, cal. 30	# #8282 8233 Q
ă	i	91		,	enbao besailm#		L	89-8996-8
ALI		#			Total company	~**	-	~~384389943 <u>333</u> %###9989
ATT	HO	34	8		Total platoon	-	-	- 64 8 4 8
R B	atta	13	oper,	(esch)	(dose) sbamps }			T R S I
RIT	Air Base Security Battalion	21	å å		Plateon head- quarters	-	:	-
5	Cur	n			mootalq lates'	-	-	- 8m S 7 8 g
SE SE	Ø.	97	9	ब्रि	Total section			8 7 8 7
SE	Bes	.0	72. E	2 sections (sech)	(dose) shanps &			7 € •
BA	- Afr	8	Machine-gun piatoon	75	-bleed noideed anetraup			
AIR		7	Ä	- p =	Flatoon he	-	7	F 3 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27	***	•	¥		gootale letoff	-	14	1 3 3 4 (3) 4 (3) B
PAN	any E	8	Self-propelled	platoon	anolices b (fices)			
MO	omo	*	-77 9 8	E 2	-base mootald stortaup	7	=	7 (E)
E C	n: C		gi	narte	Company head	~ ~		
EC.	ıntic	4		•	Technician grad	II		0 +0
STRIKING FORCE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION	Designation: Company B, f.	1			Unt	Captain. First licutemant } Second licutemant }	Total commissioned	First ergeant (885) State ergeant, mcluding Mess (384) Platon (831) Sergeant, including Motor (813) Section leader (832) Supuly (821) Corpuly (821) Corpulation grade 4 Technician, grade 5 Private, first class Private, first class Private (1811) Camoner (331) Cook (080)
	ì				H	400	10	むてきなりまるのようなとものではなるないのでき

MA C C C	The serial number symbol shown in parentheses is an	inseparable part of the spe- cialist designation. A num-	ber below 500 refers to an occupational specialist whose qualification analysis is found in AR 615-26. A number above 500 refers to a military occupational specialist listed in Chrulars Nos. 14 and 67, War Department, 1942.
	2	2	<u> </u>
2	ä	8	48248 2 24
€ 699 B 8	ន	2	84 884
(c 2) (c 2) (c 2)	22	12	411 40
(4.3)	2	9	4 66
9 899 3	22	8	42 844
	유	2	4m
8 88 8	*	7	-8 8
(E 3)	2	2	
÷	10	۰	4 66
	न्न	8	8 4444
(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)	20	10	₩ ₩₩
€	20	•	4 00
6 6 666 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	ಸ	ĸ	8
10 410			
Cook's helper (EII) Driver, gun or half-track (735) Driver, gun or half-track (735) Driver, gun or half-track (735) Gunner, assistant (605) Gunner, assistant (604) Mechanic, automobile (014) Mechanic, automobile (014) Mechanic, automobile (014) Mechanic, automobile (014) Mechanic, (605) Gunderly (605) Riffeman (745)	Total enlisted	Agregate	O Car, half-track, M2 O Carbin, cal. 30 b. O Carrier, half-track, M3 O Carrier, half-track, M3 O Pistol, cal. 46. O Riffe, cal. 30. Q Truck, ½-\con. Q Truck, ½-\con.

[A. G. 320.2 (4-9-42).]

202222

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OrnCIAU: J. A. ULKO, Major General, The Adjutant General.

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

STRIKING FORCE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES No. 1

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, November 25, 1942.

T/O 7-418, April 1, 1942, is changed as follows:

Line	Coluzza		
2419	1	8	18
2634 38	Bugier (808) Deleta entire line	(• 1)	(a)

[A. G. 820.2 (11-21-42).]

By onder of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjulant General.

T/O & E 7-95

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No. 7-95

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 21 July 1943.

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

SECTION I. Org	anization:	Pago
01	A. Infantry Battalion, Separate	2
	B. Medical Detachment, Infantry Battalion, Separate	8
II. Equ	uipment:	
•	General	5
	Chemical	6
	Engineer	6
	Medical:	
	Individual equipment	6
	Organizational equipment.	6
	Ordnance	7
	Quartermaster:	
	Individual equipment	7
	Organizational clothing	7
	Organizational equipment	7
	Rignal	8

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

SECTION I ORGANIZATION

A. INPANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

Designation: †____ Battalion

	J/CSigne		• 1.								
	t	2	8	4	8	8	7	8	9	10	11
1 ,	Unit	Headquarters (T/O & E 7-96)	Beadquarters com- pany (T/O & E 7-56)	orperies O & E 7-	fiency weapons com- pany (T/O & E 7-18)	Total	Attached medical (for details see p. 3)	Attached chaplain	Aggregate	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
234567	Lieutanant colonel	2 2 1	1 2 2	3 2	3 4	1 2 7 15 12 37	8	1	1 2 7 8 16 12		finsert number of battallon. Infantry only. To be furnished only as required and available with- in the continental
8	Total commissioned		1		<u></u>	37 1	-	_		=	limits of the United States. Will be fur- nished prior to de-
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Master sergeant First sergeant Technical sergeant Staff sergeant Sergeant Corporal Technician, grade 3 Technician, grade 4 Technician, grade 5 Private, first class Private, including Basie Total enlisted.		8		153	1 6 81 65 75 20 31 277 352 (78) 863	1 2 8 9 11 (3) 86		1 6 6 32 65 76 2 23 40 284 363 (81) 899	1 5 5 30 8 5 17 15	parture for oversea duty.
21	· · · · · ·	1	وح دا	28	==	237	==		237		
25 26 27 28	O Carbine, cal30		3	ż	8	3 8 6			3 8 6		
20 30 31 32 33 34 35	flexible Launcher, rocket, antitank AT, 2.34". Mortar, 60-mm. Mortar, 81-mm O l'i-tol, automatic, cal45. O Rifle, cal30, M1 O Rifle, cal30, M1 O Rifle, antonatic, cal30.		12	3 3 10 143 3 9	6 28 50	27 9 6 76 552 9 27			27 0 6 76 552 9		
39 37 38 39 40 41	O Mortar, 60-mm O Mortar, 81-mm O Pistol, automatic, cal. 45 O Riffe, cal. 30, M1 O Riffe, cal. 30, M1003A4 O Riffe, automatic, cal. 30 O Treiler, 14-ton O Truck, 14-ton O Truck, 14-ton, weapons carrier O Truck, 14-ton, cargo. O Truck, 24-ton, cargo. O Truck, 24-ton		10 10 4 8	2	14 19 1	22 6 35 1 4 8	2		24 6 37 1 4 8		

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

B. MEDICAL DETACHMENT, INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE Designation: Medical Detachment, †_____ Infantry Battalion, Separate

	ı	2	3	4	5
1	Unit	Tech- nician grade	Medical detach- ment	Enlisted cadro	Remarks
2 3 4 5 0 7 8 9 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 11 12 12 22 23 24 25 26	Captain or first lieutenant Total commissioned Staff sergeant, including Medical (673) Corporal, including Medical (673) Technician, grade 3 Technician, grade 3 Technician, grade 5 including Private, first class Private Litter bearer (857) Technician, dental (855) Technician, medical (409) Technician, medical (109) Technician, surgical (861) Total enlisted Aggregate O Trailer, 14-ton O Truck, 14-ton	\$ 4 5 3 4 5	(1) 1 (1) 2 3 9 6 11 (12) (1) (1) (1) (1) (5) (*2) (*2) (*5) (*5) (*5) (*5) (*5) (*5) (*5)	(1) (1)	† Insert number of battallon To be furnished only as re quired and available within the continental limits of the United States. Will be furnished prior to departure for oversea duty. Also drive trucks. Includes 12 company aid men—1 per rifle platton; heavy weapons plattoon. d Dental. For specification serial num- bers shown in parentheses, see AR 615-20.

SECTION II

EQUIPMENT

FOR MEDICAL DETACHMENT ONLY

For equipment of other components of this organization, see section II of the Tables of Organization and Equipment shown in column headings under section I of this table.

GENERAL

- 1. This table is in accordance with AR 310-60, and it will be the authority for requisition in accordance with AR 35-6540, and for the issue of all items of equipment listed herein unless otherwise indicated. This table rescinds all Tables of Basic Allowances and Tables of Equipment heretofore published except T/E 21, Clothing and Individual Equipment, so far as they pertain to the allowances of equipment for the organization and individuals covered by this table.
- 2. When there appears a discrepancy between the allowances shown in column 2, "Allowances," and column 4, "Basis of distribution and remarks," the amount shown in column 2 will govern.
- 3. Items of clothing and individual equipment, components of sets and kits, spare parts, accessories, special equipment, special tools, and allowances of expendable items, are contained in the following publications:

 Chemical Warfare Service.

Standard Nomenclature and Price List.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 1, OCofCWS.

Corps of Engineers.

Supply Catalog, Parts 1, 2, and 3.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Series A.

Medical Department.

Medical Department Supply Catalog.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 26, SGO, WD.

Ordnance Department.

Standard Nomenclature Lists SNL, index to which is the Ordnance Publications for Supply Index (OPSI).

T/A for Cleaning, Preserving and Lubricating Materials, Recoil Fluids, Special Oils and Similar Items of Issue.

T/A 23, Targets and Target Equipment.

Quartermaster Corps.

Table of Clothing and Individual Equipment, T/E 21.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 1-18, OQMG.

Components, Spare Parts, Accessories and Contents of Chests, Kits and Sets and Other Items of Quartermaster Property, Circular No. 4, OQMG.

All 30-3010, Items and Price Lists of Regular Supplies Controlled by Budget Credits and Price List of Other Miscellaneous Supplies.

Signal Corne

Signal Corps Catalog (T/BA items).

Circular No. 10-1, OCSigO, Allowances of Spare Parts, Accessories, and Expendable Supplies.

AR 310-200, Military Publications, Allowance and Distribution.

AR 775-16, Qualification in Arms and Ammunition Training Allowances.

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

CHEMICAL

	T	1	
1	2	8	4
Item	Allow- ances	For compu- tation	Basis of distribution and remarks
Apparatus, decontaminating, 1½-qt, M2.	2		1 per trk, in T of Opns only.
Curtain, gas procf, MI	2 39 4		1 per indiv. 2 per trk.
	Engin	EER	
Compass, wrist, liquid filled, or watch.	6		1 per O; s sgt; techn, med driv- ing trk.
Net, camouflage, cotton, shrimp, 22' x 22'.	4	~***	I per trk, %-ten; tlr, %-ten, (Net, cam, cotten, shrimp, will be issued in od or sand, solid clr in T of Opns only when and as authorized by
Templet, map, transparent, M2	8		army or T of Opns comdr.)
7 2	MEDI		
2761	iviauai (equîpme	nt .
Braseard, Geneva Convention Kit:	89		1 per indiv in T of Opns.
Dental: Officer's Private's Medical:	1 1		Per dent O. Per dent techn.
Neutcan: Noncommissioned officer's Officer's Private's	2 2 83		1 per s sgt; epi. 1 per med O. 1 per litter bearer; med techn; surg techn; basic.
Organ	isaliona	l equip	ment
Chest: MD #4 MD #60 Gas casualty chest Kit, suction, snake bite Machine, imprinting Unit medical equipment, pack	1 1 1 2 2 2 3		Per dent O. In T of Opnu. Pending availability, the following may be issued in lieu thereof: 1—Case, tent pin. 2—Blanket set, small. 2—Chest, MD #1.
			1—Chest, MD #2. 12—Litter, steel pole. 2—Splint set. 12—Splint, litter bar.

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

ORDNANCE

	ORDN	ANCE	
1	2	3	4
Itom	Allow- ances	For compu- tation	Basis of distribution and remarks
Binocular, M13	1 2 2 2		1 per trk when authorized by army or T of Opns coindr. See SNL G-529. See SNL G-503.
		RMASTER	
17401	viauai (eguipme	nt
Bag, canvas, field, od, M-1936 Belt, pistol or revolver, M-1936 Carrier, pack, M-1928 Cover, canteen, dismounted, M-1910.	3 39 36 39		1 per O. 1 per indiv. 1 per EM. 1 per indiv.
Haversack, M-1928 Strap, carrying, od, bag, canvas, field.	36 3		1 per EM. 1 per bag, canvas, fld.
Suspenders, belt, M-1936	3		1 per O.
Orga	nizatio	ral cloth	ing
Gloves, protective, impermeable	1		Per 40 EM outside continental US. (To be stored in near- est available dep for issue as determined by T of Opns
Suit, protective, one-piece, impermeable.	1		comdr.) Do.
Organ	ization	al equip	ment
Axe, intrenching, M-1910, with handle.	4		1 per 10 EM.
Bag, canvas, water sterilizing, complete, with cover and hanger.	1		
Bucket:	١ ,	1	1 man éple

1 per trk.

Per stove, tent, M-1941 when authorized by WD. 1 per 5 indiv or fraction thereof.

1 per axe, intrenching.
2 per pickmattock, intrenching.

1 per shovel, intrenching. 1 per wire cutter, M-1938.

CORG-M-343

Can, water, 5-gallon______ Carrier:
Axe, intrenching, M-1910_____ Pickmattock, intrenching, M-1910.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910____ Wire cutter, M-1938_____

INFANTRY BATTALION, SUPERATE

1	2	3	4
Item	Allow- ances	For compu- tation	Basis of distribution and remarks
Case, canvas, dispatch	2 2		1 per med O. 1 per 24 indiv operating in extremely cold areas.
Cutter, wire, M-1938	7 2		2 per 10 EM. 1 per trk, ¼-ton.
Geneva Convention, Red Cross, bunting, ambulance and marker.	2		
Guidon, bunting	1		
With clear lens With green lens	37 37		1 per indiv driving trk. 1 per indiv not otherwise issued goggles, M-1943 with clear or red lens when authorized by CG, Serv C or T of Opns comdr.
Kit, sewingLantern:	3		1 per 12 indiv.
Electric, portable, hand Gasoline, two-mantle, commercial.	2 2		
Pickmattock, intrenching, M- 1910, with handle.	7		2 per 10 EM.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910 Stove, tent, M-1941, complete, with grate.	25 1		7 per 10 EM. Per tent when authorized by army or T of Opns comdr.
Tent, command post, complete (with pins and poles).	1		
Tube, flexible nozzle	4		1 per trk. 1 per O; s sgt.
	sign	AL	
Flashlight TL-122-()	. 7		1 per O; s sgt; cpl; indiv driving trk.

[A G. 320.3 (14 Jul 43).]

By order of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No. 7-85

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.

RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

Oneman T	Organization	Page 2
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	B. Medical Detachment, Ranger Infantry Battalion	8
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^{*}This table supersedes all prior tables and equipment lists on the organization of this unit, 570501% 44~ACO 271

T/O & E 7-85

RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I

ORGANIZATION

A. RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

Designation: † Ranger Infantry Battalion

	1	2	3	4	8	6	7	8		
1	Unit	Headquarters and Head- quarters Company (T/O & E 7-86)	6 Ranger companies (each) (T/O & E 7-87)	Total	Attached Medical (for details see p. 3)	Aggregate	Enlisted cadre	Remarks		
2 8 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 111 121 13 114 15 116 117 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 6 27 28 80 81 82	Lieutenant colonel. Major. Captain Captain Captain crist lieutenant First lieutenant Total commissioned. Master sergeant First sergeant First sergeant Technical sergeant Staff sergeant Sergeant Technical, grade 3 Technician, grade 3 Technician, grade 5 Private, first class Total enlisted Aggregate O Gun, machine, cal. 30, light, flexible O Gun, submachine, cal. 45 O Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36-inch O Mortar, 60-mm O Motory, 61-mm O Truck, 41-mm O Rifle, cal. 30, M1 O Truck, 41-on, ommand O Truck, 41-on, oweapons carrier	1 1 3 3 8 8 1 1 1 1 0 2 3 3 4 4 177 277 888 96 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 8 8 5 0 1 1	1 2 3 3 1 2 10 6 1 1	1 1 1 9 1 15 26 1 1 7 7 18 8 6 7 207 27 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 15 27 7 18 63 39 11 18 30 39 1 18 30 39 1 14 18 30 30 1 14 18 30 30 11 18 30 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18	1 7 18 30 7 10 5	† Insert number of hat- talion. Infantry only. See page 3 for attached med- ical codre † To be furnished only as required and available within the continental limits of the United States. Will be furn- ished prior to Jeparture for oversea duty.		

T/O & E 7-85

RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

B. MEDICAL DETACHMENT, RANGEE INFANTEY BATTALION

Designation: Medical Detachment, †_____ Ranger Infantry Battalion

	1	2	8	4	8	•
1	Unit	Speci- fication serial No.	Tech- nician grade	Total	En- listed cadre	Remarks
3 8 4	Captain or first lieutenant, in- cluding. Medical officer, general duty Total commissioned	8100		(i)		†Inacrt number of bat- tation. To be furnished only as required and available with- in the continental limits of
507890	Staff sergeant, including	A72		100-100-1	i (1)	the United States. Will be furnished prior to departure for oversea duty. Also drives truck. Includes 1 aid man per company. For specification serial
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Technician, grade 5 Private, first clast. Technician, medical Technician, surgical Technician, surgical Technician, surgical Technician, surgical Technician, surgical	861	8 4 5	(b 1) (c) (c) 1) (c) 1) (c) 1) (c) 1) (c) 1)	(1)	numbers shown in column 2, for enlisted men, see AR 615-26; and for officers see
18	Total enlisted			11	2	
20		<u> </u>		1		

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*T/O & E 7-85

TABLE OF CRGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No. 7-85

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 7 AUGUST 1945

RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

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	Chemical	5
	Engineer	•
	Medical:	
	Individual equipment	5
	Organizational equipment	5
	Ordrance:	•
	Weapons and miscellaneous	6 6
		Ã
	Vehioles	č
	Motor transport equipment	U
	Quartermaster:	_
	Individual equipment	6
	Organizational equipment	Ğ
	Simal	7

RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I ORGANIZATION

	A. Ranger Infantry Battalion Designation: /Ranger Infantry Battalion											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8				
1	Unit	Hoadquarters and headquarters company (T/O % E 7-56)	companies (each)	Total	Attached medical (for details, see p)	Aggregate	Enlisted cadre &	Remarks				
2	Lieutenant colonel	1		1		1		√Insert number of				
3	Major	1	••••	1		1	• • • • •	battalion. Infantry only.				
5	Captain		1	10	₆	10 1		See page 3 for				
6	First lieutenant	5	5	14		14		attached cadre.				
7	Total commissioned	8	3	26	b ₁	27		^b To be furnished only as required				
8	Master sergeant	1		1		1	1	and available with- in the continental				
9	First sorgeant	1	1	7		7	7	limits of the				
10	Technical sergeant	6	2	18		18	18	United States.				
11	Staff sergeant	5	10 6	62	1	63	31	Will be furnished				
12 13	Sergeant	3	9	39 28	i	39 29	13	prior to departure for oversea duty.				
14	Technician, grade 3				i	1		lor oversea ducy.				
15	Technician, grade 4	15		15	2	17	8					
16	Technician, grade 5	23		23	3	26	4					
17	Private, first class	37	51	343	3	346	•••••					
18	Total enlisted	92	74	536	11	547						
19	Aggregate	100	77	562	12	574	82					
20	O Carbine, cal30	20	10	30] <i>.</i>	80] 					
21	O Gun, Machine, cal30 light, flexible.	 	4	24	[34						
22 23	O Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch	10	4 2	34 18	·····	34 18	·····					
24	0 Mortar, 81-mm	6	l	16		16	::::::	j				
25	O Motorcycle, solo	7		7		7						
26	O Pistol, automatic, cal45	100	21	226	[226						
27	O Rifle, automatic, cal30		2	12		15	····					
29 28	O Rifle, cal30, Ml	54	47	336		336 12						
30	O Trailer, 1-Ton, 2W, water tank, 250 gallon.	i	ļ <u>.</u>	î	ļ	1						
31	O Truck, 1-ton	9	<i>.</i> .	9		9	 .					
35	O Truck, 3/4-ton, command, weapons carrier.	1	ļ·····	1		1	·····					
33 34	0 Truck, 3/4-ton weapons carrier. 0 Truck, 22-ton, cargo	4	 	1 4	1	1						
<u>-</u>		l	l	1	L	L	l	l				

RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

	B. Medical Detachment, Ranger Infantry Battalion Designation: Medical Detachment, fRanger Infantry Battalion											
	1	2	3	4	5	6						
1	Unit	Specification serial Mq	Technician grade	Total	Emilsted cadre	Remarks						
2	Captain or first lieutenant Medical officer, general duty	3100		1 (a1)		/Insert number of battalion. To be furnished only as re-						
4	Total commissioned	 		a 1		quired and available within continental limits of the United States. Will be fur-						
56 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Staff sergeant. Marical. Corporal. Hedical Technician, grade 3. Technician, grade 4. Technician, grade 5. Private, first class. Technician, medical. Technician, surgical. Technician, surgical. Technician, surgical. Technician, surgical. Technician, surgical. Technician, surgical.	673	3	(1) 1 2 3	(1)	nished prior to departure for overses duty. Drives truck, 3/4-to Includes 1 aid man for com- pany. For specification serial numbers for officers see TM 12-406 and 12-407; for en-						
18	Total enlisted			1)	5							
19	Aggregate			12	2							
20	O Truck, 3/4-ton, weapone carrier	 	ļ	1								

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No. 7-86

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

			Page
SECTION	I.	Organization	2
		Equipment.	
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		Army Air Forces.	6
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		Engineer	6
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		Motor transport equipment	8
		Quartermaster:	
		Organizational clothing	8
		Individual equipment	8
		Organizational equipment	
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HQ AND HQ CO, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I

ORGANIZATION

Designation: Headquarters, † ——— Ranger Infantry Battalion
Headquarters Company, † ——— Ranger Infantry Battalion

	1	2	8	4	5	8	7	8	9	10	11	12				
					Hea	dqua	rters	com	any	ģ						
		Staff platoon								nd be						
1	Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Add instrative and personnel section	Intelligence and op- erations section	Supply and transpor- tation section	Total platoon	Communication platoon	Total headquarters and head- quarters company	Enlisted cadre	Remarks				
2 3	Lieutenant colonel, including Battalion commander	11110	 	1 (i)						40	 	† Insert number of battalion.				
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Major, including. Executive Captain, including. Company commander. Intelligence, 8-2. Supply, 8-4. First licutenant, including. Communication.	1512		(*1) 2	;			i	••	(1) 3		*Also operations and training, 8-3 (2162).				
7	Company commander	2900			(i)			(i)	•	(i) (i) (i) (ii)	•	Battalion pool of				
10	Supply, 8-4	4010	ļ	(1) (1) 3				•••	e;e •	(i)		weapons. • For messenger sorvice.				
11 12				(i)			••••			(i)		d British equip- ment.				
13	Operations and training, as- sistant 8-3 Personnel, 8-1	2162 2260	<u> </u>	(1) (1)						8	 	• 1 for supply and transportation sec-				
14	Total commissioned			7	1			1		8	-	tion; 6 for battalion pool of weapons.				
15	Master sergeant, including		 		1	 		1		1	1	11 per company, 2 spare.				
16 17	Master sergeant, including. Sergeant major First sergeant Technical sergeant, including Battalion mess. Communication chief. Intelligence Operations. Personnel Supply. Staff sergeant, including. Motor. Supply. Sergeant, including. Mctorcycle. Supply, ammunition. Supply, ammunition. Supply, rations Corporal, including. Ceres, company. Communication assistant. Motorcycle.	502 585			(1)	2	~i	(1) 1 5	i	(1)	(1)	PArmed with pis- tol. automatic, cal.				
18 19	Battalion mess	824			(1)			ů		(1)	(1) (1)	Armed with rifle,				
21	Intelligence	642 631	• • •			(1)	•••••	(i)	(i)		(1)	cal30, M1. For specification				
23	Personnel	814 816	 	 ::: .	(i)	(1)		I (I)	 ::.	(1)	[8]	serial numbers shown in column 2, for en-				
24 25	Staff sergeant, facluding	821		: : -:	<u> ::::</u>		(1) 2	(1)	· • • •	(1)	(1)	listed men, s.c. AR 615-26; for officers, see TM 12-406 and 12-407.				
26 27	MotorSupply	813 821	:::		·:::		(1) (* 1) 3	8		8		see TM 12-406 and 12-407.				
28 29	Bergeant, including	679		. .	l:::.		1 (1)	(1,		(i) 3 (i)	- <u></u> -					
30 31	Supply, ammunition	821	<u> </u>		l::::		(%)	8	2	(3)	 					
32 53	Cerporal, including	405			(1)		1	(1)	ı	(i)	(1)					
34 35	Communication assistant Motorcycle	542 679			l :::		;; (i)	(1)	(2)	(2)	 	1				
20 x	Technician, grade 3 Technician, grade 5 Private, first class	ļ	ļ	ļ. .	23	5	24	52	19	117 27	10 8					
38 39	Armorer artificer	511	8		<u> </u>		(* 2)	(2) (2)	ļ	(27 (2)	 					
40 41	Clark mail	405 405	4	·::.	[23]	<u> </u>	(; 2) (; 1)	[(1)	ļ	(2) (1)	(i)					
42 43	Clerk, personnel Clerk, typist Clerk, typist Cook Cook	405 405	4		('2) ('2)	(+2)	·(i)	1 (2)		3343832788888833						
44 45	Cook	060 060	4		(* 5) (* 5)	<u> </u>	·····	(5)	<u> </u>	(8)	(5) (6)					
46 47	Cook's helper	521 076		<u> </u>	(1.8)	(i)		(5)		(5)	(1)					
48 49	Cook Cook's helper Draftsman Driver, truck, light Driver, truck, light	345 345	8		<u> </u>		(°4) (°10)	(4) (10)	ļ	(4) (10)						

T/O & E 7-86
HQ AND HQ CO. RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

	1	3	3	4	8	6	7	8	.9	10	11	12			
					Hee.	dqua	rters	comp	eny	per q					
						taff (platoo	n	몽						
	Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Administrative and personnel section	Intelligence and operations section	Supply and transpor- tation section	Total platoon	Communication platoon	Total beadquarters and quarters con. pany	Enlisted cadra	Remarks			
57 52 53 54 55 56	Private, first class—Continued. Mechanic, automobile. Mossenger Motorcyclist Motorcyclist. Operator, radio. Operator, radio. Repairman, radio.	679	4 5 4 5 4		(*2)	(; ž) 	(1) (2) (3)	(1) (4) (2) (3)	(6) (12) (13)	(14) (13) (13) (13) (13) (13) (13) (13) (13	9: :: :: ::				
57	Total enlisted				28	7	81	66	22	88	24				
8	Aggregate			7	20	7	81	67	22	• 96	24				
0013	O Gun, submachine, cal. 45 O Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch O Mortar, 60-mm O Mortar, 81-mm					<u>i</u>	1 1 6 5 6	20 2 6 6		20 2 6 6					
23 14 15 16 17 18	O Motorcycle, solo O Pistol, automatic, cal45 O Rifle, cal30, M1 O Rifle, antitank, cal55 d	••••		7	29 24	7 4 1	81 22 • 7	67 60 8	22	7 96 50 8	•••				
8	O Truck, 4-ton. O Truck, 4-ton, command O Truck 4-ton, wespons car-	••••	:::		 -		1	i		ĭ					
0	rier, including			ļ	ļ		4	4		4					
1 2 2	ons		 	 				8893							
73	President and a second a second and a second a second and	••••		ļ	l		(1)	(1)		Ľ		<u> </u>			

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EXULTMENT No. 7-86

WAS DEFAUTIMENTE WAS INTERFED TO DO DE CONTROL DE CONTR

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

		rago
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	Engineer	6
	Medical	6
	Ordinance:	-
	Weapons and miscellaneous	6
	Meabour and misceriations	
	Vehicles	
	Motor transport equipment	1
	Quartermaster:	
	Organizational olothing	7 8
	Individual equipment	8
	Organizational equipment	8
	Signal	8
	D1MIM1	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

^{*}This table supersedes T/O & E 7-86, 2) February 19hh, including Cl, 8 July 19hh.

			H	Q AND HQ COMPAN	IY, RANGER	DIFANTRY	BATTALION	
g.	टा			Remarks	finert number of battalion. MAlso personnel (2200). Malso classification specialist (275). Gastalion pool of weapons. de for supply and transportation ection: 6 for hattalion nool of weapons.	ons. "Tor messenger service. If per company, 2 spare. If are driven by persons designated by company commanier. Parred with platol, automatic,	8 88	
ttell	я			expec betaling				32333-3
14 th	ន	the aretreadquerters on the transfer of the tr			ਜ਼ਿਜ਼ੁਰੇ≄ਰੇ	333~33	क मित्रकर्	223223~23
y Batt Infan	6			Communication plateon			-	3
Designation: Headquarters, f	8	T T T		mootaiq fatoT	75		ने नेतिनेक्	है : है है है है है वे
	7	ers oc	Atoor	anert has tiqque portection section				
SECTION I ORGANIZATION arters /Ranger arters Company, /	9	Headquarters company	Staff platoom	-qo has sonsillatal moltoss amoltans			0	
K I OR	5	Hea	3	Administrative and: personnel section		<u> </u>	न नहिन्द	a : ::a : : : :
ECTION TO THE PERSON OF THE PE	*		•	retrampheed motiettad	1313m	ਰਹਰ ਕਰ	F	
: Headqu Headqu	Э			Technician grade				
ation:	8		, OM	Specification serial	24 24 88 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 8	2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 200	88	<u> </u>
Designa	1			Unit	Ligutement colomal Battalion commender Helor Executive Captain	Intelligence, S-2. Operations and traditing, S-3. Supply, S-k. First Lieutenant. Communication.	<u> </u>	Dettalion mess Cremination chaft Intelligence Operations Personnel Bupply Staff serpeant Hotor
				н	0 m4 m0 r	-៙៰ងដងង	4 2223	282882882

T/O & E 7-86

HQ AND HQ COMPANY, RANGER IN: INTRY BATTALION

32				
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я	~333+333 ₂₈ 5333335533333333333333333333333333333	84	200	824668
6	ම දිනුම් සිට	22	82	8
80	~ddd~d id % @ @d@deedddddddddddddddddd	70	11	23006
-	~3 1 3 8 8 7 13 15 8 8 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	35	32	%2886W
9		7	7	2
5	THE WEEFFEE E	31	32	,
			7	
6	ב מדמד א מדי מדי מדי דרט מ		:	
2	### ##################################	i	1	
1	Sergeant. Mytorycle. Supply, ammunition. Supply, ammunition. Communications, assistant. Motorycle. Folmicians, grade 4 Technicians, grade 5 Private, first class Private, first class Private, tirst class Tocknicians, artificer. Clark, wall Clark, typist. Cook. Cook.	Total enlisted	Aggregate	0 Carbine, cal. 30. 0 Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch. 0 Morter, 60-me. 0 Morter, 91-me. 0 Morter, 91-me. 0 Motorcycle, solo. 0 Pistol, automatic, cal. 45.
•	58883888888888888888888888888888888888	છ	8	\$8288

T/O & E 7-86

HQ AND HQ COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

12			Remits	
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8		.oM	Specification serial	
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*T/O & E 7-87

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No. 7-87

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.

RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

	Pa	£4
Spotion J. Organization		2
II. Equipment:		
Goneral		4
Army Air Forces		8
Chemical		5
Engineer		5
Ordnance:	·	
Weapons and miscellaneous,		5
Quartermaster:		
Organizational clothing		6
Individual equipment		6
Organizational equipment		7
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This table supersedes all prior tables and equipment lists on the organization of this unit.

T/O & E 7-87

RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

			И			Benyks	† Insert letter of company. ‡ Insert number of battalion. • Armed with rife, antitank, cal. • Armed with rife, cal. • Armed with rife, cal. 30, M1903A4.	* British equipment. 42. Armed with pistol, automatic, cal. 43. Armed with ride, cal. 30, M1. * Armed with gun, submachine, cal. 45. For specification serial numbers for enlisted men shown in column 2, see AR 615-26. For officers, see TM 12-406 and 12-407.
			13			Enlisted cadre		⊣ ශහි∾ඔහි ⊣∃
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		Ranger Infantry Battalion	=			Total platoT	-8-	-8-66-66
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		Designation: Company t, t	-			Ови	Captain, including. Company commander. First licutenant, including. Platoon leader. Total commissioned.	First sergeant Technical sergeant, including Fallow, including Section leader Sergeant, including Frivate, first class, including Ammunition carrier Gunner, machine gun, assistant, Gunner, mortar, assistant Micssenger Riffernan
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T/O & E 7-87 RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

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*T/O & E 7-87

table of organization and inclimate no. 7-87

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 7 AUGUST 1945

RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

	Page
SECTION I Organization	2
II Equipment:	
Gonoral	14
General	5
Chomical.	ź
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Quartormaster:	
Organizational clothing.	5
Individual equipment.	6
Organizational equipment.	Ğ
Organizational clothing	7

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WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington 25, D.C.

Change No. 1

1 July 1945

INFANTRY BATTALION

T/O&E 7-15, 1 June 1945, is changed as follows:

Reorganization to be effected under this table requires specific War Department approval. T/O&E 7-15, 26 February 1944, has been renumbered T/O&E 7-15-OS by Change No. 2, 1 June 1945.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO Major General The Adjutant General

CORG-M-343

WAR DEPAREMENT, Washington 25, D.C.

1704 7-15 INFANTRY BATTACION

1 June 1945

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1	Headquarters (T/O&F- 16-OS)	Headquarters Compan, (T, O&F - 7-16-OS)	3 Rifle Companies (T. O&F each-	Heavy Reapons Co (T. Og.F.	Tota! Battalion	Fnl.s'ed Cadre	Rema	ırks
2 Lieutenant Colonel	1				,			
3 Major	1				ı			
4 Captain	2	1	1	1	7			
5 First Lieutenant	1	2	7	3	15			
6 Second Lieutenant		1	3	า	13			
7 Total Commissioned	5	4	7	7	37	l		
ĉ First Sergeant		1	1	1	5	5		
9 Technical Sergeant		2	4	4	18	18		
10 Staff Sergeant		7	18	19	80	‡ 9		
11 Sergeant		6	21	10	79	2		
12 Corp.nel		2	13	19	60	5		
13 Technician, Grade 4		6	3	3	14	11		
14 Technician, Grade 5		11	4	6	29	11		
15 Private, First Class		36	123	93	49H			
16 Private		13	48	33	190			
17 Basic		(4)	(21)	(9)	(76)			
18 Total Enlisted		84	235	188	977	101		
19 Aggregate	5	88	242	195	1014	101		
20 Carbine, Cal 30	3	40	37	95	249	1		
Gun, Machine, Cal 30 21 Heavy, Flexible	İ			8	8	, 1		
Oun, Machine, Cal 30 22 Light, Flexible			2	8	14			
Gun, Machine, HB, Cal 50 23 Flexible		1	1	2	6			
24 Launcher, Rocket, 2.36-inch		5	6	9	12			
25 Mortar, 60mm	ĺ		3		9			
26 Mortar, 81mm				6	۱ ۾	!		
27 Pistol, Automatic, Cal 45	2		22	46	114			
28 Rifle, Automatic, Cal 30		[15	1	45	1		
29 Rifle, Cal 30, M1		48	171	54	615	}		
30 Rifle, Cal 30, M1 (Snipers)	İ		3		9	1		
31 Rifle, 57mm, M18	l	1	3		9	1		
32 Rifle, 75mm, M20			1	6	6]	
33 Trailer, 1/4-ton		3	4	14	29		'	
34 Trailer, 1-ton	ļ	1	 	3	4	i		
35 Truck, 1/4-ton	1	٥	4	20	41	l		
36 Truck, 3/4-ton, Weapon Carriec	l	1	i	1	2			
37 Truck, 1-1/2-ton, Cargo	L	1_1		3	4			

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington 25, D C

Change 2

T/O&F 7-15

5 September 1945

INFA	NTRY	BATT	ſΛŢ,	ION
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	Ł	3	4	5	6	7	R	9
1	Headquarters (T/O&E- 7-16-OS)	Headquarters Company (T/OLE- 7-16-OS)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O&F each- 7-17-0S)	Heavy Weapons Co (T/O&E.	Total Battalion	Fallsted	Rem	arks
20 Carbine, Cal 30 29 Rifie, Cal 30, M1		50 38		,	259 605			
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CORG-M-343

T/O & E 7-15N

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No. 7-15N

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 16 April 1948

INFANTRY BATTALION

Reorganization to be effected under this table requires specific Department of the Army approval

		Page
Section I.	General	1
	Organization	9
	Equipment	A


SECTION I

GENERAL

- 1. Mission.—To close with the enemy, capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver; or to repel his assault by fire or close combat.
 - Assignment.—Organic to Infantry Regiment, T/O & E 7-11N.
 Capabilities.—a. Furnishing a base of fire and maneuver.

 - b. Maneuvering in all types of terrain and climatic conditions.
 - c. Furnishing limited antitank protection.
 - d. Seizing and holding terrain.

T/O & E 7-15N



INFANTRY BATTALION

				Remarks	finers number of battalion. Insert number of regiment. For specification serial numbers for offi- cers see TM 12-406; for collected men see TM 12-427.		
			٠	Enlisted			ផ
		Infantry	15	Heavy wespens company (T/O & B 7-15N)		1 7 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	201 ET 4 4 4
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SECTION II	ORGANIZATION	#	2	Headquar- ters and beadquar- ters com- pany (T/O & E 7-16M)		11.00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	21 B w æ
	OR	Designation: †	2	Total battallon	u = 2	85585188 8 x	National and
		Dealg	1	Unit	Lieutonant colonel Major Captain Lieutonant. Total commissioned	Photos Property Prope	Aggregate O Carbine, cal. 30, beavy O Gun, machine, cal. 30, light O Gun, machine, cal. 30, light O Lambder, rocket, 2.35-linch O Lambder, rocket, 3.25-linch O Mortar, 60-linch O Mortar, 60-linch
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T/O & E 7-15N

INFANTRY BATTALION

	2.	Remarks	
	٥	Enlisted	
	×	Heavy Weapons Company (T/O & E 7-18N)	ಜಿ ಜಿ ್∞ಇವಲ-
	•	3 rifle com- panies (each) (T/O & E 7-17N)	EZE00 4-4 1
	m	Headquar- ters and headquar- ters com- pany (T/O	n & reduc
	63	Total battalion	84820420E2
		Unit	O Pistol, automatic, cal. 45. O Rife, automatic, cal. 30. O Rife, cal. 30. O Rife, cal. 30. O Rife, cal. 30. O Rife, 54. O Rife, 75. O Traile, 74.00. O Traile, 14.00. O Traile, 14.00. O Truck, 14.00.
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INFANTRY BATTALION

| Recapitulation of SSN | Total | Reliated SSN | Total | SEN | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Total | Tot

| Officer 58N | Total | Lt col | Maj | Capt | Lt | Lt col | Maj | Capt | Lt | Lt | Lt | Capt | Lt | Lt | Capt | Lt | Capt
*T/O & E 7-15N

TABLE OF OBGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
No. 7-15N

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 15 November 1950

INFANTRY BATTALION

Reorganization	to b	e effected	under	this	table	requires	specific	Department	ol				
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Section I.	General	1
II.	Organise tion	8
	Equipment	8


SECTION I

GENERAL

- 1. Mission.—To close with the enemy and capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver; or to repel his assault by fire or close combat.
 - 2. Assignment.—Organic to Infantry Regiment, T/O & E 7-11N.
 - 3. Capabilities.—a. Furnishing a base of fire and maneuver.
 - b. Maneuvering in all types of terrain and climatic conditions.
 - c. Furnishing limited antitank protection.
 - d. Seizing and holding terrain.

CORG-M-343

INFANTRY PATTALION



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
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CORG-M-343



*TOR 7-15C Appendix II

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION)
AND EQUIPMENT)
NR. 7-15C (Appendix II))

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington 25, D. C., 13 June 1956

INFANTRY BATTALION (Mountain Operations)

Designation: _____ Battalion, ____ Infantry

SECTION I

GENERAL

ORGANIZATION

- 1. When operating under prolonged mountain conditions, units organized under TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956, may be reorganized under this Appendix when specifically authorized by the Department of the Army. To determine authorized allowances of personnel and equipment for units organized under this Appendix the modifications shown herein will be applied to the authorized allowances in TOE 7-15C and changes thereto.
- 2. MISSION. That of Infantry Battalion, TOE 7-15C, under prolonged mountain conditions.
- 3. The Assignment, Capabilities, Basis of Allocation and Category of this unit are as established in TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956.
- 4. MOBILITY. For mobility of components of the battalion, see paragraph 4, Section I, General, Organization, of each applicable Appendix and/or paragraph 6, Section I, General, Organization, of each applicable Table of Organization and Equipment.

^{*}This Appendix supersedes TOE 7-15, Appendix II, 20 September 1952.

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SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

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TOE 7-15C
Appendix II
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By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN A. KLEIN, Major General, United States Army, The Adjutant General. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Active Army:

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NG: State AG (5), TOE 7-1R (2), TOE 7-12R (2), TOE 7-16R (2).

USAR: Same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.

CORG-M-343

*TOE 7-15C Appendix III

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION)
AND EQUIPMENT)
NR. 7-15C (Appendix III))

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington 25, D. C., 13 June 1956

INFANTRY BATTALION (Jungle Operations)

Designation: _____ Battalion, ____ Infantry

SECTION I

GENERAL

ORGANIZATION

- 1. When operating under prolonged jungle conditions, units organized under TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956, may be reorganized under this Appendix when specifically authorized by the Department of the Army. To determine authorized allowances of personnel and equipment for units organized under this Appendix the modifications shown herein will be applied to the authorized allowances in TOE 7-15C and changes thereto.
- 2. MISSION. That of Infantry Battalion, TOE 7-15C, under prolonged jungle conditions.
- 3. The Assignment, Capabilities, Basis of Allocation and Category of this unit are as established in TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956.
- 4. MOBILITY. For mobility of components of the battalion, see paragraph 4, Section I, General, Organization, of each applicable Appendix.

CORG-M-343

^{*}This Appendix supersedes TOE 7-15, Appendix III, 17 August 1953.

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TOE 7-15C Appendix III

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By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN A. KLEIN, Major General, United States Army, The Adjutant General. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Active Army:

Gen Staff, DA (5) except DCSLOG (2) CNGB (10) CARROTC (2) COFCH (2) CMH (1) Tec Svc, DA (5) except CSIGO (21) Admin & Tec Svc Bd (2) Hq CONARC (60) OS Maj Comd (5) OS Base Comd (5) Log Comd (3) Armies (25) Corps (10) Div (8)

Inst1 (3)
Gen & Br Svc Sch (20)
PMST ROTC Units (1)
Trans Terminal Comd (2)
OS Sup Agencies (2)
Mil Dist (3)
MAAG (5)
Mil Msn (5)
Units org under fol WK:
7-12R, Hq & Hq Co, Inf
Regt (2)
7-16R, Hq & Hq Co, Inf
Bn (2)

NG: State AG (5), TOE 7-1R (2), TOE 7-12R (2), TOE 7-16R (2).

USAR: Same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.

TOE 7-11D-PENTOMIC BATTLE GROUP, 1 February 1960

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		RECAPITULATION			}		
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	10817C	DEFECTOR KIT CHEMICAL AGENT RESPIRATOR AIR FILTERING PAINT SPRAY		Ì	1		
		ENGINEER ITEMS	ļ ·	i	i	- 1	
	302670	-	١	1	1	1	
	222752	BAG WATER STERILIZING COTTON DUCK POROUS STITCHED SEAMS 36 GA	282	282	-	-	
	226580 226880	DIVIDERS DRAFT PROPORT 7 3-4 IN LG DRAFT AND DUPLICAT EQUIP SET SMALL SKETCH NOTES AND ORDERS	1 1	1 1	!		
	232828 232940	FIRE DIRECTION SET ARTY 13000 METER MAX RANGE FLASHLIGHT RT ANGLE 2-CELL LENS 1.693 IN DIA	199	109			
	235152	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.5 KW 2 WÎRE DC 28 V SKID MTD GENERATOR SET GAS ENG O.4 KW 60 CV 1 PM 2 WÎRE AC 120 V SKID MTD	3.	-5	-	-	
	235156 235163 235263	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.9 KW 60 CY 1 PH 2 WIRE AC 120 V SKID MTD	5	,		.	
	238615	FIRE DIRECTION SET ARLY 15007 METER MAK RANGE FLASHLIGHT RT ANGLE 2-CELL LENS 1.693 IN ÖIA GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.9 KM 2 WIRE DC 28 V SKID MTD GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 0.5 KM 60 ČV 1 PH 2 WIRE AC 120 V SKID MTD GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.9 KM 60 CV 1 PH 2 WIRE AC 120 V SKID MTD GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 3 KW AC 120 V 1 AND 3 PH 120/240 V 1 PH 120/200 V 3 PH 60 CY SKID MTD MALLET MOOD MEAD 10 IN LG 8, IN DIA FACE	1 2	1 2	ļ		_
	243860	MACLET WOOD HEAD TO IN LG 8, IN DIA FACE INTRENCHING OUTFIT INF	1	ì	1	_	
. -	249076 249635	LIGHT SET GEN ILLUM 25 OUTLET LOADER SCOOP TYPE DSL DRVN & WHLS 2 1/2 CU YD MACHETE RIGID HOL 18 IN LG W-SH		7	1		
	250050 250577	MACMÈTE RIGID HOL 18 IÑ TĞ M-BH HAGNIFIER MONOCULAR READ 3 IN OIA 1.4 PWR HETASCÖPE ASSEMBLY IMAGE INFRARED	45 1 36	1 45			
	251445 257355	METASCOPE ASSEMBLY IMAGE INFRAREO PLOTTING SET ARTY FIRE CONT	36	30	1		
-	259890	PROTRACTOR SENICIPE DIASTIC IN IN DIA GRAD IN MILE VOS AND	[,	ì	1	
	262175	INCHES 1 - 10000 1 - 20000 1 - 40000 RACK BATTERY CHARGING MZ AND 20000 V SHIPERSCOPE	Í	1	1	1	
	267620 269345	SAN CHAIN GAS DRVN 36 IN SCALE PLOT TRIAN 12 IN LG YOS METERS 1 TO 25000 HETERS 1 TO	. 3	3	 	<u>-</u>	
	273200	SMIPERSCOPE	16	16-			~
	274210	SPRAYER INSECT MAND 2 GAL CAP SYEREOSCOPE LENS AERIAL PHOTO INTEPPR 2 1-4 PWR & 1-2 IN FOCAL	'	7			
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	279510 282705	SURVEYING SET ARTY FIRE CONTROL 4TH ORDER TAPE MEAS STL 3-6 IN W FT AND MET 100 FT LG	-3	1 3		ļ	
	285850 285950	TOOL KIT CARP ENGR SOO TOOL KIT PIONEER ENGR SOUND	3		-	ļ. ;	
	285952	TOOL KIT PIONEER ENGR COMBAT PLAT	1 1	1 1	•	ļ	
	28 8 790	TRAILER BASIC UTIL 2 1/2 TON TRIPOS SURVEY WINEAD FIX LEGS MIT 39 IN	1	1 3	1	١.,	
	240314	<u></u>	2	1 2	ļ	l	
	l	MEDICAL ITEMS	ļ				
	305150 325437	BLANKET SET BED SMALL FIRST AID KIT GENERAL PURPOSE 12 UNIT	171	102		T	
	342000	FIRST AID KIT GENERAL PURPOSE 12 UNIT TIMHALATOR SINGLE LATRINE DOX PREFABRICATED PORTABLE M-2	2	2	1 -	_	
	345980	LIGHT SURGICAL BRACKET PORTABLE BATTERY OPERATED	3.	2	1 -	† -	
	349175	LIGHT SUBGICAL BRACKET PORTANLE BATTERY OPERATED LITTER FOLDING PICTO POLE ALWAININ POLE REDICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET DISPRESARY FIELD MEDICAL SUPPLY SET FIELD SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPLIES	1 2	1 2	ţ	t	
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	-373788	SPLINT SET TELESCOPIC SPLINTS STOVE GASOLINE BURNER TWO BURNERS WITH METAL CASE	:		1	1	
	-374255	SUPPORT LITTER FOLDING SUPPLY SET COMBAT	2 7	-2-	 		
- 	374298	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET INDIVIDUAL	32	25	-		
	}	ORDMANCE_LIEMS	-	į			
	-481974	BAYONET KNIFE WASCARBARD CARBINE	1301	1270			
	401250 401250	BAYONET KNIFE M/SCARBARD CARBINE BINOCYLAR SASO MILITARY RETICLE BINOCYLAR SASO MILITARY RETICLE BIPOD RIFLE 7-624M					
	401510	BIPOD RIFLE 7.62MM BOARD PLOTTING ARTILLERY BOARD PLOTTING AZIMUTH RANGING	1 12	92]	<u> </u>	
	401919	I CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED	25	20]	l	
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SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

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11723 DEBOTITION SOUTEMENT SET SENDENCE 1011/14/100 CASC - 100-14	-							
17123 COM MACHINE T.A.2700 LIGHTWEIGHT STREAM, PURPOSE A0 A0 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1		<u> </u>		<u> </u>				
17123 COM MACHINE T.A.2700 LIGHTWEIGHT STREAM, PURPOSE A0 A0 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1		A11788	NEWN 1210W BOILDMENT SET EXPLOSIVE INITIATING FLECHMONS: 80			1	1	
17123 COM MACHINE T.A.2700 LIGHTWEIGHT STREAM, PURPOSE A0 A0 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1	_	411989	REMAIL TO TOUT BUT SET FEBLACION IN TRAVIANT TOUT THE		1-			
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A32730 TABLE GAMPICAL TRING FOR 8.2-INCH MORTAR 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	1 1		ATELY TALLING ON MAINT					ľ
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### ### ##############################		460290	TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6X6 LWS					
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### ### ##############################			TRUCK OULP 5- FON 6X6 W/NN			<u></u>		
### ### #### #### ####################		461790	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON 4X4] _ 58 _		i	l	l
### ### #### #### ####################		461793	TRUCK UTILITY 174-YOH 4X4 CARRIER FOR 108-HH RIFLE					
481893 TRUCK WRECKER MEDIUM 3-TON 8X6 W/NN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	L	461834	TRUCK VAN SHOP 2 1/2-TON 6X6	1	3			
### ### #### #### ####################			TRUCK WRECKER LIGHT 2 1/2-TON 6X6 W/WN	1 - 1	1			
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131981 CASH BOX STEEL \$INGLE COMPARIMENT A 2/16 IN M 9 9/16 IN LG 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	⊢ −		LARE MILITARY WATER CAN & GAL					
313113 CANYAS REPAIR KIT 31348 CHEST HYAN BOOK 320079 COMMISSARY OUTFIT FIELD BREAKOUNN M-1932 520679 COOK SET HILLD 520679 COOK SET FIELD 522368 CLOCK MESSAGE CENTER 522368 CLOCK MESSAGE CENTER 522369 DESK FIELD PLYWOOD 19 3/0 IN W 11 1/4 IN H 14 9/8 IN DP 523797 DESK FIELD PLYWOOD 19 3/0 IN W 12 1/4 IN H 14 1/2 IN DP 523901 DUPLICATING MACH STENCIL PORTABLE 529901 PLAG SET H-238 520623 FOOD CONTAINER INSULATED REC CANGULAR ALUMINUM 9 GAL 530623 FOOD CONTAINER INSULATED REC CANGULAR ALUMINUM 9 GAL 53053 FLAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIANT-MENTAIN 530623 FLAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIANT-MENTAIN 530623 FOOD CONTAINER INSULATED REC CANGULAR ALUMINUM 9 GAL 530623 FLAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIANT-MENTAIN 530623 FLAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIANT-MENTAIN 530623 FLAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIANT-MENTAIN 530623 FLAG COLOR ORGANIZATIONAL SILK 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530623 FLAG CHEVEN-COLON-RED-CROSS BUNTING ANBULANCE AND MARRER 530	ı		CASH BOX STEEL SINGLE COMPARTMENT & 3/16 IN W 9 9/16 IN LG	ايا	i		1	
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320019 COMMISSARY OUTFIT FIELD BREAKDOWN H-1923 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3			CHEST HYMN BOOK				\Box	
920493 COCK SET FIELD 99 99 922488 COCK MISSAGE CENTER 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			COMMISSARY OUTFIT FIELD BREAKDOWN M-1955	L i	i	1	L_ I	L
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		320443	COOK CET FIRE	755	33			
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330627 FOOD CONTAINER INSULATED REC'ANGULAR ALUMINUM 9 GAL 58 58 934504 ELAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIAM-JEVISH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		523789	DESK FIELD PLYWOOD 19 3/6 IN W 11 1/4 IN H 14 5/4 IN DP	7	3			
330627 FOOD CONTAINER INSULATED REC'ANGULAR ALUMINUM 9 GAL 58 58 934504 ELAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIAM-JEVISH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	l!	323797	DESK FIELD PLYWOOD 22 3/8 IN W 23 7/8 IN H 14 1/2 IN DP	114	12	L		
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934418 HEATER DUCT TYPE FORTABLE GASQLIME 230000 0TU 534427 PLAG GREVEA-CONV-RED-CROSS 8 MATTHE AMBULANCE 1 534407 PLAG GREVEA-CONV-RED-CROSS 8 MATTHE AMBULANCE 7 534409 FLAG GREVEA-CONV-RED-CROSS 8 MATTHE AMBULANCE 1 534409 FLAG HEATER SPACE (SAL OR OIL 23000 6TU 18 378 1H H 18 934572 FLAG HAT COLORS 51LK 20000 0TU 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3	احسا	224264	LELAG CHAPLAIN CHRISIIAN-JEWISH	L				
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334489 FIGATER SPACE (SAL OR OIL 35000 STU 18 378 1H H 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18		224412	HEATER DUCT TYPE FORTABLE GASOLINE 250000 BTU					
334489 FIGATER SPACE (SAL OR OIL 35000 STU 18 378 1H H 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18		334427	FLAG GENEVA-CONV-RED-CROSS BUNTING AMBULANCE AND MARKER		! !]	
934972 FLAG NAT: COLORS 51LK.		934489	LITERAL GOLDON BONISMO			 		
23427Z FLAG MAT COLUMN 5 51LK 33488 GOGGLES M-1940 320 191 3489 341492 34			HEATER SPACE COAL OR OLL 45000 BIO 18 5/8 IN H	1 10	4.			
334868 GUGGLES M-1746 200 191 341868 HEATER IMMERSION TYPE FOR CAN CORRUGATED 43 68 341868 HEATER MATER IMMERSION GAS OPERATED 7 7 7 342030 MATTOCK PICK S L8 MOMINAL SIZE N-36 IM LG MANOLE 62 63 4		724272	LELAG MATE COLORS SILK	 			 	
14 14 14 14 14 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 16			GUGGLES M-1744	400		l	. 1	i
341886 I HEATER MATER IMMERSION GAS OPERATED 342030 MATTOCK PICK 3 LB MOMINAL SIZE W-36 IN LG HANOLE 7 7 63			HEATER INMERSION TYPE FOR CAN CORRUGATED			i		
294030 MATTOCK PICK 3 LB MONIMAL SIZE W-30 IN LO MANULE 84 04			HEATER WATER INMERSION GAS OPERATED		1 4	l		Į.
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940. 840.	Line From Investor	ITEM DESCRIPTION	FULL 0786H0TI	STREETH TH	1796 -8- 07000010		POR VC3
			OTHERS NO.	8750000711	*******	-	
<u> </u>			 - ` - 				-
	- \$47923	KIT BARBER W/CARE ORGAN FOLDING SHAPLAINS					
	\$47405	PACKBOARD PLYMOOD	25	25			
	347925	PAD SHOULDER	146	45			
	\$48493 \$50828	PANEL MARKER GROUND BIGNAL TO ATROPAPT LOCKER BOX	1	29		 	
	552189	LUCKER BUA PAULIN DUCK OD 17 M 12 PT	ا ا	, i			
	9921+7	PAULIN DUCK CO 17 X 12 FT. PAULIN DUCK CO 40 X 20 F?	1	-			
	953623 953623	PERFORATOR PAPER DESK ADJUSTABLE 3 PUNCH 1/4 IN DIA PERFORATOR PAPER DESK NONADJUSTABLE 2 PUNCHES 2 3/4 IN CTOC	 }-				
	550717	RANGE OUTFIT FIELD SASOLINE M-1937	_22_	21_			
	959197	RANGE OUTFIT FIELD JASOLINE H-1937 REFLECTOR LIGHT FON GASOLINE LANTERN					
	\$39637 \$42002	OUTFIT OFFICERS MESS PANEL SET AP-30-C	 }			┝┈╢	
	942003	PANEL SZT AP-30-D	<u> </u>	i_			
-	562013	IRUKER WOOD METAL EDGE SINGLE EDGE 18 IN LA	3				
	563405	SAPE 28 IN H 17 IN W 17 1/2 IN DP SCREEN LATRINE DUCK FWHMA OLIVE DRAB W/COVER	13				
	343596	SEALER STL STRAP HNO DBL CRMP END JAW 9/8 IN W 0+010 TO 0+023			ļ		
	564933	THE STRAIGHT TRIMMERS SOLID STEEL A 4/8 IN CUTTING LG 9 IN LG	1 1	1 1		!!!	
	366301	SHEARS STRAIGHT TRIMMERS SOLID STEEL & 3/8 IN CUTTING LG 9 IN LG SLING FLAGSTAT WEBSING OLIVE DALS SHADE NO 7 SHOYEL HAND RD PT OPEN BACK O HANDLE 11 1/8 TO 12 1/2 IN BLADE	1 3	1			
	\$69801 \$70109	SHOVEL HAND RD PT OPEN BACK O HANDLE 11 1/2 TO 12 1/2 IN BLADE	100	155	h	├	
	\$70109 \$70461	STOVE GASOLINE BURNER 1 BURNER 5500 BTU STRAP QUICK RELEASE PACKED	<u> </u>			ł I	ļ
	570788	i ctostrum ct, cto wwo ovurp tavemim t/a im w n.not im two tipab	1 4		·		
	\$72044 \$74397	TABLE FOLDING LEGS WOOD SOLID TOP WOOD LEGS 28 L 24 W 87 28-F2 H TENT COMMAND POST COMP W/PINS AND POLES TENT COMMAND FOR MEDIUM COMP W/PINS AND POLES	18-				
	374029	TENT COMPAND POST COMP MYPINS AND POLES	- 1				
	374463	I TENT KITCHEN PLYPKOOP COMP W/PING AND PCLES	!	?		[
	\$74477 \$74550	TENT MAINTENANCE SMELTER COMP W/FRANT AND PINS TENT WALL SMALL PHWMR OLIVE DRAB COMPLETE W/PINS AND POLES	 -}	- }	 -	 i	
	977422	1 SCALE WEIGH PLAT FOLDING A AND N TYPE 300 LB CAP	ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ	<u>l</u> i	<u> </u>		
	578741	ITYPEWRITER PORTABLE ELITE W/CARRYING CASE	12	18			
—	383946	WHISTLE THUNDERER STAPLER PAPER FASTEN OFF TYPE LT DUTY	1-79-	74	 	!	
	396643	TYPENRITER NON PTBL 11 IN CARRIAGE	1-1-		ļ		
	398684	TYPENRITER NOW PIBL 14-15 IN CARRIAGE	,	,,,,	ì		
	 	SIGNAL ITEMS	 				
	603120	ANTENNA AY-339/PRC	 	-			
	603250	ANTENNA EQUIPMENT RC-292	14	14	L		
	604010	AXLE RL-27	36	20			
	609570	CHANNEL ALIGNMENT INDICATOR ID-292/PRC-4 CHARGER RADIAC DETECTOR PP-1978/PD	 	- 25		╌┤	
	609670	CHEST BC-S CIPHER MACHINE YSEC/KL-7	1 7	7	L	1	
	610280		1 - 1			[]	
	610284 611010	COIL C-161	1 24	- 24		1-1	
	411110	CONNECTING AND SAITCHING KIT MX-139/6T	1 31		<u> </u>		
ı	611280	CRYSTAL UNIT SET CK-6/PRC-6	1 15		ł		
	613150	DETECTOR SET AN/PRS=1	1				
	614378	DYNAMIC LOUDSPEAKER LS-166/U FREQUENCY METER AM/IRM-32	 }	-	 		
_	616820 618114	FREQUENCY HETER ANTORM-32 ENGINE GENERATOR SET PU-434/P	10	10		L	
	619410	MANDSET-MEADSET M-144/U	1-19-	14	1		
	527510 328135	MODIFICATION KIT MX-898/GR MULTIMETER AN/PRM-15	 		 		
	428119	MIR 7 METER AN/URN-109	<u>i</u>	i_	<u> </u>		
	628192	LITE TTE ETER MEAST/INNAMA	1	1 1	!]	
	634475	RADAR SET PORTABLE ANYPPS-A	1 - 1		 	 	
	A14A70_	I RADIACMETER IN-93/UD	1 11	1.11		 	
	434475	#4014CWETED 14-148/80	91	31	1		
_	639748	RADIO SET ANY ORC-T HTO IN TANK COMBAT FULL TRACKED LIGHT GUN TADIO SET ANY ORC-S HTO IN TANK COMBAT FULL TRACKED LIGHT GUN FARID SET ANY ORC-19 HTO IN THE 3/4 IDD FAREO	1 1	1	 		
L	440704	RADIO SET AN/GRC-19 MTD IN IRK 3/4 TON CARGO	∔ ∔-				
	441601	RADIO SCT AN/GRR-S MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON RADIO SET AN/GRR-S MTD IN TRK 3/# TON CARGO	1 1	1	L	L_	
	843500	I RADIO SET AN/PRC-6	90	99			
	441800	RADIO SET AN/PRC-10 RADIO SET AN/PRC-9 HTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	1 17 2	 - 11 -	 		
L	-449101	I BIDIO SET ANIVEC-10 NTO THE TRY 1/A TOM	ـ ندـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ			<u> </u>	
	649104	RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 HID IN TRE 3/4 TON CARGO RADIO SET AN/VRC-18 HID IN CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED RADIO SET AN/VRC-18 HID IN TRE 1/4 TON	1]]		
	649801	RADIO SET AM/VRC-18 MID IN TRK 1/4 TON	1-1		 	1-1	
<u></u>	449804	RADIO SET AN/YRC-18 HTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	<u> </u>	<u></u>			
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••	400000 1167	ITEM DESCRIPTION	7044 8145N91H	510F440			1000
-	650101	RADIO SET AN/VRO-3 4TD IN TRK 1/4 TON	21	21			
	650104	RADIO SET AN/VRO-3 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON CARGO RADIO SET AN/VRC-24 'TO IN TOK 1/4 TON	1	21 1	i	1	
i ~	657722 657722	RADIO TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/GRC-46 PEEL RL-39	1 2 27	27	•	l	
[-]	660060	REEL COUIPMENT CE-11 REEL UNIT RL-31	85	85	!		
	660945 663823	RETPANSMISSION CABLE KIT MK-126/G	12	12	i i	'	
	663695 667000	SHELTER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT S-144/G SHUNT INSTRUMENT MULTIRANGE MX-1471/U SOUND PANGING SET AN/THS-3	5	. 1	f 3		
	669160 672370	I cook on-a	110	110	1		
	672380 672390	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SH-993/GT SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SH-22/PT SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SH-26/P	13 9 2	2	•	i i	1
	676870 678260	! TELEPHONE TA-1/PT ! TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	79	79	ţ	1	
	680750 681690	TELETYPEHRITER SET AN/PGC-1 TERMINAL STRIP TM-184		i	Ī		
	683652	TEPMÍNAL TELEGRAPA-TELFPHONE ANTICC-14 TEST SET ELECTRICAL POWER TS-93A/U TEST SET ELECTRON TUBE TV-7/U	2	1	1	[i
	483665 488520	TEST SET ELECTRON TUBE 14-7/U TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-31 TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-41	156	,	<u>†</u> !	i i	
	689090 689090	TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-41 TOOL COUIPMENT TE-113 VIBRATOR PACY PP-68/U	1	•	· !		
	694790 698350	VIBRATOR PACE PP-68/U AIRE WD-1/TT ON SPOOL OR-8 1/4 MI LIRE WD-1/TT IN WIRE DISPENSER MX-306/G EA	12	12	!		
	698390 698400	LIRE WO-1/TI IN WIRE DISPENSER MX-300/G EA LIRE WO-1/TT RL-159/U WIRE PIKE MC-123	179 40	179	i		
	698470 898522	WIRE PIKE MC-129 WIRE REEL RL-159/U WIRE SPLICING (IT MC-336/G	18	18	İ		
	498535	· ·	16	15	•		
ļ	715773	TRANSPORTATION ITEMS			ł		
	715775 715775 747920	CHAIN ÁSSÝ SGL LEG W/PEAR LINKS AND 1 GRAB HÒX 9/8 IN BY 16 FT OR TLIFE PRESERVER YOKE GAS OR ORAL INFLATION W/NYLON ENVELOPE	12 17	12	í •		
ļ		DEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS	• '	•			
	943056	LAUNCHER AND GUIDANCE SET TRUCK MTÖ ANTITANK/ASSAULT MISSILE	,	,	Ì		
 -	_945780	SIMULATOR TRAINING ELECTRONIC \$55 ANTITANK/ASSAULT MISSILE	i,	ĺí			
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SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

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	649001	RADIO SEI AN/VRC-9 MID IN TRK 1/4 TON RADIO SEI AN/VRC-9 MID IN TRK 1/4 TON CARGO	11_	1_	l 1	ll	
	649004	RADIO SET ANIVEC-9 MID IN THE 3/4 TON CARGO	1 1				
	649101	RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 MTD IN IRK 1/4 TON	۱ ه	5	أ و ا	1)	
	649104	RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 MID IN IRK 1/4 TON RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 MID IN TRK 1/4 TON CARGO		1	1		
	449566	RADIO SET AN/VRC-15 MID IN CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED	į	ž	l ž		
	319801-	RADIO SET ANTURCEIS HTO IN TRK 174 TON				} }	
	650101	DADIO SET ANYUDO-1 NTO 'N TRY 1/A TON				1 1	
	- 50104	RADIO SET AN/VRO-3 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON RADIO SET AN/VRO-3 MTO IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	 {-		í		
	630104	RADIO SEI MAYANG-3 MIO IN IPA 3/4 JON	1 :		1 :	1 1	
	- 637222	RADIO SET AN/VRC-30 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON RADIO TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/GRC-46	{ -			{· !	
	931668	RADIO IEEEITPERKIIER SEI ANJONC-48	1 .:			f I	
	440000	REEL RL-39	1-12-	13		l - 1	
	860040	REEL EQUIPMENT CE-11	36	36	36	l I	
	440119	REEL UNIT AL-31	I		ļ		
	660943	RETRANSMISSION CABLE ATT MK-126/G	[2	[2	1 3	: 1	
		SOUND LOCATING SET GR-4 SPEICING KIT TELEPHONE CABLE TL-982/U	II_		11	ll	
	448120	SPLICING KIT TELEPHONE CABLE TL-582/U	1		7		
	. 449149	SPOOL DR-6	iA2_			L	
	672380	I SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SD-22/FT	1	4	1	[<u>-</u>	
	412390	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SB-46/P	L 1	L i	ii	t_ 1	
	676870	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SB-84/P	50	30	50	J — 1	
	\$20256	TELEPHONE SET TA-264/PT] 2	2	j 5	j 1	
	67826U	TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	67	67	67	T I	
	300:50	TELETYPLURITER SET AN/PGC-1]2	l i		1 1	
	401490	ICLETYPENRITER SET AN/PGC-1 TERMINAL STRIP TH-184	1			11	
	_491743	TERMINAL TELEGRAPH-TELEPHONE ANTICC-14	ź	l i	<u>i</u>	1 1	
-	667667	l test set electron lube lv-7/u	1		1	11	
	486520	TOOL EQUIPMENT IE-33			ei	1 1	
	688600	TOOL EQUIPHENT TE-33				11	
	498399	MIRE WD-1/IT IN WIRE DISPENSER MX-104/4	122	133	122	្រំ	
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	498470	MINE BIKE MC-153	1 1	ĭ	1 .) i	
		WIRE REEL RL-159/U				 	
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SECTION III - BOURNAINT

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		CHENICAL ITEMS					
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-	108193	DETECTOR KIT CHENICAL AGENT				_	
	124400	MASK PROTECTIVE FIELD			المددد		ł
	132600	PESPIRAYOR AIR FILTERING PAINT SPRAY	1427	2117	7676		
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		ENGINEER TYENS					
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l i	202373	AXE CHOPPING SINGLE BIY HANDLED 4 LB	111	117	111		1
	204980	SELT LINEHANS SAFETY LEATHER N-TO INCHES SAFETY STRAP SIZE 22	12		18		
	216925	CARPENTER EQUIPMENT SET NO 1 ENGINEER SQUAD	, ,	3))		İ
_	222752	COMPASS LENSATIC LUMINOUS DIAL INDUCTION DAMPED & DESPEE AND					
		20 NIL GRADUATIONS WITH SCALE WITH CASE	272	272	272		ł
	224980	DIVIDER DRAFTSHANS PROPORTIONAL 7 3/4 INCH WITH CARE		1			l
	224660	DRAFTING AND DUPLICATING EQUIPMENT SET NO 1	1	1	1		
L_	232020	FIRE DIRECTION SET ARTILLERY SET NO 4 16500 YO HAX RANGE	i	i	ا قــــــا	L	L
<u> </u>	232020 235152	GENERATOR SET ELECTRIC PIBL GAS DRVM SKID MID AIR COOLED DC					
1 1		28V 2 WIRE EQUIPPED FOR STARTING AT MINUS AS F 1.8 KM					
	234120	GLASS READING 3 INCH CASE		1			
,	229403	HATCHET AVE PATTERN HANDLED & N/A IN	1 1	1 1	ا ۽ ا	1 1	ĺ
	243840	HATCHET AND PATTERN HANDLED S 3/8 IN INTRENCHING EQUIPMENT SET NO 2 INFANTRY		1	·		
L I	249074	LIGHT SET GENERAL ILLUMINATION SET NO 2 1 1-2 KY COMMAND PORT		:	1	[ĺ
	249011	LIGHT SET GENERAL ILLUMINATION SET NO 2 1 1-2 MY COMMAND PORT		 -			
ŧ i		LIGHT SET GENERAL ILLUMINATION SET NO 3 3 KW	!		! <u>,</u> }!		:
}	230030	MACHETE 18 INCH M-1942 WITH PLASTIC SHEATH	 } -				
1 1		MATINA FINA MANULLY 7 LU	13	45	69		ĺ
	256040	PIONEER EQUIPMENT SET NO 1 ENGINEER SQUAD PIONEER EQUIPMENT SET NO 3 ENGINEER COMBAY PLAYDON					
ı 7	256120	PIONEER EQUIPMENT SET NO 3 ENGINEER COMBAT PLATOON	1 1	1	1	1	1
ليبا	257353	PLOTTING EQUIPMENT SET NO 1 COMMAND POST PROTRACTOR SEMICIRC PLASTIC MACHINE SUM 10 INCH DIA GRADUATEU			لقسيبا	ليبيا	
1	259890	PROTRACTOR SENICIRE PLASTIC HACHINE GUN 10 INCH DIA GRADUATED					
		HILS AND YAROS					L
	263560	REPRODUCTION EQUIPMENT SET NO 4 GELATIN PROCESS 22 X 33 INCH	1	1	1		
I	267630	SAW CHAIN PORTABLE GASOLINE DRIVEN SA INCH BLADE	š	i	L1		Ĺ
	268840	SCALE COORDINATE ALUMINUM SQUARE 1 TO 25000 AND 1 TO 50000 SCALE					
1		GRADUATED HETERS YOS	, ,		ا ما		
	269345	SCALE PLOTTING TRIANGULAR BOXWOOD 12 INCH LENGTH GRADUATED YDS					
ı	******	AND METERS 1 TO 25000 SCALE METERS 1 TO SOCOO AND 1 TO ASSOC	l l	Ī	1	l i	i
		CON HELENS IN CONTINUE PRICES IN SERVICE PRICES				_	
		SCALE INCHES AND CENTIMETERS	2	2	2) 1	i
}	272400	SHOVEL HAND GENERAL PURPOSE ROLMO POINT CPPN BACK BOLLED				$\overline{}$	
1		SHOULDER TUBULAR SHANK SIZE NO 2 D-HANDLE	1 757	117	121		ŧ.
	273400	STEREOSCOPE HAGNIFYING POCKET WITH LEATHER CASE STEROSCOPE SCAMBING 1-5x AND 4-8x MAGHIFICATION WITH BINGGULARS					·
1	275610	STEROSCOPE SCANNING 1-5% AND 4-5% MAGHIFICATION WITH BINOCULARS	i		1 -	1 }	i
		AND CASE					
1	279510	SURVEYING EQUIPMENT SET NO 18 ARTILLERY 4TH ORDER	1 1	1	1 1	1 1	i
	282705	TAPE HEASURING STL METRIC-US 100 FT 3/8 INCH WIDE 0-008 INCH. THICK GRADUATED ONE SIDE METERS DECIMETERS AND CENTIMETERS				_	
	I	THICK GRADUATED ONE SIDE METERS DECIMETERS AND CENTIMETERS		ì	ł	1 1	ĺ
L	L	OTHER SIDE FT 10THS AND 100THS W-CASE					
Γ	28613C	OTHER SIDE FT TOTHS AND TOOTHS M-CASE	3	3	2	I - 1	
L	286170	TOOL SET ELECTRIC PORTABLE SO CYCLE	11	i	I		
$\overline{}$	290579	TRIPCO RANGING POLE	2	-	2		i
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		MEDICAL ITEMS	1				
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	303130	BLANKET BET BED SHALL	-		•		
1 .	342000	INHALATOR SINGLE ONE MASK TYPE		1 5	1 3		i
_	344778	INHALATOR SINGLE ONE MASK TYPE LATRINE BOX PREFABRICATED PORTABLE M-2		·	•		
1	345980	FIGHT SUBGICAL BRACKET BORTANLE BATTERY APPRATED	1 1	, ;	1 :	i i	i
	347060	LIGHT SURGICAL BRACKET PORTABLE MATTERY SPENATED		11	10		
ŀ	349175	MENTER THETRIMENT AND CHARLE COT BESTSTAND SIZER		· "	* !	1	i
<u></u>		MEDICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET DISPENSARY PIELD MEDICAL SUPPLY SET FIELD SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPLIES	 }-		ļ ————————————————————————————————————		
1	349250	REVICAL BUFFLY DEI FIELD BUFFLERENTAL BUFFLIED	•		!	1	i
-	358450	RESUSCITATOR HAND OPERATED BELLOWS TYPE	 				
1	369400	SPLINT SET TELESCOPIC SPLINTS	1 1		•	1 1	i
	373790	STOVE GASOLINE BURNER TWO SURMER WITH HETAL CATE					
1	374250	SUPPORT LITTER FOLDING	1	, 1	} 2	,	i
	374293	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY AET COMMAT	 	 		ļ	
1	374298	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET INDIVIDUAL	91	29	31)]	1
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	1	CADNANCE ITEMS	I	1	(]	1 7	1
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	401076	BAYONET KNIFE W/SCABBARD CARBINE	406	401	404		
1		BAYONET KHIFE W/SCAPBARD RIPLE	Lisas	تنفيا	ا مُقَفِيا		L
	481247	AINOCULAR AX3G	130	197	138		
1	40/252	BINOCULAR 7X50	L			L!	L
	*S1313	BINGCULAR 7X50	\$1	31	31		
i	401811	CABINET SPARE PARTS & TYPE I HODEL 1940	1 %	L 7	T	i	i .
	281881	ZAPATRE CAL .30	195	140	199		
1	1 405226	CARRIED PERSONNEL PULL TRACKED	J ***				į
-	409225	CABINET SPARE PARIS S TYPE I MOREL 1940 CARBIER CAL 35 CARBIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED. CHAIN YOU 5/8 IN X 16 PY	1	1	- 6		
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March Color Colo	-	LIME			OUNTITY			PAR
March Color Colo		17200	ITEM DESCRIPTION	PULL	ERBUCTO .	117F '81		LOCAL
A				67861N)716	STREMETH	#19EM979		
1012 COMPANS 100 EQUIPMENT SET NO 5 EQUIP		i			•	•	"	
1012 COMPANS 100 EQUIPMENT SET NO 5 EQUIP								
13123 DRESCHILLEN SOUTHERS 180 1		408180	CIRCLE AIHING					
1		410959	COMPASS					
1			DEPOLITION EQUIPMENT SET NO 3 PROPERTY.				\vdash	
1			GAUGE CLIMBERS STEEL 2 1/8 IN WIDE 1 LEG 1 1/16 IN LONG 1 LEG	•	•	•	1	
A 1002 GUP MACHINE CAL 100 BOS 4191944		343/34	3/4 IN LONG 3 IN OPING 3 REFERENCE LINE MARKINGS					
A 1097 SUM MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS A 1721 AURITOR MACHINE CAL 30 DES MITTERS AURITOR MACHINE		417082	GUN MACHINE CAL .30 BRG M1919A4	11		11	lí	
A A A A A A A A A A		417097	GUN MACHINE CAL .30 BRG M1919A6					
1723 BURY SOURCEST PATE 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10		417112	GUN MACHINE CAL .50 BRG H2 HEAVY BARREL					
ACCORD LAUNCHER GRENAGE RIFLE 178			GUN TOMM SELF PROPELLED FULL TRACKED MISS	•	•	6		
A00000 LUNCKER ROCKET 2-3-1 INCH A02323 MORTAN 02-1 INCH ON MORTAN A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCH ON MORTAN A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCH ON MORTAN A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCH ON MORTAN A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCH ON MORTAN A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCH PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02333 MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02330 RIFLE LOS - MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02330 RIFLE LOS - MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02330 RIFLE LOS - MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02330 RIFLE LOS - MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02330 RIFLE LOS - MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02330 RIFLE LOS - MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE A02330 RIFLE LOS - MORTAN 02-1 INCK PROCESSAR / NO. 7 YOU AS TRUCE OF TR		417247	GUN SUBHACHIME CAL +45					
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123820 MOUNT RIPOR PROSTAL FOR THE POST ALL FOR THE POST AND FOR THE		- 151111	MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN CAL . 10 M2				_	
### ### ### ### ### ### ### ### ### ##			MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN CAL +50 MS	1				
### ### ### ### ### ### ### ### ### ##	-	425482	MOUNT TRUCK PEDESTAL FOR 3/4 TON 6X4 TRUCK					
### ### ##############################		425700	MOUNT TRUCK PEDESTAL FOR 1/4 TON 4X4 TRUCK					
0.39980 RIFLE AUTO CAL 320 860 M398A2 110			PISTOL AUTO CAL +45	194	174	194		
181610 RIFLE US CAL 370 SHIPPAS 1816			RIPLE 104-HM DH HOUNT	باببا			1	
0.00 0.00			MIPLE AUTO CAL +30 BRO MIVIBAZ					
443710 TABLE CAMPUT CLIPTON 2 433700 TELESCOPE CLIPTON CLIPTON 2 443700 TELESCOPE CLIPTON CL	_		BIFFE HE CAL AND ENTOPRE					
A49730 TABLE CRAPHICAL FIRTHON 3 3 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6			STRAPPING KIT STEEL STRAPPING HAND S/A X 0.825 IN STRAPPING	"	"i			
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494279 TOOL SET ARRORERS		449760	TELESCOPE BC	1	1	1		
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\$17040 TRAILER ANNUT IT TON 2-TON 2W 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3			TOOL SET ORGA MAINT 2ND ECH NO 2 COMMON	i	1			
\$17040 TRAILER ANNUT IT TON 2-TON 2W 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3			TOOL SET ORGH MAINT 2ND ECH NO 2 SUPPLEMENTAL	i_	i	i		
\$37190 TABLEE CARGO 3/7-TON 2W \$1		457040	TRAILER ANNULITION 2-TON ZW		2			
A37220 TRAILER CARGO 1/2-TON 2W 12 13 12 13 12 13 13 13			TRAILER SOO TO 1/4-TON 24					
### ### ### ### #### #### ############	i		TRAILER CARGO 3/4-TON 2W					
### ### ### ### #### #### ############			TRAILER CARGO 1 1/2-10M 2M	17				
SOUTH TOUCH CARRO 2 1/2 ION PAS LINE WW 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	- 1		TRILER IAM HAIRE A 1/4-TON EN		;		. 1	
SOUTH TOUCH CARRO 2 1/2 ION PAS LINE WW 10 10 10 10 10 10 10			TRUCK CARGO 3/4 TON 414	44		- 44		
40210 TRUCK CARGO 3-10M AYA LUB WW 40210 TRUCK CARGO 5-10M AYA LUB WW 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WRECKER 2 1/2-10M 6XA WW 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT			TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 6X6 LW6				1 1	
40210 TRUCK CARGO 3-10M AYA LUB WW 40210 TRUCK CARGO 5-10M AYA LUB WW 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WRECKER 2 1/2-10M 6XA WW 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT WR 401040 TRUCK LIGHT		440141	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 6X6 LWB WW	19	11	10		
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GATTO TRUCK UTILITY /4-TON AXA 32			TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6X6 LWB WY			2		
GATTO TRUCK UTILITY /4-TON AXA 32		441040	TRUCK LIGHT WRECKER 2 1/2-TON OXA WW					
A42220 WATCH STOP TYPE & CLAS 19 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3		441780	TRUCK SHOP YAM & 1/2-10M BAB	;				
A42220 WATCH STOP TYPE & CLAS 19 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3		-334/35	WAYCH GOTSY GRADE II	763				
QUARTERMASTER LITEMS			WATCH STOP TYPE B CLASS 19	!				
SOUTH SAME CANNAS WATER STREETING FOROUS COMPLETE WITH EUSPERSION 19 13 13 13 13 13 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15				1				
April			QUARTERMASTER LTEMS					
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30999 80% (A39) SHALL		303102	BURGE THE COALS STREET THE LAWAR COMPETE MILL CANDULATION	11	11	19		
30999 80% (A39) SHALL		600610	MOTTLE VACUUM 1 OY CAP YAPER SHAPE WIRATE BAR CUP	 2				
12474 SURPRE OIL STONE TEST GALV W/COVER 10 &AL 10 14 14 14 14 14 14 14			BOX CASH SHALL	l i	i	l il		
12474 SURPRE OIL STONE TEST GALV W/COVER 10 &AL 10 14 14 14 14 14 14 14		312271	BUCKET GEN PURPOSE METAL GALV HV WOT W/O LI TA BY	100	30			
\$1.4271 CAM CORR MEST CALV W/COVER 32 6AL 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68		512676	LAURNER OIL STOVE TENT	i				
SIASSS CAM GASOLINE S CAL CAP 220 225 226 227 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228		914208	CAM CORR NEST GALV W/COVER 10 BAL			14	7	
S19887 CAN MATER 3 9AL 298 216 259 216 259 216 259 216 259 251 2			CAN CORR HEST GALV W/COVER JZ BAL	 		·	$\vdash \vdash$	
1								
\$14455 CARAIRER WIRE CUTTER \$8 \$2 \$0			CANVAS BERAIR CIT	- ~~				
SIABLE CASE FLD OFF MACH 22 1/2 x 32 1/4 x 17 IN 3			CARRIER WIRE CUTTER	1 1		96		
SIABLE CASE FLD OFF MACH 22 1/2 x 32 1/4 x 17 IN 3		316765	CASE FLD OFF MACH 18 1/2 x 13 1/4 x 17 IN	T 7	1	1		
S17990 CHAIR FOLDING 13 15 15 15 15 15 15 15			CASE FLD OFF MACH 22 1/2 X 13 1/4 X 17 IN	1	نسا	ا فــــــا		
\$22445 CLOCK ALARM \$		\$17990	CHAIR FOLDING		11	13		
92428 CLOKE MESSAGE CENTER 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			CHEST HYMMAL HUSIC SOLTION FIBER		 !-			
924216 COMMISSARY QUIFIT FLD BREAMOONN 1		493466	LOINCH MESSAGE CENTER		1			
\$24460 CONTAINER FOOD INSULATED \$4		424314	COMMISSARY OUTFIT FLD SEEAVOOWN	† 	-			
925087 COOKSET HOUNTAIN 42 43 43 43 43			CONTAINER FOOD INSULATED					
\$39.791 COVER NATER CAN INSULATED 9 GAL CAP OF CAM	_	929087	COOKSET HOUNTAIN	43	43	43		
928982 DESK PIELD ROPTY PIELA COMPANY 928963 DESK PIELD H-1446 939701 PILE PAPER CLIP HOARD 9 IN WIDE 15 1/2 IN LONG 939504 PLAC CHAPLAIN CHRISTIAN-JEWISH 2 2 2		434291	COVER WATER CAN INSINATED & GAL CAP OF CAN	i				
933761 FILE PAPER CLIP BOARD Y IN WIDE IS 1/2 IN LORGE 930564 FLAS CHAPLAIN CHAISTIAN-JEWISH 3 2 2		926039	CUTTER WIRE	33		39	"	
933761 FILE PAPER CLIP BOARD Y IN WIDE IS 1/2 IN LORGE 930564 FLAS CHAPLAIN CHAISTIAN-JEWISH 3 2 2		235593	DEPT LIEP USIA LIBER ZONEWAY	 ,} -			⊢ ⊸l	
		724613	DEDE FIELD M'ITOT	•	1 17	'?'	1	
			TARE FOREN SEEF DOORN T IN HIVE AS ALE IN SINT	 			 	
		******	TOTA SIM BUILD SINISTING APRICAL	٠.	·	· · ·	, I	
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- Landard Control - Landard Co		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	 				
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SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

44	E MARE ITEM	ITEM DESCRIPTION		QUANTITY		-	PRA LOCAL
	******		PIAL STACHSTH	9154C68 918461H	States In		144
F							
	524355	FLAG COLOR ORGANIZATIONAL SILK					
	534427 534487	FLAG GENEVA-CONV-RED-CROSS BUNTING AMBULANCE AND MARKER FLAG GUIDON BUNTING	1	1	1 :	1 1	
	534572	FLAG NATE COLORS SILK	1	1	1		
	334809 334886	ELAG SET M-238 GOGGLES M-1944	150	146	150		
_	241945	HEATER INHERSION TYPE FOR CANS CORRUGATED		84			
	541670 541686	HEATER TENT GASOLINE 250090 BTU HEATER WATER IMMERSION GAS OPERATED		2		1 1	
	347055	KIT BARBER W/CASE	17				
-	549519 550803	LANTERN GASOLINE LEADED FUEL LOCK PAD BRASS 1 3/4 INCH			- 37		
_	550828	LOCKER BOX MACHINE DUPLICATING STENCIL FIELD KIT		1-1-		-	
	552230 559201	OUFFIT OFFICE'S MESS	i_		1 2	<u>. </u>	
	559637	OUTFIT OFFICE'S MESS	10	10	10		
-	362002	PAD SHOULDER PANEL SET AP-30-C	101	101	101		
	36200y	PANEL SET AP-30-D PANEL SIGNAL VS-17 GVX	32	20	- 32		
	562034 564318	PAULIN DUCK OD 40X20 FT	11_	1 :	1 1		
-1	564339 565171	PAULIN DUCK OD 17x12 FT PERFORATOR ADJUSTABLE 3 HOLE	11	1	11	[_]	
	565191	PERFORATOR NON-ADJUSTABLE 2-HOLE		1			
	- 572223 572224	RANGE FIELD A PACK RANGE FIELD B PACK	23	23	23	-	
_	573142	REFLECTING CONE GASOLINE LANTERN					
	575177 575711	RULER MAPLE BRASS EDGE 18 IN SAFE FIELD COMBINATION LOCK	_ 2	2	2	l	
	377422	SCALE WEIGH PLAT FOLDING A AND N TYPE 300 LB CAP	Ţ.		1		
	978130 579815	SCREEN LATRINE COMP W/PINS-POLES SHEARS OFFICE BANKERS 9 INCH	12		- 1	┝─┤	
	502727	SLING FLAG NEB OO STAPLER PAPER FASTEN OFF TYPE LT DUTY	<u></u>	<u>-</u>	 .		
1	309325	STANCE PAPER PASIEN OF TYPE ET BOTH STENCEL OUTFIT COMP METGURES AND LETTERS 1/2 IN AND 1 IN STOVE COOKING GASOLINE 1-BURNER WEASE	1 1	. 1	1	1 1	
	586908		4.9	*3	4.3		
	_58699 588697	STOVE TEMT TABLE CAMP FOLDING	13-	1 23	13		
	390200	TENT COMMAND POST COMP W/PINS-POLES TENT KITCHEN FLY PROOF LOMP W/PINS-POLES		بقنا	10		
	590265 590275	TENT MAINTENANCE SHELTER WIFRAME AND PINS		i	;		
	590635 595727	TENT WALL SMALL COMP W/PINS-POLES TUBE FLEXIDLE NOZZLE	148	163	149		
_	596643	TYPEWRITER NOW PIBL 11 IN CARRIAGE	7		7		
	396684 596788	TYPEWRITER NON PTBL 14-13 IN CARRIAGE TYPEWRITER PTBL W/CARRYING CASE	 	11	13		
_	398933	MMISTLE THUNDERER					
		SIGNAL ITEMS	l	Ì	1		
	400100						
	403120	ANTENNA AT-339/PRC ANTENNA EQUIPMENT RC-292				1	
	604010	AXLE RL-27 CHANNEL ALIGNMENT INDICATOR ID-202/PRC-8					
	409570	CHE, T BC-5		<u> </u>			
	610590	I CIPHER MACHINE TSEC/KL-7	,2	1,0	,:		
	611010	CLIMBERS LC-240/U		- 10	13		
	611130	CONNECTING AND SWITCHING KIT MX-199/01			- 23	 	
	\$12810	CRYSTAL UNIT SET CR-6/PRC-6 DETECTOR SET ANTPPS-3	1 4	<u> </u>	l •.	L	
- 7	613150	I DYNAMIC LOUDSPEAYER LS-144/U	10	7 2	18	} }	
	614990	EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD SB-187GT	10		10		
	- 616420 -	FLASHLIGHT NX-991/U FREQUENCY HETER AN/URM-32	202	101	- 202	 	
	419408	HANDSET-HEADSET H-81/U		ļ		 	
	628139	HODIFICATION KIT MX-898/GR HULTIMETER AN/PRH-15	<u>l</u>	1 1	1		L
	428193	NULTIMETER ME-77	1,2	1,3			
	434400 434430	RADIAC DETECTOR CHARGER PP-430/PD		1-12-	13	 	
	636901	RADIACHETER IM-93/UD RADIO SET AN/ARC-27 HTD IN TRK 1/4 TON			1		
	439648	RADIO SET AN/GRC-7 MTD IN TANK TANK GUN	i_	نـــا	<u>i</u>		
_	639748	RADIO SET ANGERC-B MID IN TARK TENY GUN RADIO SET ANGERC-19 MID IN TRK 3/G CON CARGO	1	1 - 3-	1		
	#41601	RADIO SEL ANJORC-17 MID IN TAX 374 UN CARGO RADIO SEL ANJORR-5 MID IN TAX 1/4 TON RADIO SEL ANJORR-5 MID IN TAX 3/4 TON CARGO	1 1	 	1-1	1	·
	41604	RADIO SET AN/GRR-5 HTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	46	36		 	ļ
	443701	RADIO SET AN/PRC-9 MID IN TRK 1/4 TON]	Ĺ
	43800	RADIO SET AN/PRC-10	42	42	42		
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
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
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┪	401088	BAYONET ENIFE WASCABBARD FOR TABZIM RIFLE BINOCULAR 6X30 MILITARY RETICLE	784	766	 	 	┢
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	401251 401258	BINOCULAR 7X50 W/O RETICLE BIPOD RIFLE 7.42MM	عوالم	30		L	L
٦	401519	BOARD PLOTTING AZIMUTH RANGING INFANTRY	15	15	_ _	Γ	
┥	411785	COMPASS HIL GRADUATIONS DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT SET EXPLOSIVE INITIATING ELEC-NON-ELEC	92		 	 	┢
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	414448	FIRE DIRECTION SET ARTILLERY 19000 METERS MAX RANGE GUIDANCE AND LAUNCHING STATION FERTAC-1	ـنــا		<u> </u>	L	L
٦	417112	GUM MACHINE CAL -50 BRG MYY BARREL FLER GUM MACHINE 7-82-MM LIGHTMEIGHT GENERAL PURPOSE	12	13		Γ	
-	437125 720470	LAUNCHER GRENADE 40-MM	1 - 33	85	 	$\overline{}$	╁
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4358110	RIFLE 90-MM	16		i	1 1	
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437250	SCALE GRAPHICAL FIRING FOR 4.2-INCH MORTAR	```	. "6	1	1	
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457110	IRALLER ANDHERIOUS CERGO 1/4 TON 2-WHEEL	1 ,5	1 34	•	1 1	
457190	TRAILER CARGO 3/4-TON 2-WHEEL	35	. 35		1 1	
457220	TRAILER CARGO 1 1/2-TON 2-WHEEL	1 :6	16		1 1	
457495	TRAILER TANK WATER 1 1/2-TON 2-WHEEL TRUCK AMBULANCE FROMT LIME 1/4-TON 4X4	1			ł I	
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532575	HEATER IMMERSION LIQUID FUEL FIRED 30 IN 16	5.2	22		1	
532940	INTRENCHING OUTFIT INFANTRY ENG SM-5-4-5180-511	1 1	î			
534385	FLAG COLOP ORGANIZATIONAL SILE	1 1	į		1 1	
536197	ISEND NATIONAL USA RATON WISKINGE 3 FT HOLS! 4 FT FCT	26	1 26			
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	414378	LOUDSPEAKER PERMANENT MAGNET LS-144/U ELECTRONIC TELETYPEWRITER SECURITY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KW-7			 		
	614450	FREQUENCY METER AN/URM-32	• •	1	1	1 1	
	618109	GENERATOR SET CASOLINE ENGINE PU \$32/PPS	4	4	 	1	
	419111	GENERATOR SET CASOLINE ENGINE PU 992/PPS GENERATOR SET GASOLINE ENGINE PU 422/U			<u> </u>	li	
	619410	HEADSET MICROPHONE H-144/U	20	20	!	1 1	
	634443	HULTIMETER ANJURN-105			 	├	
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	457124	RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	22	22	 	-	
	697222	RADIO TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/GRC-44		<u> </u>	1		
	660000	REELING MACHINE CABLE HAND RL-39	52	52		I I	ı – –
	440060	RADIO SEL CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39 RADIO TELETYPEMBITER SET, AN/GRC-34 REELING MACHINE CABLE HAND RL-39 REEL GUIPMENT CE-11			 	ļi	
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	672370	SHITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SB-PH9/GT SMITCHBOARD TELEPHONE NANUAL SB-22/PT	•	•	1	1 1	(
	672380	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SE-22/PT			 	 	
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	670260	TELEPHONE SET TA-912/PT	74	74	7		
	481470	TERMINAL BOARD TM-184 TEST SET AN/UPM-99			 	 	
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	674790	INVERTER YIBRATOR PP-66/U TEST_SET_RADIO_FREQUENCY_POWER_AN/URM-93	1	1	ļ		ı — —
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	478390	WIRE WD-1/TT ON DR-8 1/4 MI WIRE WD-1/TT MX 198/G	90	- 20	}	1. 1	i
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SECTION III - BOUTPMENT

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APPENDIX C

EVOLUTION OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION AND THE SPAN OF CONTROL

Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
American Revolution 1777	4 companies each with 40 or more men	4	160	Rifle battalions were formed. When the number of men in the regiment exceeded 160, battalions were formed with the senior captain as command- ing officer.
	4 companies each with less than 40 men	4	Less than 160	When the number of men in the regi- ment was less than 160 it was opera- ted as a battalion with the regimental commander as commanding officer, (von Steuben, "Regulations")
Post-Revolutionary Army Act of September 29, 1789	4 companies, each with 3 officers and 70 men	4 or 8	260 men 12 officers	The infantry regiment was authorized 8 companies, each consisting of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 60 privates.
Organization of the Legion of the United States Sections 2 and 3 of the Act of March 5, 1792				In combat the regiment was operated as an 8-company battalion, unless two 4-com- pany battalions were organized.
				This organization was based upon the Roman Legion and certain theories of Marshal Maurice de Saxe. The legion, commanded by a major general, was composed of four sublegions, each commanded by a brigagier general. Each sublegion was composed of an infantry battalion, a rifle battalion, a company of dragoons, and a company of srtillery.
	8 companies, each with 3 officers and 95 men	8	766 men 32 officers	The infantry battalion was composed of 8 companies armed with caliber .69 smooth-bore muskets.
	4 companies, each with 35 officers and 95 men	4	383 men 16 officera	The rifle battalion was composed of 4 companies armed with caliber .54 (or smaller) rifles and was employed as flank support for the infantry.
				The dragoons were mounted troops, trained to fight as cavalry when mounted, or as infamry when dismounted.
				The legion was dropped in the reorganization of 1796.
Organization of the Army Act of April 30, 1790	4 companies, each with 3 officers and 76 men	4	304 men 13 officers, including 1 major	The regiment was increased to 12 companies (3 battalions) with 3 majors as battalion commanders. This was the largest US regiment to date.
Organization of the Army March 3, 1791	4 companies, each wit 3 officers and 76 men	4	304 men 13 officers, including 1 major	
Organization of the Army April 12, 1808	10 companies, each with 4 officers and 78 men	10 or 8	390 men 20 officers	The infantry battalion did not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain.
				When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel.
Organization of the Army June 26, 1812	10 companies, each with 4 officers and 102 men	10 or 5	510 men 20 officers	The infantry battalion did not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain.
				When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a ()lonel.

Ristorical Period	Number of Companies	Spaz of Control	Strength	Remarks
Organization of the Army March 3, 1815	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 70 men	10 or 8	350 mea 15 officers	The infantry battalion did not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 compenies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain.
				When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel.
				This post-war reduction resulted in a total "peace" establishment of 10,000 men.
Organisation of the Army March 2, 1821	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 51 men	10 or 5	255 men 15 officers	The infantry battalion does not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain.
;				When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a cofonel.
				This reduction decreased company strength to the lowest ever authorized. It remained at this strength for 15 years.
Organisation of the Army July 5 - 7, 1888	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 89 men	10 or 5	440 men 15 officers	The infantry battalion does not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain.
				When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel.
				The Seminols War (1836-1842) necessitated the addition of 38 privates and 2 sergeants to each infantry company.
Organization of the Army May 13, 18, 19 and June 18 and 26, 1846	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 106 men	10 or 5	530 men 15 officers	The regiment and battrilion were the same. Of the 10 companies, 2 were designated as battsilion companies and 2 were assigned as flank companies. Composite battalions were formed for specific missions.
				During this period companies were designated by letters rather than by their captain's name. Flank companies were designated A and B, the battalion companies C through K.
				If required 2 hattalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain.
				When battalious were not formed, the intrary regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel.
				This was the infantry organization during the Muxican War (1846-1848). The caliber .69, amoothbore, findlock musket and the new caliber .54 percussion cap rifle, Model 1841 were the regulation infantry shoulder weapons.
Organization of the Army July 29 and August 3, 1361	8 companies, each with 100 men	8	800 men	This act provided for 10 regiments of infantry in the old army and 9 regiments in the new regular army. The regiments of the new army contained 3 battalions, 2 of which were used in the field and one was used as a depot or training unit.

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Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
Civil War 1861 - 1865	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 98 men	10 or 5	960 men 66 officers	The volunteer infantry regiments were raised by the States. They were organized as 10 company (battalion) regiments because the War Department believed that the new 3-battalion regiment was too complicated for the State-raised units. By the end of the war over 1,700 volunteer regiments had served. Each company contained 1 captain, 1 1st livuteant, 1 2d lieutenant, 1 1st sergoant, 4 pergeants, 8 corporals, 2 musicians, 1 wagoner, and 64-82 privates. The regiment had a lieutenant colonel and a major in addition to a colonel and it was possible to organize 2 battalions from the 10 companies, but this was, tactically, rarely done,
				When the war ended the new regular infantry regiments were organized as 10-company (battalion) units.
Organization of the Army June 16 and 23, 1874; March 2 and 3, 1875, and June 26, 1876.	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 48 men	10	484 men 30 officers	This regiment was one of the smallest ever authorized; company strength in the Indian Campaigns fell to as low as 37 men. There were no battallons.
Organization of the Army March 8, 1896 (Spanish-American War)	10 companies,	4	424 men 12 officers	As in the Civil War, the States were requested to furnish volunteer troops. In addition, 10 United States Volunteer (Non-State) regiments were formedfive negro and five white each authorized 992 enlisted men. These regiments were composed of men who were immune to trootcal diseases.
				Of the 10 companies authorized for each regi- ment, 8 were active and were divided into two 4-company battalions. The two inactive com- panies plus two new companies formed the third battalion, As early as 1890, the Socretary of War recommended adoption of a 3-battalion, 12- company regiment. A similar organization was established in 1790 but it was supplanted by the Organization of the Legion of the United States in 1792.
	ļ			Because of improvements it lirearms (dispersion), the proper span of control was thought to be 4 companies for 1 leader (a battalion commander).
] 		Hy March 1,839 companies contained 112 men and regiments 1,378. In the Philippines infantry rifle companies were
)		increased to 128 men in the non-regular volunteer units.
The National Defense Act of 1916	12 rifle companies and 1 machine- gun company	5		This act provided for 64 infantry regiments organized into 3 bettallons of 4 companies each. A regimental machinegun company was added to the regiment at this time.
				Four companies in a battailon plus an attached platoon of the machinegun company made one more leader in the span of control.
Tables of Organization, 1917 - 1918	4 rifle companies, each with 6 officers and 250 men	8	1,026 men 27 cfilcers	These tables were basically the foundation for the rille battalions of the World War I army, but they required adjustment to French and British combat experience.
		3		The brigade machinegin battalion of 3 companies and the division machinegin battalion of 4 companies (inter reduced to 2 motorized companies were formed as separate infantry units to support infantry rifle battalions, companies, and platoons.

Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
				Automatic rifles (BAR) were introduced at squad level.
				Because of the introduction of new weapons (the machinegin, trench mortar, hand and rifle grendee) and the defense doctrine of trench warfare with its need for manpower, the infantry rifle company was increased from 150 to 250 men and from 3 officers to 6. The insistence by General Perahing, Commanderin-Chief, American Expeditionary Force, upon open warfare and maneuver brought the battalion and smaller units into fire and movement tactice.
World War II (pre-Pearl Harbo.') Table of Organization, 7-15	3 rifls com- panies, 1 heavy weapons	4	904 men 28 officers	The battalion commander was now a lieutenant colonel. The tradition commander, the major, was second in command.
Infastry Battalion, Rifle 1 October 1940	company	į į		Machineguns and heavy mortars were now organically assigned to the heavy weapons company of the battalion.
				The rifle battalion had 24 vehicles.
Table of Organization, 7-25 Armored Infantry Battalion 1 March 1942	3 rifle com- panies, 1 battalion head- quarters and headquarters company	4	676 men 24 officers	This battalion was formed to furnish pro- tection and infantry support for the armored divisions. Although smaller in strength than the rifle battalion, it was a highly mobile unit mounted in half-track cars (M2 and M3) with armament.
				There were 4 self-propelled antitank guns and 12 towed smittank guns in each battalion. This type of battalion is an example of the specialized units created by the advances in weaponry and tactics.
Table of Organization, 7-15 Infantry Batislion 1 April 1942	3 rifle com- panies, 1 head- quarters com- pany, 1 heavy weapons com- tany	5	884 men 52 officers	This battalion with its groutly increased strength and the addition of the handguarters company reflect the trend toward better costrol and more personnel to absorb expected combat losses.
Table of Organization, 7-15 beauty Battalion 1 March 1943	3 rifle com- panies, 1 heavy weapons company	4	818 men 32 officers	The battalion headquarters company was dropped and the headquarters detachment reinstated by this TO. General McNair's policy of trimming all TO of "excess" units and personnel influenced this change. The detachment, as part of the headquarters, did not increase the span of control of the battalion commander.
Table of Organization, 7-15, Infantry Battalion February 26, 1944	3 rifle com- panizs, 1 heavy weapons com-	5	836 men 35 officers	The increase in strength was necessitated by prospective combat losses in the ground combat to be waged in Europe.
	pany, 1 head- quarters com- pany			The new 75mm recoilless rifles were added to the battalion in the new gun platoon of the battalion heavy weapons company.
Table of Organization, 7-15, infantry Battalion June 1, 1945	3 rifle com- panies, 1 heavy weapone com- pany, 1 head- quarters com- pany	5	977 men 37 officers	With General McNair's death in action, his austerity program was no longer a factor in organizat'onal policy. This organization of the largest infantry battalion during World War II indicates the deaire to attenghen the battalion because of the impending victory in Europe and the probable redeployment of units to the Pacific.
Post World War II - Pre-Korean War Period Table of Organization and Equipment, 7015N Industry Bettellon April 18, 1948	3 rifls com- panies, 1 heavy weepons com- pany, 1 head- quarters and headquarters company	5	883 men 34 officers	This post-war battalion reflected a reduction in personnel in an effort to return to peace-time unit attength and at the same time be capable of furnishing a base of fire, maneuver capabilities in all terrain and climates, limited antitank protection, and a force for seizing and holding terrain.
Pre-Korean War Period Reduction Table No. 7-15-N-20, TOE 7-1: Infantry Battalion June 27, 1949	3 rifle com- panies, 1 heavy weapons com- pany, 1 head- quarters and headquarters company	5	685 men 32 officers	This greatly reduced battalion was the result of post-war economies. Unfortunately, the Koros Police Action began in 1950 and these low-strength units were found to be inadequate to meet the demands of combat.

ilistorical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks			
Korean War Table of Organization, 7-15N, November 15, 1950	3 rifle com- panies, I heavy weapons com- pany, I head- quarters and headquarters company	5	Full strength 880 men 5 warrant officers 34 officers Reduced strength 685 men 5 warrant officers 32 officers	A full-strength and reduced-strength battalion was provided by this Table. The authorization for rapid expansion to meet combat requirements was a built-in feature of this organization which was at that time engaged in combat in Korea.			
The Peniomic Period Table of Organization and Equipment, 7-11D Battle Group 1 February 1960	4 rifle com- panies, (5 in the Pentomic Air- borne Battle Group) 1 headquarters company 1 mortar battery (4.2-in)		1286 men 3 warrant officers 67 officers	Reorganization Objective, Current Infantry Division (ROCID). This organization simmated the regiment in favor of the battle group. The battle group was smaller than the regiment but larger than the battalion. The commanding officer was a colonel. "It was designed for sustained combat opera- tions either alone or in combination with one or more battle groups. Individual and crew- served weapons were replaced by improved models that increased firepower, decreased weight, and simplified operation and mainten- ance." (Pizer). Among the weapons replaced were the M-1 and the Browning automatic rifie. The addition of the mortar battery, which was staffed with artilicry personnel, made the battle group similar to the regimental combat team of World War II and Korea. The organization of fire teams in the infantry rifie squad was also a feature of the battle group. The battle group was considered "not big enough" (Weigley). For this reason the Army almost returned to the triangular division organization of World War II and Korea.			
Table of Organization and Equipment, 7-15E Infantry Battalion, Infantry Division 15 July 1963	I headquarters company, 3 rifle companies	4	792 men 2 warrant officers 37 officers	The Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) was organized and tested during the 1962 to 1964 period. Four types of divisions were organized under ROAD infantry, armored, airborne, mechanized, and airmobile. These divisions are currently suthorized by TOF. The ROAD infantry battalion (maneuver) was organized as an integral part of the division structure (see Note). The battalion and brigade were restored to the infantry division, but the regiment was not. The basic structure of the ROAD division is headquarters and headquarters company aviation battalion cngineer battalion armored cavalry squadron support command military police company signal battalion brigade headquarters and headquarters comoany division artillery tank battalion infantry battalion infantry battalion			

Note

The number of maneuver (infantry) battalions may vary. They are assigned or attached to division headquarters (brigade headquarters structure). Although in practice division structures vary, examples of representative mixture of maneuver battalions can be approximated for each type division. For example, an infantry division might have eight infantry battalions and two tank battalions, an armored division might contain six tank battalions and five mechanized (infantry) battalions, a mechanized (infantry) division might have seven mechanized (infantry) battalions and three tank battalions; and an airborne division might include nine airborne (infantry) battalions and one tank battalion.

The new airmobile division is heavy with cavalry battalions (infantry). Three of these -- one brigade -- are parachute-qualified. However, there is no fixed normal or standard mix of maneuver battalions for POAD divisions.

The airborne division has a strength of approximately 13,500, the other divisions have a strength in excess of 15,000.

SOURCES: See "Sources," p 184.

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APPENDI : D

THE SPAN OF CONTROL: ROCID AND ROAD DIVISIONS

The ROCID division actually added more subordinate units, or commands, to the division commander's span of control. In combat, the divisional brigade provided by ROCID contained a two-battle-group task force commanded by the assistant division commander (ADC). The division commander's span of control consisted of seven units: the brigade, three battle groups, the armor battalion, the cavalry squadron, and the artillery. In practice, the ADC was directly under the division commander. If the brigade was not used, the ADC was relieved of active control of a maneuver unit. Hence, the division commander's span of control, in that case, would be eight units.

The ROAD concept reduced the division commander's span of control from eight to five units. This was an achievement in assuring stronger and more effective unit control. In 1962, the ROAD organization consisted of three brigade headquarters, an armored cavalry squadron, and division artillery.

In 1964, under the provisions of TOE 7E, the ROAD Infantry Division consisted of the following units and personnel:

		Warrant Officers - 132 Enlisted - 14,488			
ннс	Engr Bn	MP Co	Avn Bn		
0-42	0 –44	0-9	0-45		
E-95	E-896	E-179	E-250		
	W-2	W-1	W-23		
Sig Bn	Div Arty	Bde HHC (3)			
0-24	0-191	0-23			
E-547	E-2308	E-94			
W-4	W-17	W-6			
Armd Cav Sqdn	Spt Comd**	Tank Bn	Inf Bn* (8)		
E-749	0-141	0-34	0-37		
0-45	E-1778	E-538	E-792		
W-22	W-23	W-3	W-2		

^{*}Number of battalions shown represent a type division only. Compositions of divisions may vary.

^{**}The support commander's responsibilities to the administration company are limited to tactical, security, and movement aspect.

Principles of Organization

All military organizations are designed to perform an anticipated mission. The requirements of the mission determine the number of men and the type of equipment which the unit must possess. To effectively direct the efforts of the various groupings of men and equipment toward the accomplishment of the mission, a command or control structure is necessary. Essentially then, there are two basic principles which must be considered in developing any organization regardless of the mission. These are the principles of Mission and Control.

Mission

In providing a unit with the necessary means to accomplish its mission, care must be exercised to insure that the following factors are considered:

- Economy. Only the personnel and equipment normally required in performance of the mission should be organic to the unit. Equipment not used on a day-to-day basis should be pooled at the highest echelon practical and requested by the using units as needed.
- Simplicity. The simplest weapon is the fist or a club. An army organized and equipped in this manner however, would be short-lived on the battlefield of today. Simplicity must be tempered with consideration of the other factors affecting organization, such as a weapons system, that will insure success on the battlefield.
- Flexibility. Infantry units must be capable of a wide variety of operations, with or without nuclear weapons support, and in any type of terrain, weather, or situation. Consequently, the organizational structure of these units must be one that will facilitate the formation of combat groupings or task forces containing the necessary elements to accomplish the essential functions of finding, fixing, fighting, and finishing the enemy. Infantry units have this flexibility to a high degree and are capable of receiving and directing the operations of attachments and coordinating the efforts of reinforcing units.

Control

The organization must have an effective command and control system. In developing a control system for a unit, the following factors must be considered:

 Unity of Command. This factor expresses the need within a command structure of having one and only one commander. The commander is responsible for everything which his unit does or fails to do. At each level of command, responsibility must be matched by corresponding authority which enables the commander to carry out his responsibilities.

- Span of Control. By definition, span of control is the number of immediate subordinates one commander or leader can effectively control, supervise, or direct. Maximum and minimum limits of span of control vary with the conditions under which the unit is designed to operate and the complexity of functions performed. In a unit, for example, composed of identical elements each performing the same function, the span of control should be greater than in a similar size unit composed of different type elements each with a different function. Other factors affecting span of control are: freedom of movement, communication facilities, and staff and command assistants available to the commander.
- Chain of Command. Chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. It is the factor which enables the commander to retain unity of command of all elements of his unit without exceeding the maximum practical span of control. The commander has overall responsibility for the actions of all elements of his unit. If he directly commanded the actions of all elements however, his span of control would be excessive. By using a chain of command he can limit the number of subordinates that he directly supervises. In the Infantry Division Infantry Battalion, for example, the battalion commander assigns tasks to his unit commanders and holds them responsible for the successful execution of such tasks. Unit commanders employ the same procedure with platoon leaders, and platoon leaders with squad and section leaders.

Source: <u>Infantry Reference Data, ROAD</u>, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, February 1964.

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The infantry battalion has evolved over years; its American ancestors may be for the American Revolution. The modern in States Army began in the period just priod was forged and tested on the battlefields of Nuclear weapons, the Korean War, and the siderable influence on the size, composited day infantry battalion. The adaptation of division organization to the ROAD division of the United States Army the highest fire ever possessed in our military history, its application to troop carrier and fire sinfantry battalion to become highly air moderns.	und in the units nfantry battalio or to World Wa of Europe and he Cold War ha tion, and weapo the World War on has given the and movemen The advent of support mission	s organized on in the Unit of the Paciave exerted onry of the roll armore infantry in capabilit the helicop	d during nited battalion ific Area. d con- present- ed battalion ty it has poter and		

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Security Classification	LIN	LINKA		LINK B		LINKC	
KEY WORDS	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	
battalion	j	[.					
infantry]						
company			[.				
rifle		ļ					
command		1	ļ				
control				•			
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